Two Days Waiting Death

Evening Star, Issue 19782, 4 February 1928, Page 17

Two Days Waiting Death

Vain Attempts at Rescue

[From our own Correspondent.J

SAN FRANCISCO. January 6,

Some of the American newspapers ' have been unsparing in their criticism of the operations of the naval craft concerned in the lamentable tragedy of the ramming of the United States submarine S 4, off Provincetown, and the utter helplessness of , naval' vessels in the vicinity to rescue the imprisoned men in the sunken submarine, so near the shore, in but 200 ft of water. The blunt charge that the Navy Department “crucified” the crew of the submarine S 4 by its “cruel indiffer- - once ” to their fates was made in a letter received in Washington from Mr and Mrs John M. Jones, of Hennessey, Oklahoma, parents of Lieutenant-com-mander Roy K. Jones, who commanded the ill-fated craft. The letter was written to Representative M'Clintic (Democrac), of Oklahoma, and was the bitterest attack yet made on the navy’s alleged responsibility for failure to rescue the crew of the sunken submarine. It said, in part: “ We were first advised of the disaster by the Press, and not until four hours after we had wired the department did we hear a word roni them. Mrs Jones and I kept the vigil for six days, waiting for some word of encouragement 1 from Washington, only to be rewarded with a statement from the Secretary that ‘the S 4 ivould probably not be raised before spring.’ “ We both feel that the Navy Department has crucified our dear boy and his comrades, and the cruel indifference which it has shown these poor boys who died in the service of their country is inhuman and without a precedent. Mrs Jones and myself both commend you for the stand you have taken, and pray yon may be successful in causing this ship to be raised immediately.” Responding to this criticism, Mr Wilbur, Secretary of the Navy, denied that he had informed Mr and Mrs Jones that the submarine would probably not be raised before spring, pointing out that every effort was being made to raise the craft immediately. He added: “The navy did not have the address of Mr and Mrs Jones, and did not learn it until Mr Jones wired the Navy Department for information about his son.” LEGISLATORS’ CRITICISM Tne.Navy Department was severely criticised by Representative Griffin (Democrat), of New York, for failure to provide safety appliances for submarines and facilities for raising sunken submarines. Such devices and facilities,

he said, have been used successfully for years by foreign nations. He proposed three measures of safety ■which, he said, he would recommend to the House Naval Affairs Committee in behalf of his resolution for investigation of the S 4 disaster. The New York member has made a study of the submarine question, and two years ago characterised the United States submarines as “ floating coffins ” in a speech in the House at Washington, following the Sol disaster. His three proposals were:—(l) Telephone buoys, such as used by Germany. (2) Grappling rings on submarines, with which German undersea craft are equipped. (3) Especially constructed salvage vessels, such as, he said, were employed by Germany, Italy, andFrance. Had. the United States Navy possessed these safeguards, he said, the six men who were alive after the S 4 went down could have been rescued. “Sending men down in submarines without safety precautions is the most refined form of human cruelty,” Representative Griffin declared. “Every citizen w r ho has any heart or sympathy ought to pray Congress to adopt safeguards for the future. The Navy Department sends up a request for 800,000,000dol for additional vessels. Why cannot it do something to protect human life? The navy should have taken these precautions a long time ago. I want a thorough investigation to satisfy Congress of the real situation, and then T want legislation to correct it. The first safety precaution is the telephone buoy, a simple instrument which is set loose from a sunken submarine when the vessel has an accident and goes down. It bobs' around and attracts the attention of passing boats. It is opened, and a telephone is found inside whereby the men inside not only can tell their plight, but also give their exact location. This is not a dream. It is in actual use in Germany. This device was used when the submarine U 3 went down in Kiel Harbor in January, 1911. This brings us to the second device, grappling rings on submarines. An investigation of Secretary Wilbur’s administration of the navy -was demanded in a 'resolution introduced in the House of Washington by Representative Loring Black, of New York City. Citing recent disasters to naval vessels and criticism of.alleged inefficiency by high naval Representative Black said that Congress ought to inquire whether these things were mere isolated accidents or the result of a policy which had led to deterioration and weakening of America’s sea power. He pointed out that within a comparatively short period - one* battleship, five destroyers, three submarines, and one aeroplane carrier had figured in serious accidents. - William Philip Simms, a noted American yrax. correspondent, who has made

American Submarine Tragedy

a study of naval affairs, has asked from Washington: “What has become of the listening gear about which we heard so much during the war ? , The commander of the submarine, we are told, while far below the surface, could hear and locate other vessels as they cams and went. Was the S 4 so equipped? If not, why not? And if yes, then it would be very useful to find out why the gear failed. Something is wrong somewhere, and most likely among the higher-ups, since the lower grades have little to say in matters of this kind.” While all this criticism was being hurled at the powers that be at Washington, the Human Research Corporation or Philadelphia presented to the United Stafcs Government, through Secretary Wilbur, the invention of a device whereby a submerged submarine is capable of signalling to the surface. Adoption of the device, it was declared, would avert accidents similar to that which had sent the S 4 to the bottom with the loss of all on board. MESSAGES FROM THE DEPTHS A vivid and heart-rending picture of what transpired in the torpedo room of the sunken S 4 during the two days and nights, and six trapped men sat in darkness, foul air, and penetrating cold at the bottom of the sea, while the single officer alive tapped messages on the hull of the diver, waS 1 revealed also when the log signals sent from the submarine were made public by the Navy Department. The log signals disclosed that from the very start the six imprisoned seamen were confronted, not only with the desperate problem of a decreasing air supply, but also with rising water in the torpedo compartment. Among the first messages they sent was one saying that water was 18in deep within their narrow chamber, and rising slowly. Navy officers expressed the opinion that this might have been the ultimate cause of their death. The message log showed how communication was established with the trapped men. As soon as it was determined that there was life on board the submerged vessel a system of signalling by knocks was devised._ They were told to answer “Yes” with three taps, “No” with five, and “I don’t know ” with seven. The first question, asked at 5 p.m., on Sunday, December R 3, was “Is the control room flooded?” Seven taps, came in reply. “Is water in torpedo room?” Three taps was the answer.

“Are you in the torpedo room?” Again three taps. This**system worked out so well that it was thought Lieutenant Graham Fitch, the S 4 torpedo officer, must be one of the men in the torpedo chamber, and that a better mode of communication could be worked out by using the international code with which Fitch was familiar. ,

There followed plaintive inquiries as to the progress of tho rescue workers, always accompanied by a plea for haste. The men on tho S 4 were kept advised of every hope. An intermittent conversation was kept up, in tho hope that the time might pass more easily for the imprisoned sailors if they ecu Id be kept concentrating on the signals.

“Is water still coming in?” Fitch was asked at 11.51 p.m, on Sunday. “Slow. Hurry.” ‘ 4 We are working as fast as possible. Have you any light?” “We have no light, the air is very bad.” At 9.38 a.m., Monday, the men asked that an effort be made to send them an oxygen bottle, and it was at this time that the S 8 began to have difficulty in reception.

A few hours later the S 8 told the entombed men that cranes were on the way from New York, and asked: “Will air last until to-night?” “It will last until 6 to-night,” -was the tapped reply.

From the torpedo room at 2 p.m. on Monday came the query: “Is there any hope?” and the men were quickly assured: “ There is hope. Everything possible is being done.” Faint - tappings were heard by the S 8 during Tuesday, and at 4.30 p.m. it received a three-tap “Yes” to an inquiry whether the men on the S 4 were “ 0.K.” At 6.30 p.m. on Tuesday, more than seventy-two hours after the submarine was rammed and sunk by the Paulding, the S 8 heard “ taps at random.” Then nothing more was heard from inside the sunken submarine.

To save the entire crew of forty of the sunken submarine, rather than to provide six men in the torpedo room with a little air, was the first effort of the navy salvage fleet. Answering questions as to why the rescuers first did not attempt to send air to the men known to be alive rather than blow out the ballast tank, Commander Ellsberg told the Naval Court of Inquiry that it was thought wiser to try to save the entire crew rather than relieve six men who were apparently in good condition. Ellsberg gave the court a picture of the efforts made by the salvage fleet in the face of gales and cold weather. Ter this narrative was added a discourse on safety devices, which concluded with the statement that the submarines of the United States navy had as many of these as similar vessels in any other, navy* |