THE GEORGE STREET FIRE.

Evening Star, Issue 4084, 29 March 1876, Page 3

THE GEORGE STREET FIRE.

At the sitting in banco to-day Mr Justice Williams delivered judgment in Regina v. Jenkins as follows :

This was a rnlo calling upon the Coroner to show cause why an inquisition Should not be quashed. The inquest was held -under the Bth section of the Coroner’s Act, 1867, to inquire as to the origin of a fire in George street, Dunedin. The jury found that the premises burnt had been wilfully set on fire by '"William Jenkins, the occupier, vnth intent to defraud the National Insurance Company. The motion was based on. alleged defects appearing on the face of the inquisition, and on the ground that the Coroner at the time of holding the inquest was a shareholder in the National Insurance Company, and thatthereforehohadno jurisdiction to hold the inquest. I can find no case where a coroner’s inquisition has been quashed on the motion of the accused for defects apparent on the face of it. InSuisitions have been quashed on motion for such efects where the verdict has been that the death was accidental, and the object causing death has been made deodand though even in these cases it is said that the most convenient course is to put the party to his demurrer. (E v. Brownlow, 11, A. and E., 128.) The coroner’s inquisition, when it contains the subject matter of accusation, is equivalent to the finding of a grand jury .(Coroners’ Act, 1867, section 16. Jarvis on coroners,"' 273), and the same rules that apply to quashing on indictment would apply to the case of au inquisition. It appears that the Court may, in its discretion, quash any indictment for any such insufficiency ns will make any judgment given upon it against the defendant erroneous. Yet that judges are in no case bound ex debitp just itice to quash an indictment, but may cause the defendant either to plead or to demur to it. This, it seems, is generally done when an indictment is for a crime of any ecormous or public nature, as perjury, forgery, sedition, nuisances to the highways, and other like offences. (Hawkins, P.C.8., 2, c 25,146.) I am inclined to think that the present inquisition is defective in not sufficiently stating the offence with which the accused is intended to be charged, hut 1 see no valid reason to depart from the almost universal practice of leaving the accused to take advantage of any defects in the inquisition ■ when he is arraigned on it. As to the question of want of jurisdiction it may he conceded that if the Coroner has such an interest in the subject matter of the inquiry as to bring him within the rule that no man is to be judge in his own cause then there is a wont of jurisdiction. That Coroners’ inquisitions will he quashed when there is no jurisdiction appears by the case Foxtail v. Barnett—(23 L. J., Q. 8., 7). In eonsidering this question it will be well to determine in the first instance what is the nature of the inquiry before the Coroner and the result of the finding of the Coroner's jury. The inquii yis not for the purpose of deciding whether or not a. person is guilty of an offence or to determine litigated rights; it is a preliminary inquiry which may or may not end injthe accusation of a particular individual (per Tentrtfrden, C.J., in Garnett v. Ferrand, 68. and C. 626). An accusation is the worst result that can happen to anyone upon such an inquiry. The proceedings before the Coroner’s jury are in substance the same as those before a grand jury, and an accusation by the one is the same as an accusation by the other (per Blackburn, J. 8., v. Ingham, 5 B. and S., 275), with, however, this distinction—that in the cose of a coroner's inquiry the question whether mit particular person shall be accused arises only incidentally and may not arise at all. If a bill is ignored by the improper behaviour of interested grand jurors the Court will grant an ioiformatiou (E. v. Inhabitants of Upper St. Leonards, 10 Q. 6.,* 827), but.the mere fact of grand jurors being interested appears to be no ground for objection to an indictment. I think I am right in saying that the decisions as to the incapacity of judges from interest in the subject matter of a cause may be summed up in the two following propositions(l.) That a man who has been wronged cannot act as a judge in a case where the guilt or innocence or the measure of punishment of the person who has wronged him is to be decided, (2.) That no man as a judge can decide or assist in deciding a question tbe decision of which involves the smallest direct pecuniary loss or gain to himself. Was then the Coroner in the present instance Incapacitated from acting on either of these grounds F As we have seen, the inquiry is strictly preliminary. No one is accused in the first instance. There is a possibility that the inquiry may result in an accusation, but whether it will do so or not and who may be accused appears only in the course of the proceedings. The end of the inquiry is an sensation only, no one’s guilt or innocence is decided, no sentence is pronounced, no punishment inflicted. The CoronerJJthough a judge in name exercises {unctions that are but quad judicial. I think, therefore, that the mere fact of the Coroner being a shareholder in the Company would not render the inquisition invalid unless it could be shown that the result of tbe inquisition would be to affect tbe interests of the Company and of the Coroner as. a shareholder: Would, thmi, the finding of a coroner’s jury have in ary wav hindered Jenkins from recovering the amount of .the insurance in an action against the company on the policy ? The case of the Pricco of Wales Oomwny v. Palmar (25 Beav., 605) was cited as an authority for the position that the finding of a jury on a coroner’s inquest threw the burden of proof in a civ.il case on the party alleging the contrary. The circumstances of that case were of a very extraordinary J-ind. It was practically undefended, and I Oo not think that it could ho held to overrule the principle established in the case of fhartell v. Beaumont (1 Bing., 339, 8 montf 1 612); that if an action be brought against otn insurance company to recover a loss by fire, and the defendant plead that the plaintiff wilfully burnt down the premisft, the jury, before they find a verdict against the plaintiff, must be satisfied that the crime imputed to him was proved by as clear evidence as would justify a conviction for arson. Obviously the mere fact of the existence of the inquisition would not justify such-a conviction. The case of Thnrtell v. Beaumont goes beyond this, for it decides that where the above defence is put and set, and the plaintiff obtains a verdict against the company, the court will not f s *?? * new on the ground that, subsequently ™ . e a true bill bad been fonnd by a grand jury against the plaintiff and others mWio 1° defraud tbe company in the “d, as I have before remarked, the verdict of the Coroner’s jury, whan it contone an accusation, is equivalent to an indictment. As, therefore, the verdict of the Coroner’s jury amounts to an accusation only, and as the result of proceedings could not affect directly the peonmary interest of the company, in which the Coroner Is a shareholder, I come to tho conclusion that the tact of his being a shareholder is no grounds for the , quashing the inquisition. The rule will be dis. charged with costs.