HAPPINESS AND MISERY.

Evening Star, Issue 4204, 17 August 1876, Page 4

HAPPINESS AND MISERY.

.(From the Com hill Magazine.) Man, says the pessimist, so long as he villa, is like a dissatisfied peevish Child that clamors for all it sees, that Coon tires of all which a good fortune idiots its, and that is ever torn enting itself with cravings for the impose bie or unattainable. In this very illustration ■we seem to detect the fallacy of the pessimist’s view. We certainly should not look at such a fickle, whimflieal child as an illustration of will, hut rather the absence of will. The ■ pessimists talk as though all desire were will, whereas it is one of the chief re-

volts of a development of will to restrain desires. Will, in its higher forms, may indeed be said to begin with a power of checking the impulse •f the moment, or (as the physiolo■fstß word it) with a process of inhibition. The misery of this unlimited state of desire results not from un excess, but from a deficiency of will, or rather of the absence of will. We may assume that it is the object of . will to attain the highest amount of happiness perceptible. If, then, the

indulgence of vain and uesalistiable desires is found to biing vexation and misery, a robust will, led by reflection and reason, will stoutly resist such desires. Desire involves the imagination of some wished-for object, and our will is perfectly well able to check -Such desires by a wise control of those ideas and fancies which arise from time to time. Now what will be the result of this higher development of will enlightened by knowledge 1 First of all, it will lead to a considerable

diminution of the region of desire. It ’ 2s the weak and foolish ehild just beginning to “feel the largeness of the world that desires everything. The self-disci-plined man confines his desires to a few objects, which really lie within his reach. He learns to entertain a modest Triew of life, and to satisfy himself with a; moderate realisation of mundane felicity. In the second place, this '-growth of a higher typo of rational will ‘ i« eure to be followed by a voluntary

concentration ot tno.ugnt ana enort on Certain definite objects as conditions of happiness, instead of on the final end happiness itself. We torment ourHelves like unwise children by ever dwelling on felicity itself with its myriad individual hues of de- • fight,, as though this vast undefined region could be acquired by a day of two’s exertion. By and . fey we learn, as J. S. Mill learnt, that ..to think' of happiness as the object of OU'r effort is about the most certain way of losing'it, and-that the one safe -method of reaching felicity is to fix mi some particular line of action which 18 interesting in itself, and. fairly certain of leading to some considerable /•mount of gratification as its result, 1 and to throw ourselves heartily and cheerfully into this. Let a man select • style of life and a mode of occupation which best suit his individual

tastes, and which are certain (prorTided he can concentrate his energy on them) to afford him a fair amount satisfaction, and the conditions Of a moderate degree of happiness are * seourod; It be worth while to point out how progress in -moral culture will assist in securing this modestly-conceived type of happiness. In the first place, there is aothing which so much tends to cure the mind of extravagant notions respecting individual felicity as a wide •ad intimate sympathy with others. Where this feeling is fully developed and constantly present, a person learns habitually to compare Lis own fortune with that of others, and to estimate the degree of his own happiness by the standard of average life, fie finds a positive satisfaction in putting himself on a level with others, and in recognising that he has his just fihare of life’s enjoyments. Esteeming the happiness of others as a thing no less good than his own, he draws a real pleasure from the reflection that others •re as happy as .himself, and that his good fortune does not lift him above the level of the common human lot. In the second place, it is to be remarked that morality supplies an object of human effort which is pre-eminently fitted to the condition of a permanent Satisfaction. We may not be able to •fiord' others any more . than ourselves •u unbounded happiness, or even to compass any lofty achievement of virtue. On the other hand, our daily duty provides ua with a point for concentrated effort, Which is always attainable, and is certain to afford an eveiv renewed satisfaction.