The Evening Star MONDAY, DECEMBER 18, 1876.

Evening Star, Issue 4309, 18 December 1876, Page 2

The Evening Star MONDAY, DECEMBER 18, 1876.

In considering what is the best method of reconstructing the Legislative Couneil the question presents itself on the threshold—ls there any need for a second Chamber at all ? Tbafc question has, indeed, been ©ften and leex-ncdly discussed by competent authorities, who have, for the. most part, reached the conclusion that a parliamentary system is incomplete without a second Chamber; but since a small party in this Colony, which is represented in the General Assembly, is of opinion that an Upper House is superfluous, if not a real evil, the subject eannot well be passed by. The advocates of the unicameral system take their stand mainly upon the idea of the unity of power. They urge that, inasmuch as in a democratic form of government the ultimate power rests with the people at large, and the people is directly represented in the Lower House, it is merely introducing ao element of con-, fusipn into the Government to clog the free action of that House by making the concurrence of another body, not deriving its authority from the popular will, necessary to validate its legislative measures. The practical objection is also taken that, while in a Constitution like that of New Zealand, the Legislative Council is nominally superior to the House of Representatives, and supposed to possess full liberty of rejecting any measure passed by the latter of which it disapproves ; yet in point of fact, whenever the pinch comes the community expects the Council to give way and let the Lower House do as it pleases ; so that, in reality, the Council is not an effective check upon the Lower House, and it is but an idle farce to maintain it for such a purpose. Is is further shown that the most powerful second Chamber in the empire the House of Lords—a body, too, aristocratic in itself, and expressly representing an aristocracy, is like its inferior copies, compelled to bow to the popular will at the supreme moment, and with all its inherent strength, can do n« more than stay the progress of the torrent for a time. It is best to leave the House of Lords out of account, since, as we have said, it is an essentially aristocratic body, and is one of the estates ef a Constitution which is certainly not based upon a democratic foundation ; whereas the Legislative Council of New Zealaud is not, and was never intended to be, an aristocratic body, and the Constitution, of which 4 it forms a part, does rest upon a democratic basis. The two cases are not parallel. The fallacy which lies at the bottom of the arguments of the advocates of a single chamber in this Colony is that a democratic and a republican form of Government are one and the same thing. We take it that there is as much difference between the two as there is between an aristocratic and a democratic form of Government. A democracy means a fair distribution of political power amongst all rauks of the community, gnd, a3 proved by the Colo nial system of Great Britain, may >ubsiat as an integral part an empire, of which the Supreme He;id is & monarch. In this respect it differs widely from a republic in which even the chief magistrate is the creature of the people, and every branch of Go-' vernment frs dependent upon their dictum. A single Chamber, therefore, seems theoretically to be the kind of Parliament suitable for a republic ; and modern republics have consequently always shown a tendency to drift m this direction. England did so during ihe days of the Commonwealth ; and France and Spain, in their multitudinous experiments at eonß'tisution-maki»g, have had recourse to the unicameral system more than once. Pennsylvania and Georgia have also tried it. But the practical disadvan- j tages of a single Chamber, uncontrolled in its I power, are so great that even the promoters of revolutions are beginning to abandon this field of experiment; and the wise framers of the Constitution of the United States took very good care, by providing a second. Chamber, in the shape of a senate of a highly Conservative character, not to 6iib ' ject that young Republic to the trials Of

Parhamentary sy«tem. If i have proved thcmiwlves ill'i;t> die practical work of Government m Republics, there is little to be said for j them, even theoretically, in Colonial de-, moXnwaes. It, does not is. iwsumecLthat a 'second; "Chamber %asWpb be itn first, :'a|d thalpifc tmi needs' cr#» a separate State, alienee* the spirit of that yjjfce CfPrTlonsea Zealand and in h»'r sister'colonies hate betrayed a disposition to convert themselvesand a particular class of the community intoa distinct order, exercising an undue preponderance in political affairs. That, however, is. not a vioe of the. system, bjit. j>i its appJication, and could be eradicated by a reconstruction of the House on correct prinpipleß, by which it would be brought into harpublic opinion; while, at the same time, it would consist ; solely of men versed in the conduct of public affairs, or, at the least, bo well educated that they would not be likely to go far astray, and, moreover, honest in their actions/ It is useless to disguise the fact that it is virtually impossible to exclude from the Lower House political adventurers and men of such low and sordid ideas as to be incapable of taking a comprehensive and patriotic view of the measures submitted for their consideration. A general election usually results in a fair expression of the popular feeling of the moment; but who will dare to eay that the best man is sure to win at an election ? Very often, indeed, he is defeated jußt because he is the best man—because he understands public affairs too well and is too conscientious to pander to popular whims, or to make promises which his less scrupulous and more ignorant adversary gives without hesitation. This is a marked defect of our representative system; and the best apparent •orrective for it is the establishment of a second Chamber wherein can be' collected political experience which would otherwise be lost to the State either fer a time or permanently. An educated second Chamber, fairly selectedfrom all raaks of society, and commanding public confidence, would be an almost perfect safeguard againg the excesses of the Lower House, because it would no longer be in the power of the members of the latter to say, "We represent the community at large, and you do not." One House would be as truly a representative body as the other; but the Legislative Council would be really the Upper by reason of its superior intelligence, and the general recognition of its right to stand firm when it thought fife, while the House of Representatives would possess the enormous counterbalancing advantages of being the holder of the pursestrings, and the maker and unmaker of Cabinets.