SUPREME COURT.

Evening Star, Issue 3016, 18 October 1872, Page 2

SUPREME COURT.

NISI PRIG'S SITTINGS.

This Day. (Before Mr Justice Chapman,)

AITKEN V. PRITCHARD, To-day the defendant’s case was closed. His Honor, in summing up, said the principal thing for the jury to consider was, what was the real motive of Pritchard in prosecuting the enquiry before the Magistrate—whether he really believed Aitken had committed a felony, and desired that public justice should be done, or whether be had some other motive. First of all, the circum-tance of Aitken taking possession of the horses, and driving them to stables, was present to Pritchard’s mind at the time, if Hajneshad told him everything, as in fact, he did; and further, that be had given Aitken information that a warrant was out against him. In the statement of Pritchard nothing was said about, advising Aitken to clear out, but Haynes stated that he gave him that advice. The jury must take the circumstances, together with the other admissions both by Pritchard and Hayes, to enable them to judge whether a public-spirited prosecution of the offender was Pri chard’s real motive, or whether he had some other motive. Pritchard himse f said he did not care whether Aitken was committed or not, so that he got back bis horses, and hayes said his object was to keep possession of them. That was perfectly consistent with the advice which gave to Aitken, and which was communicated immediately afterwards to Pritchard, his employer. Tuat advice was, that as a warrant was out against Aitken, he should clear out; and it was for the jury to say whether the object of Haynes, acting for his employer, was to get Aitken out of the way, so that the warrant could not be executed ; so, as he thought, he might obtain restitution of the horses by direct civil proceedings. He might have been imstakcn, but that might have been his idea, for both said they cared little for the prosecution, if they got the horses back. Nor was the mode in which Aitken said ho took the horses of much importance, though it want to tho question whether Pritchard believed Aitken was or was not acting under a supposed right. Taking the circumstances into consideration ; what passed at Pigroot; all that Pritchard was informed by Haynes on his arrival at Naseby ; all the circumstances he himself observed there ; and the fact that undoubtedly Aitken had in a way taken the law into his own hands, it was for the jury to consider whether Pritchard had a wellgrounded belief that Aitken was acting feloniously. In that case his conduct was not merely right in continuing the prosecution, but he would have been blatneable had he allowed it to drop. On the other baud, they had to consider whether Pritchard was not fully aware that Aitken was only acting in the prosecution of a wrongfully supposed right. But if they thought Pritchard acted on a well-grounded belief that Aitken was acting feloniously, there was sufficient to establish reasonable and probable cause. If on the other hand they thought he had not so acted, but from entirely different motives, well knowing Aitken was prosecuting a supposed right, then there was au absence of real and probable cause. But real and probable cause was not the only element to be considered : there must be malice shown. The jury found the first and second issues in favor of the defendant, and the third and fourth in fav<*r of the plaintiff—damages, LSO.