RESIDENT MAGISTRATE’S COURT.

Evening Star, Issue 3308, 26 September 1873, Page 2

RESIDENT MAGISTRATE’S COURT.

Friday, September 26. (Before I. K Watt, Esq., R.M.)

Brown v. Moss.—Claim LI, wages for one week as cook to defendant." Plaintiff stated that, after being in defendants service for three Aveeks, defendant, on the second day in the fourth Aveek, discharged him without notice. To defendant : I get my living by chopping wood, cooking, kc Yon have never engaged me to do two or three days’ work 'Defendant stated that plaintiff came to him saying he was very poor, and witness gave him odd jobs about, the house, paying him according to the work done. For three AA-eeks, however, plaintiff was working continually for Avitness. for which he was paid LI per week. Judgment for plaintiff for amount claimed, with costs.

Meikle v. Harper. —Tnthis adjourned case, his Worship asked plaintiff the name which the child in question bore, plaintiff stating that it was christened Arthur Harper, and went under that name. Judgment was then given as follows : This is a complaint made by Jane, wife of John Meikle, the mother of an illegitimate child, horn before her marriage, against FredericW Tl;\rpcr, :ifather of the child, for refusing to provide for its support, ihe complaint is brought under sections 5, (5, and 7 of the Destitute Persons Ordinance, 184G, by which the putative father, either alone or in conjunction with the mother, is made liable for the support of the child. For the defence it is urged that, as the complainant was married subsequently to the birth of her child, her husband, by the operation of section 57 of 4 and 5, William IV,, Chapter 7<i (The Poor Law Act, 1834), alone is liable for the support of the child (Lang v. Spicer, 1 Meeson and W., p. 120). Against this it is contended that this Act is not applicable to, and therefore has not under the English Laws Act, 1858, become law in New Zealand. [Before proceeding, I would remark by way of parenthesis, that it is possible that the New Zedand Ordinance, No. 1, session 1, adopting the laws of New South Wales, and Ordinance 10, session 2, repealing the same, may have affected the operations of the Imperial Act in New Zealand; but, as I have no means of ascertaining, my judgment will be given irrespective of this consideration.] I am of opinion, although neither the entire Imperial Act, nor the entire section quoted is “applicable to the circumstances” of the ('olony, that so much of it as makes the husband of the mother of an illegitimate child liable for its support, is, under certain circumstances, and to a certain extent, applicable to New Zealand.—(English Laws Act, 1858). I have now to inquire under what circumstances and to what extent it is applicable ; and this involves also the consideration of the question, Which operates as the later enactment, the Imperial Act of 1834, or the New Zealand Ordinance of 184(5 ? That is, do the cm eluding words of Section 1 of the English Laws Act, 1858, re-enact the provision of section 57 of 4th and sth William IV., chapter 7G, or should they be read thus—“ And shall’’ (unless subsequently repealed or superseded in New Zealand) “continue to he therein applied in the administration of justice?” I think the latter alternative is the correct reading of the law, for if the English law hail been repealed wholly or in part by the Ordinance of 184(5, it could hardly be continued by a subsequent enactment. It appears then by the Ordinance —Ist, That when the mother is not of ability to support the child, the putative father is liable for the whole support. 2nd. That when both the mother and father are able to contaibute to the support, they should do so in the proportions to be decided upon by the _ 3rd. That when the mother only is of a.bility to support the child, she alone is to be held liable. But what is the ability of a married woman, who has no income of her own, and only keeps her husband’s bouse ? 1 am of opinion even if the Ordinance only were in operation, that it would be the ability of her husband. But reading the English Act with it, as I think it should be read, the liability, which the Ordinance imposes on the mother, is by her marriage transferred to her husband. Having considered what is the law upon the matter, I have now to apply it to this particular case. I am of opinion that the evidence of the mother is sufficiently corroborated for me to adjudge the defendant to be the putative father of her child Arthur Harper, and to find that ho has refused to provide for the support of the same. I do, therefore, order that the defendant, on this 2(sth day of September, instant, and on or before the 26th day of every succeeding month, until the said child shall have attained the age of fourteen years, or until its decease, if it shall sooner happen, shall pay to John Meikle, the husband of the complainant, the sum of 10s, being one nioioty of the estimated cost of the support of the said child ; and also that the defendant shall pay fur the said John Meikle LI 10s, costs of these proceedings, Brodrich v, Dix.—ln this adjourned case his Worship gave judgment as follows : The oral evidence of the plaintiff’s clerk Hannah, and the defendant, in its most material point, is simply and absolutely contradictory, oath against oath, hut they both agree in this point, that the receipt after it was given to the defendant was never again in Hannah’s hand ;

and therefore it could not have been tampered with by him, but if tampered with at ail, it must have been done whilst in possession of the defendant. Why, however, it should have been done by the defendant, it is difficult to conceive, as in its present aspect it militates against his defence. Three out of the four experts consulted by mo upon the appearance of the document, agree with me in thinking that the “2” has been altered to a “ 3,” and altered back again to a “ 2,” but Hannah had no opportunity of doing this, and it is difficult to conceive any motive that the defendant could have had for doing it. lam therefore constrained to give judgment on the document as it now stands, irrespective of the apparent tampering. Judgment for the plaintiff, L2O 4s (id, with costs.

Nolan v, Worsp.—ln this case, adjourned from yesterday, his Worship gave judgment as follows

Upon reading the cases cited by the learned counsel, I have conic to the conclusion that, having sued and obtained judgment on a quantum meruit for the services he has actually rendered, the plaintiff is not now entitled to damages for being wrongfully discharged, even if such were the case. Plaintiff will, therefore, be non-suited ; but defendant will be allowed no costs, the case not having been met upon its merits. Judgment was given by default in the following cases :—Smith v. Griffen : claim LI 3s 7d, for bread supplied ; Waterworks Company v. Stables ; claim LI 11s 6d, for rates.