RESIDENT MAGISTRATE'S COURT.

Evening Star, Issue 4244, 3 October 1876, Page 2

RESIDENT MAGISTRATE'S COURT.

Monday, October 2. (Before J. Bathgate, Esq., R.M.)

Judgment went for plaintiffs by default in the following cases :—City Corporation v. T. Robson, claim L 4 Is 3d, for rates ; same v. T. Q. Lee, IA 17s 6d; same v. J. P. Burn, L 5 16s 3d; same v. J. Monson, L3los; Oliver and Ulph v. Samuel Lewis, LlO 14s 4d, balance due on goods supplied: Blackman v. S. E. Bird, L2, for cab hire. Elder v. M'Kewan.—Claim L 36 2s 6d, the price of a draught horse bought at auction. His Worship delivered judgment in this case, which, he said, involved a point of some importance to auctioneers. A preliminary defence was set up that there was no Bale under the Statute of Frauds. The entry in the sale-book made by the auctioneer's clerk at the time contained the name of the vendor, the description of the horse, the reserve, and the buyer's name — viz., " E. BPKewan, L 36 2s 6d." The plaintiff did not found his case upon any conditions of sale read by the auctioneer, but rested his claim solely on the contract as contained in the entry made by the clerk, which was somewhat peculiar. The last bid but one had been L 36, and the defendant offered «n advance of 2s 6d provided the horse wa3 satisfactory on trial. This was agreed to and the word "trial" added by the clerk to the entry. He (his Worship) was inclined to repel the preliminary objection and to consider the details in the book and the clerk's signature for the defendant as sufficient to satisfy the Statue of Frauds. It would be well however for auctioneers to obviate all possible objections under the Statute, as the auctioneer in a case quoted was found personally liable for his neglect in not connecting the conditions with the entry in the sales ledger. Three trials of the horse were made in Stafford street, but the last one-appeared to be the only, one in presence of plaintiff and defendant and the evidence was very conflicting as to its result. Stephenson, the aucVoneer, and three other uidependant witnesses deposed that the horse was staunch; while four other independent witnesses deposed in very strong terms that the horse was not staunch, and twi others' evidence was tendered to the same effect. The sale not having been absolute, but conditional, his Worship was of opinion that there was no sale tifl an approval had been given by the buyer. Be was dissatisfied with the horse at its trial, and intimated the same to the clerk, who canoelled the entry in his book. The evidence adduced by defendant established that he had not come to an unfair or unreasonable conclusion, or that there waß any ground for interference by a court of law. Judgment would be given for defendant, with costs.

Tuesday, October 3. (Before J. Bathgate, Esq., R.M.)

Judgment was given for plaintiffs by default in the following cases :—A. Briscoe and Co. v. A. Hoskins, claim L 39 17s 6d, for goods supplied and the amount of a bill of exchange; same v. Parsons and Henderson. 7 ?» ™ n a P rom issory note: same v. Horatio Wragg,l3 18s, for goods supplied: J. Bowie v. E. Huntley (Christchureh), L 5. for groceries suppUed (less 4s 6d for whisky) ; Buyers v. R. Manford, L 6 5s 6d, for board and lodging. TTniversity of Otago v. Charles King.— oiaim 1,10, damages for trespass. Mr Chanman appeared for plaintiffs; Mr E. Strode for defendant.—From the evidence it appeared that defendant, who is a contractor, had been carting stones through the plaintiffs property without permission. There M fcwan.—His Worship gave judgment in each case for plaintiffs for 10s with costs, saying that it was the duty of plaintiffs to fence in their propsrty; but at the same tune anyone trespassing as defendants had done would be fined much more neavily than had been done in these instances.