LEGAL LIABILITIES OF MARRIED WOMEN AS TRADERS.

Evening Star, Issue 3461, 26 March 1874, Page 3

LEGAL LIABILITIES OF MARRIED WOMEN AS TRADERS.

In before Mr Bussell, Q.C., the case of M’Govern v. Binkey raised an important question under the (.Married;Vv oiflenfs 'pPypperty Act, plaintiff, John M‘Govern, haberdasher, Union street, Manchester, sued the defendant, Margaret Hinkey, draper, 25, Lord street, Southport, for a sum of Lls 12s, the balance of a;debfy,o| £3£. whiofoshe had contracted with the plaintiff, and the remainder of which she had paid in instalments. Mr W. Mane, who appeared for the plaintiff, said the defendant was a married woman, living apart ]|rppa jjqr ; husband, supporting and maintaihing herself by her own industry, and receiving no assistance from her husband, whom she had not'iiSsn I’lotffve ye v ars. The question which would arise in the case was whether r qh.e -was debts apart from her husband. 'SheiWafi carrying on a separate business of her own in Southport, and he might take!dtlth&fc rthelwas carrying on the business in accordance with the first section Women’s Women’s Property A ct, and that* ail which she had become entitled to since she had been carrying on the business separately. . would; be -hfiK isfeparate property, held for her separate use, independeutly of her husband, Slnj. was, therefore, clearly possessed of prdpAt-ty of her husband, and the 11th section of the Married W ct gave her the power to sue for any debts that might be owing to her in.respect to that property. ThereWMcertaiiily'no section in the Act imposing on a wife a liability to be sued in her own name, but he suggested that the fact of the Act having vested, property separately iu her and given her the exclusive control over it implied a HabilityiinOier to pay debts in respect of that property or the business by which-phe acquired it.. ..Takingit.as a matter of contract','he' contended’that the fact of a husband allowing a wife to carry on business separate and apart* from Him impliedly conferred upon her a power to contract debts in her own mmf.. Xt was clear that in equity a marned Womctf mbsb bifid 'her separate estate by a contract, and it was a question whether she had not power to do so by law. This property in her business was vested in hj an 4 it,,.was only a reasonable inference that' a wife' enabled’ to bind her separate estate by a contract, Mr Smith (of the firm, of Smith and Boyer) argued that, as far as the Married "Women's property Act,was concerned, there svas no liriplieff liability 5 Ancfras *that--cbnlfebdAd fdrj because if there had been any intention to set aßide adong-9stpbli^h e 4 pßnqiple I pf law, there would have been an express provision to that effect. There was no question of separate estate intthik no pretence that the wife had pledged her separate estate. The Judge said he was not aware that this question had ever been raised before. The defendant was a married woman, living se-

parately from her husband, and carrying on business separately from him, and the goods in respect of which she was sued were goods supplied to her in the way of trade. Certain payments had been made on account of those goods, and she was now sued for the balance remaining due. In answer to the claim the defendant set up the plea of coverture, and the question was whether the plea was a good defence. It was perfectly clear that in common law it would be a good defence, for a married woman had no power to contract such a debt as that in question by the 'common law. But it was sugRested that under the Married Women’s Property Act, sections 1 and 11, the liability contended for in the present case was imposed upon a married woman, not expressly, but by implication. From the language of the Ist section, it struck him that | it was merely enabling. It gave a married woman the power to acquire property for her separate use, and it aid not impose any

... I liability on her that she was not subject to I before. By the llthr section, a married i wpmaUj, j\vas empowered to maintain any action m her own name to recover earnings or other property declared by the Act to be her separate property. That was clearly an enabling enactment, and such being the case, the question was whether he was to infer that not only had this ability been created, but that a liability had been likewise imposed. Inasmuch as the statute did not impose any liability in respect to the property mentioned in sections 1 and 11, the liability of the woman stood just as it did at common law. But did nob the statute itself show that in expressly making her, in statute 12, liable in respect to debts contracted before marriage ? He would not, therefore, go beyond the letter or spirit of the Act, which was clearly enabling to a woman, but not rendering her subject to any liability except such as was expressly imposed upon her. He thought the liability of the defendant stood just as it did in common law, and she was not, therefore, liable in this action. He dismissed the case. [As. a transcript of the English. Act is embodied in the New Zealand, ; sthtute,‘thb above decision should operate as a caution to traders giving credit to married women who never have taken advantage hereof, and in law required amending.— Ed. S. M.]