The Evening Star. SATURDAY, JUNE 22, 1872.

Evening Star, Issue 2915, 22 June 1872, Page 2

The Evening Star. SATURDAY, JUNE 22, 1872.

The telegraphic news by the Ran Francisco Mail, though professing to give an account of the negotiations respecting the Alabama claims, arc so imperfect that it is difficult to understand how the matter really stands. We are told of explanations given by Cabinet Ministers in both House of Parliament, which are accepted as satisfactory by men of all parties. It does not by any means follow that that which is sufficient to satisfy a legislature shall be equally well received outside its Chambers. Popular feeling is not legislative wisdom, and is not always to be measured by the dictates of right reason. Most commonly national traditions have more to do in creating public opinion than a knowledge of facts, and this may account for the disfavor with which the Washington treaty is viewed in what is likely to be its amended form. It would be premature to decide upon the right and wrong of the condemnation of it pronounced by some journals, of which the Pall Mall Gazette is the type, for we have not the materials before us : but it will be a matter for regret throughout the world should it prove that it is impossible to agree upon the equitable conditions on which national differences may be settled. We have no fear that the countries will resort to war. The interests at stake are too vast and the certainty of mutual ruin too apparent to permit such madness ; but the consequences of the failure of reference of national differences to a Court of Arbitration must be to leave such disputes to be settled by war when convenient; a curse, the evils of which are increasingly felt in proportion to the spread of commerce and the multiplication of facilities for territorial intercommunication.

France lias been busy reviewing the conduct of the leaders in the Array during the Franco-German war. While the true causes of every disaster should be fairly, fully, and impartially investigated, it is impossible to believe in the condemnation of the unsuccessful generals, pronounced by popular Assemblies. It may be very soothing to

national vanity to affijm that, had the French troops been differently commanded, the war would have ended differently. Other people arrive at other conclusions. The French were beaten because they had not advanced with the necessities of the time. They had good weapons, but they were badly used. Every fresh disclosure proves that the administration of France was defective ; that while the Government of Napoleon was to all appearance strong, it was inherently weak ; that men were appointed to offices for which they were ; unfit; that there was laxity of supervision ; and, in consequence, when preparation was supposed to be complete, results shewed that the lives of the soldiers and the honor of the nation had been sacrificed by unprincipled swindlers who contracted to do what they never did, and got rich by imposition. The contrast between the Prussian and French systems of Government were brought out in strong relief throughout the war. In Prussia everything appeared to have been conducted on a plan that insured success. The organisation was perfect, and the adaptation of means to ends, prompt and decisive. So also with the generals. It was found on the first trial that the old system of attack and defence was not suited to modern weapons ; but both men and generals Avere equal to the new conditions. New drill Avas not needed : the tactics Avere altered to suit the necessity. There Avas no hesitation—no vacillation. In the retrospect the French Avish to hide these facts j and instead of attributing their disasters to their system, they lay blame upon their generals. Much must be alloAved for in wounded national pride ; and it cannot be expected that in a few short months the chaos into which the country Avas thrown can be reduced at once to order. But it is poor rcAvard to men who Avero to a great extent the victims of a system, to have their names held up to contempt and their characters canvassed in the Legislature, for events altogether beyond their poAver to avoid. The commercial neAVs is merely a repetition of that to hand by Suez. The small decrease in the stock of bullion in the Bank of England, seems hardly to have justified an advance in the rate of discount. One reason may have been a determination on the part of the Bank Directors to check the spirit of speculation that avas developing itself in the formation of companies for various purposes. Unfortunately Avhen resort is had to such a. course, not only is speculation checked, but trade is affected. It is not a mere Avarning that credit has reached its limit, biit that the credit already accorded shall be Avithdrawn : and it is stopped suddenly and without notice. The result must necessarily be disastrous. All trade arrangements are interfered Avith: sales of goods are restricted, and failures are imminent. As a consequence prices recede until a turn in the tide fills the vaults of the Bank Avith bullion, and the directors find it necessary to reverse the screAv. It is time that this mischievous monopoly Avas abolished, for such power over men’s fortunes and prospects is too great to be entrusted to the mercies of a Bank parlor, although it may be that of the Bank of England. In other respects the neAvs is unimportant.