REFLECTIONS ON THE WAR.

Evening Star, Volume VIII, Issue 2354, 18 October 1870, Page 2

REFLECTIONS ON THE WAR.

(BY A MILITARY CORRESPONDENT.)

Examined by the light of the numerous and ably detailed accounts from the scat of war which reached us by the mail, the conduct of the operations by those who assumed the direction of the French armies serves but to increase the amazement with which we were disposed to regard the utter imbecility —or even worse—which appears to have characterised their successive steps. We read much of the overwhelming numbers by which on each occasion the French found themselves opposed, and against which they struggled heroically ; but it has been Justly observed that this superiority of force on the part of their enemies, however much it may redound to the credit of the French soldiery, so far from palliating the conduct of the commanders (whose fatal blunders rendered its presence possible), or detracting from the merit of the Prussian victories, serves only to throw into stronger relief that rapid coi(p d'ce'd, the essence of generalship, which enabled the Prussian strategists at once to detect the weak points of their line, and by a series of crushing blows, simultaneous, well-directed, and vigorously followed up, to shatter the French corps in succession. The Prussian plan of operations would seem to have been simply perfect; and though, after the first successes, it was necessarily guided by the events as they occurred, yet the manner in which, keeping their enemies in complete ignorance of their movements and their strength, the Prussian leadeis suddenly struck with overpowering force at the light point and at the right moment, is, from a military point of view, worthy of the highest admiration. Of the French plan of the campaign there is nothing to be said, because, sq far as we can Judge, they bad not formed apy. Reviewing th{s rapid series of events as far as possible dispassionately, and taking into consideration what we gather from the later telegrams, a strange fatality, or nemesis, seems to have attended the French generals at every step, tending to make their ultimate defeats doubly sure. It cannot be believed that any commander of even the meanest ■oapacitj r , on finding that his enemy in formidable strength had established himself upon his right flank (having previously crushed the portion of the army opposed to him), and was rapidly getting into his rear, wouUl u n 4 c mb*e i“UWtd mice qf such a moveiqout. Uij. the contrary, his object would bo to endeavor without delay to concentrate on e more his broken army, and to foil the “turning” movement by withdrawing bis own forges *Oll some strong position further to the' rear—say Chalons—where he could choose his own ground on which to offer battle. Chalons, it may be observed, would seem to have -beep peculiarly ht fce d tq be the luttlcrground'of the French army in retreat, Being the site of the great camp of instruc. tion,°the country around must 1)3 most intimately known to both officers and men. It covers Pan’s, commanding l the direct line of rail to the capital, and as the old 'historical ground of what was perhaps the first Napoleon’s finest campaign, offered the farrostheld on which to dispute their enemies’'further advances. 1 . ’ However, the fates decreed otherwise, and observe the state of affairs subsequent to the battle of W*rth or Hagucnan. ’The rhv suit of that cn ageraeut was to push the remnant of M‘.VI ah on’s army back upon Nancy ; the rapid advance of the Prussians upon Luneville and Pont a Mousson placed them at once between Metz and Nancy, thus completely severving the b reucb line. Any further advance necessarily placed them in rear of Metz. It is obvi-ms, therefore, that the Emperor’s only hope of reuniting his broken line was ip have pdlcu buck i*t onc,e. V-cf We read, incredible though it seems ip these days ■ f rapid communication and of every sqi ntific appliance to ensure it, that the Emperor on the 10th of August, at Metz, had received no accurate accounts of M‘Mahon’s def.at on the (Ith, or, if he had received them, had neglected to move his main army accordingly. The result we know. The Prussians established themselves in rear of Metz, unopposed ; the main French army was confined in and about that

fortress, absolutely useless, slaughtered in ineffectual attempts to escape - and probably ere this prisoners of war—leaving their enemies at liberty to concentrate an overwhelming force upon M'Mahon’s new army, the result being the wholesale capitulation at Sedan. Doubtless the history ot this great war will, sooner or later, be written. It will then be interesting to note the manner in which the Trench historian of the future will account for the fatal, and apparently gratuitous, blunders committed by his general. M. Thiers, as we all know, executed a great literary feat of this description with reference to the battle of Waterloo ; but this campaign, we fancy, will require a greater even than Thiers. — Argus.