The Evening Star SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 10, I870.

Evening Star, Volume VIII, Issue 2292, 10 September 1870, Page 2

The Evening Star SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 10, 1870.

War, the world’s curse, has nipped in the hud the slowly returning pi;os-

perity of Europe and the world. ;It can hardly he said to have taken us by ' surprise, for last month shewed how nearly France and Prussia had reached the wav point. The armed peace is at last at an end, and what is to be the •resultii»oae eanrpredict. The strangest part of the matter, in our present state of information, is to know the precise ijature of the difference proposed to be ' settled between the belligerents, East

month it was announced that the nomi-

nation of Prince Hohenzollern to the Spanish thronp was looked upon as a threat by France, and that in consequence he had withdrawn all pretensions to it. This, however, seems in ItenniSd Of the French Emperor to have been an index: to the persistent efforts of Prussia to surround France with antagonistic Governments. He appears remembered the check to his own; designs when he was compelled to resign Luxembourg, and the impossibility of achieving the long- ‘ chensHed, plan of . annexing the Provinces on. the Rhine' because (Of the' • iu*:r i; , '.l .-i.i '-/

gvqwing-^trerigtb Prussia. Ever side's, ; .haß' b(^a..ey ! rfleuce of jealousy on. the part- of France—a smothered ra»c6ui‘ that only .needed opportunity hjry.war. There may ! luVve been other motives of a personal or family character that have led to this result. Napoleon is animated by the desire to found a dynasty. His age, increasing infirmities, and the illconcealed under-current against this hope disclosed by the x-ecent elections, pointed to the necessity for some step calculated to re-establish his tottering power. The army gained, his position may be considered assured. But an idle army is a source of weakness, rather than strength, to a monarch. There are no honors to be gained—no rapid promotions to be expected when there is an armed peace. Men get tired of daily drill and showy reviews, and want some opportunity of distinguishing themselves. It is, after all, a risky matter on the part of the Emperor; for the necessary prestige can only be gained by success, and in the present case that is by no means a certainty. If the motives we suggest as possible form the key to the conduct of Napoleon, it would follow that so far as Prussia is concerned, it must be considered - a defensive war. But it must be admitted the Prussians have not shewn the slightest, backwardness ■ to snap their fingers in the face of France. They took possession of Luxembourg, and defied her power, consolidated their own power in Germany without asking leave, threatened .to provide a king for the Peninsula, and with promptitude and readiness rushed into the fray by invading Franco as soon as ever hostilities were proclaimed. The Prussianjjtactics (are to prevent, if possible, war being carried on, on their own soil. Their immediate object in taking the initiative has been to throw the whole of its desolating effects upon France. If they can prevent a French army entering Prussia, it is so much suffering and expense saved, and one great step towards victory. France will not long be content to see her fields and vineyards trampled under foot, her villages destroyed, and her population ruined. But the victory of Prussia would, in all probability, be the downfall of Napoleon. The powers of the two countries may be considered pretty nearly equal; and, if left to themselves, the war may prove long and tedious. But will it he confined to these two nations! No one can say. It is the plain interest of every other power of Europe to stand aloof, and permit them to exhaust thenstrength and their resources. Relatively, as they weaken each other, the other's gain strength. But so many contingencies occur to drag outsiders into the quarrel, that these obvious motives may be inoperative. Neither can we venture to reason upon the future from the past. There have been territorial wavs, commercial wars, and wars of succession. Tiie last long European war was to establish the Divine Right of Kings. In the present case there is no common European idea to be established. Prussia, exhausted by wav, is less formidable to Austria, and Russia is too far off to be deeply interested in the matter. France, exhausted by war, is less formidable to Italy,; and, so far as England is concerned, there is everything to he gained by neutrality, and nothing by taking part in the quarrel. Great Britain, too, has a weak point in Ireland, which may yet afford some trouble. That precautionary steps are necessary there can be no doubt; but since England has fiir deeper interest in Asia, America, and Australasia than in Europe, we feel assured that absolute necessity only will lead to her taking part in the Avar, Asia matter of course, the money market was immediately affected, and numerous failures must be expected. Our contemporary, the Daily Timas, forebodes sadly, and sees all sorts of ill consequences to us in New Zealand. All our schemes are to be knocked on the head ; and so on, Jf there were only one way of going to work, perhaps he might be right; but it may possibly turn out that although our legislation is void—if it be void—the war, while absorbing and wasting large capital, may also set some free for investment, and that there may be men who have wisdom enough to see that it is better to employ it in the construction of reproductive works, than to have it blazed away in gunpowder and wasted lu fivers pf blood.