GERMAN VIEWS OF THE LATE WAR.

Evening Star, Issue 3102, 28 January 1873, Page 2

GERMAN VIEWS OF THE LATE WAR.

Some of the most valuable additions to the literature of the late war—as throwing fresh light on passages of it which previously had been somewhat obscure; and as containing a good deal ol sound thought, of just criticism, and of useful reflection, —are the official treatises just published. Colonel Rustow’s book is a formal histbry of the entire campaign from beginning to end. M, Niemann’s volume also aspires at giving an account of the whole war ; but it is not so elaborate as that of Rtistow. Major Blume’s and Count Wartensleben’s publications are less comprehensive in their scope and character, the first deal ng only with the events which followed the capitulation of Sedan, the second with the astonishing episode of Bourbaki’s defeat and ruin in tranche Comte ; but as they are compiled from official sources, being mainly collections from the journals kept by the Staff of the Ge'iuan armies, they are of the very greatest import auce and interest. In these volumes we, in fact, see for the first time the views which guided the German Chiefs in their "difficult operations in besriging Paris, and in keeping down the efforts of a vast national resistance; we mark the workings of the wonderful organiz tion which ultimately effected the subjugation.of France ; and it is with some pride that we find our judgment on the incidents of this part of the struggle confirmed in almost every particular. Vet even these works are hardly more valuable than the last tract, Tactical Deductions from the War or 1870-71, from the pen o Captain A. V. Boguslawtki. This volume, like the celebrated pamphlet of the late eminent and lamented Captain May, shows how thoroughly even subordinate officers in the Prussian service have meditated upon the art of war in its different branches ; and it not only contains excellent observations on the general strategy of the campaign, but indicates clearly the differences in the tactical systems of the contending armies, with the important consequences which flowed from them, and points out ably the practical lessons which recent experience has taught on the subject. In some respects this treatise is the most important of the series ; for unquestionably tactics are the department of military science which has most changed, and which, therefore, at the present time requires, in a special manner, attention. These treatises very fairly acknowledge that the preponderance of the German forces was so great at the outset of the campaign, that success on the French side was hopeless ; but they insist also, with perfect truth, that the ruinous dissemination of the French army accelerated disaster and made it ceri tain, and that the concentration of the German host was a grand example of organization and strategy. For instance, even assuming that the Germans numbered 450,000 men, and the French not more than 220,000, how different might the resuits have been had the French army held good positions behind the Vosges between Metz and Btrasburg, or had Von Moltke attacked on a double line, and not availed himself of the base given to him in the Rhenish Provinces ! But when, contrary to the dictates of prudence, Napoleon Hi. advanced to the frontier with a force numerically much too weak, it was then unwise in the highest degree to have made a long irresolute pause ; and if he could uot have assumed the offensive, he might at least have drawn his corps into something like connection with each other, and have impeded, if not altogether, the junction of the German armies. Captain Boguslawski makes these just remarks on what the Emperor might have accomplished, even had he continued upon the Saar, if his conduct had not resembled that of Hohenlohe and Brunswick in 1806 :

One or two Infantry Divisions from the corps of Frossard formed from the rear at Chalons, with two Cavalry Divisions, might have fallen at ouce on the Rhenish Provinces, driving back the weak Prussian outposts and blockading Saarlouis, after which they might have intrenched a position somewhere about Kreuznaoh, pushing forward detachments as far as

the Rhine, destroying the railways, and thereby much impeding and delaying the advance of the German armies.

The tempest burst on the French right wing, and then, as Colonel Rustow points out, the absurdity of the Imperial arrangements became self-evident from the first moment. Even allowing that Mac Mahon should have been east of the Vosges, why was Felix Douay detained at Belfort, and why was De Failly left in the air between Frossard and the Ducde Magenta? The struggle at Woorth warrants us in saying that if Douay had been in line with his whole corps, as he might have been, the issue would have been very different, and Do Failly’s corps was almost useless on the theatre of operations upon the 6th of August. As for Woerth, Mac-Mahon, beyond question, would have done better to fall back ; but, apart from the single tactical mistake of throwing his heavy cavalry away, he handled bis men with no common skill, and they fought heroically till their final overthrow. This battle deserves to he studied by those who talk of the worthlessness of the French soldiery ; and it is remarkable as almost the only instance in which the flanking movements of the German commanders were encountered, as ey should obviously be, by a bold and determined attack on the centre. Great as was the inferiority of the Marshal’s force, such an attack at one time proved nearly successful ; and the circumstance should be borne in mind by those who argue that tho whole art of war has been transformed since 1866. Niemann justly says The prevailing idea of MacMahon was to break through the enemy’s centre by means of large masses. At all events, the French fought very bravely, and until the numerical superiority of the Germans told, they offered a successful resistance. The Marshall had also managed his troops well. The battle of Forbach, on the same day, was conspicuous for the fatal mistake so often visible in the French operations—the notion that a mere passive defence is expedient if it is possible to avoid it. This idea, founded on a narrow view of the effects of recent changes in small arms, shows how completely the French chiefs had forgotten the maxims of Napoleon I. ; and it entailed a disgraceful defeat on Frossard, who, instead of crushing the single Division of Kamcoke, allowed his corps to stand on the Spicheren heights until it was turned and out flanked on the right and left. The Germane, on the contrary, although at first in very great inferiority of force, assumed the offensive without hesitation, aware that reinforcements were at hand, in this respect carrying out faithfully the judicious teaching of Fringe Frederick Charles, itself derived from aa intelligent study of the French tactics of the First Empire. Captain Boguslawski observes: The 14th Division Was exposed to fearful risk by being engaged as it is was, and scarcely with a sufficient motive. When once seriously engaged it c uld not do better than attack vigorously, so as to prevent the enemy from assuming the offensive, relying on the support of the troops coming up from the rear. This did not fail, for they hurried up from all sides at the sound of the cannon.

Woerth and Forbach separated the French army, and drove its left and ceutreupon Metz, while its shattered right wing was forced back to Chalons. These volumes concur in pointing out how admirable were the German movements in hemming Bazaine in on the Lorraine Fortress, and how hesitating were the Marshal’s arrangements on the 14th and loth of August; but we shall not recur to a well-known subject. On the IGth Bazaine was too late, and tbe terrible battle of Mars La Tour proved how faulty and poor was the tactical system of the French commanders. On that day, when the extrication of the French army by bold movements should have been the paramount aim of its chiefs, two French corps allowed themselves to be arrested by one German corps, and again deliberately stood on the defensive ; and, although Leboeuf aud Canrobert at last attacked, they did so without effect or vigour. Captain Boguslawski thus comments on their feeble tactics : At Mars La Tour the Germans fought for’ a long time against a decided superiority of numbers. Here again the French attempted no general counterstroke, which could in both cases have hardly failed to succeed. . . . But the French commanders had weakened the offensive element in the soldier, which has always been a Frenchman’s best point, by laying down in the official instruction, that the defensive offered the best chances.

(To he continued.)