WHY THESE BATTLESHIPS?

Evening Star, Issue 19662, 15 September 1927, Page 15

WHY THESE BATTLESHIPS?

VARIOUS VIEWS ON DISARMAMENT “I submit broadly that the United States could fight a war of some duration without receiving a single cargo from overseas. We, if our ocean highways were closed, might be starving in a month, while our dominions would suffer cruel losses. _ Such a difference of conditions is fundamental.”—Lord Sydenham, in ‘ The Times.’

“It was obvious to us before the war that if the United States —tho richest, the most powerful, and most self-contained country in the world—desired to build the biggest avy they could do it,” said Viscount Grey in a recent speech. ‘‘lf that was true before tho war, it is at least as true now. With Europe exhausted by the Great War, the United States is the most prosperous country in the world. I would therefore say this: That it tho principle has been laid down, and equality between the United States and the British navies is to lead to ill-focl-ing and tho measuring of strength between the two, I would rather go back to tho old plan and say to the United States: ‘We must build a navy of a certain size to protect British interests and British trade routes, and especially trade routes between the Cape and Australia. which the United States docs not for a moment threaten, and if you choose to build a larger navy and think it necessary for your interests _we arc not going to enter into competition.’ ” “ Every naval expert in tho world knows that our whole naval problem is incomparably more difficult and complicated in itself than that of America, and never can bo otherwise,” writes Mr Garvin in the ‘Observer.’ “Fair minds in the United States know this. They know what is our European position while France and Italy stand out of fbe conference and submarines multiply. “If America in the end wants full naval supremacy she must have it. Her advantage is such that the thing is there for her to take when she chooses. This country would not lose a night’s sleep over it. We would run no more risk than we do now in assuming that war is impossible and unthinkable between the two English-speaking countries. But they have a wider responsibility than that. If while saying that neither desires ‘ supremacy ’ they cannot agree on the meaning of ‘ equality, - ' they will kill tho general cause of disarmament.” “The British Government and the British people are prepared to welcome Anglo-American parity in sea power so long as it is not translated and applied in ways that will diminish our margin of security,” says the ‘Sunday Times.’ “ But that reservation for a country like ours, which could not maintain itself for three months if its overseas supply of foodstuffs and raw materials wore cut off, is absolutely vital.” “Mr Bridgeman asked for a frank discussion of the vital naval needs of each Power. British needs have been explained N ; n detail, but the nature of American needs is still left obscure,” states ‘The Times.’ “There has been an immense amount of talk about ratios and guns and tonnage,' but no attempt has been made to provide an agreed answer to the simple question: What are all these battleships, cruisers, and destroyers for ? “The vague answer is defence. But against whom or what? In tho background of all'these naval discussions lurks the idea, of a potential enemy. Who is he? These three greatest sea Powers of the world have at any rate modified tho conception of the potential enemy in relation to each other, since they have met on tho assumption that it is desirable not to build against each other indefinitely, find that a great common interest would ho served by an agreed limitation of.tbcir naval forces. “Yet tho spectre is not wholly banned. The failure to prepare for the conference by confidential consultation and the avoidance of the real issue during the conference itself show that the full implications of the method of limitation of naval armaments by agreement have not yet been accepted by all the participating Powers. The idea of naval rivalry persists even in the discussions on limitation. War between Great Britain and the United States is, of course, unthinkable, and war between Great Britain and Japan or between Japan and America is highly improbable. “The German navy has disappeared, and there is little prospect of a formidable navy appearing in any other part of the world in the near future. In these circumstances much might have resulted from the frank discussion suggested by Mr Bridgeman about what all the ships are for. “ Let us take as a test the debate on cruisers, so far ns it has been revealed to us,” remarks the ‘ Westminster Gazette.’ “The United States has made a proposal that the total tonnage for cruisers should be 400,000 tons, and since the British figure had been brought down to 460,000 tons, this seemed to bring agreement within sight. But at this point the United States intimated that she would probably absorb 250,000 of the permitted tonnage in building twenty-five cruisers of 10,000 ton%, to which our experts replied that we should be compelled to do the same at great cost, and that the balance of permitted tonnage would be altogether too little for the needs of our Empire.

“ So far from getting relief out of this formula, wo should need a great now programme of big cruiser construction, and at tho same time have to scrap a largo numhy of small cruisers which wo think essential. Now, this is obviously a good answer if we arc thinking of the "United States as a rival and potential enemy, hut it is no answer if we decide, to ‘ leave her out of account.’ In the latter case wo say to her: ‘You build according lo your necessities, and wo will continue to build according to ours.' On the theory that war between the two Powers is 1 unthinkable ’ or an ‘ offence against humanity,’ it cannot or ought not to matter how either uses its liberty to build, whereas on tho ordinary European theory of competing armaments it is, of course, vital. “Wo take this as the test case of the argument which has been going forward at Geneva. It is evident that the experts do not, and very doubtful whether their Governments do, accept Lord Grey’s propositions. The experts of the United States evidently cherish the ambition of having the biggest navy, for the sake of having it; the British still feel the necessity of building up to the United States, if she starts a new type of cruiser. “ There is no solution of the problem on these lines; at tho end of everything there remains the fact that the United States can outbuild us, if she chooses, but that if she does so as the result of a breakdown at Geneva she will do it in the least fortunate way for both of us and for the general cause of disarmament in the world. We feel confident that there will be enough good sense on both sides to avert these consequences.” Sir Austen Chamberlain, in the debate on the Foreign Office vote in the House of Commons, said; “ Our delegation went out there with a carcfully-thought-out plan for the further limitation of naval armaments, and the efficacy and extent of tho proposals which we prepared to lay before the conference may be measured, perhaps, by this single fact: that for years to como they would mean a reduction, adopted by others following the same example, on the naval expenditure which wc would otherwise have to incur of a sum nearer £50,000,000 than £40,000.000. “To my mind and lo the mind of our Government, tho question of total tonnage is by itself insignificant, and a

check armaments or to secure further limitation. Unless some further limitations are to be put upon the number of ships which have the most aggressive character, which are the accompaniments and parts of the great fleets, then the mere total limitation of tonnage would lead not to a reduction of naval competition, and not to a reduction of expenditure, but would involve all the parties in still further extension and still further expenditure. “I cannot believe that, when the proposals of His Majesty’s Government, which mean a great deal, are fairly before the country, when it is possible fairly to put before the country both our own proposals and tbe proposals of foreign countries, there will be any doubt as to their reasonable character, or as to the sincerity of His Majesty’s Government in seeking to derive the greatest possible relief for our people, and the other peoples associated with us, in that conference called through tho initiative of President Coolidge. “It is unthinkable to us that we should enter into competition with the United States of America in a new race of armaments. We do not attempt to suggest, without criticism or objection from us, that in any class of vessel they are not entitled to the parity that their needs require.

“For our part, we seek onty’ to secure the special protection which is vital to an Empire so peculiarly situated as ours, on the lowest scale that we can arrange with other naval Powers, so that all our burdens and efforts may bo lightened, and that the menace of war, if there be a menace of war, with big armaments may be removed. We must recognise, and I am sure that others will recognise, the difference between an Empire such as ours, which is scattered over every sea and divided by’wide oceans, and the position of empires which are practically self-contained, and whose communications in war would bo unmenaced even although they were engaged in a great struggle. “Wo in this country not merely desire trade as others desire it, not merely desire protection as others desire it, but we, whose supplies are only sufficient for seven weeks’ consumption, and our people, have to think how we could live, not how we should starve, if our sea communications were interrupted. These are obvious considerations. They aije considerations to which others, I am sure, will give due weight. “We base our whole foreign policy on support of the League, and appeal to the League in the last re’sort, and the purpose of all this policy is to secure peace not only for ourselves, but for the world.”