RESIDENT MAGISTRATE’S COURT.

Evening Star, Volume VII, Issue 2052, 2 December 1869, Page 2

RESIDENT MAGISTRATE’S COURT.

This Day, (Before James Fulton, Esq., R.M.) • DRUNKARDS. Mary Cameron, Mary Hamilton, and John Gill were fined 20s for drunkenness, or to be imprisoned 48 hours; Jane Louisa Brown was fined 10s or 24 hours for a like offence. MINOR OFFENCES. The following fines were imposed for the offances specified : —George Elliot, leaving his horse and dray, 5s and costs; Richard Pearson, leading a horse across a footpath, discharged with a caution ; Charles Brown, allowing three cows to wander, 2s Cd each and costs ; Peter Henrichson, driving without proper reins, 10s and costs. JUDGMENT. His Worship gave judgment in the adjourned case of David Hutchison. Our readers will remember that the defendant was summoned for plying for hire with two drays, for which he had not taken out licenses, and pleaded that he was not under tfie necessity to do so, for drays employed in carting material supplied by him as a contractor. His Worship agreed with this view, and gave judgment for the defendant. INFORMATIONS BY THE INSPECTOR OF NUISANCES. Hugh Johnston, lighting a fire in the open air with leave from the Corporation, fined Is.—James Kentledge, premises in a dirty state, 10s and costs.--John Halley, leaving a cart in Moray Place, and a horse in Cumberland street, 2s 6d each offence. INFORMATIONS BY THE TOWN BELT RANGER. Jules Burlane, riding across a footpath, 2s 6d and costs.—W. Puddy, allowing two bullocks and a heifer to wander, 2s fid each. CHARGE OF PERJURY. Charles Abbott was charged on the information of Mr W. M. Hawkins, with wilful and corrupt perjury, in the evidence given by him befoie the Resident Magistrate, on Friday, November sth, in the case of Hawkins V. Abbott, Mackenzie and Bell. Mr W,' ML Wilson for the prosecutor, Mr Macassey, with him Mr J| H, Hams for the defendant.

On the information being read by the Clerk of the Court, Mr Macassey said he proposed taking objection to the charge on the information. Although under the Police Act the same precision was not necessary in a preliminary examination as was required in a charge before the Supreme Court, it was absolutely necessary that the information or summons should disclose some offence recognised by the law. If it did not, it followed that the Court had no power to entertain the charge made. If the information on summons b.-fore the Court did not disclose such an offence, any warrant committing the defendant for trial would be an incorrect proceedin';, and it would bo compe ent to apply for liberation by writ of habeas corpus. The defendant was charged with committing wilful and corrupt perjury in the Resilient Magistrate’s Court. No one ever heard of a charge of perjury couched in such terms. The very gist of the offence was contained in the words spoken. In cases of prosecution for libel, the very words alleged to be libellous must be set forth, and in cases like the present, the words should be specified also. Instead of that, the prosecutor took the wide range of the Whole trial before Mr Strode. In the case before the Court, as in every other, the prosecutor must be bound down to specific words. The defendant could not, on any principle of justice, answer a charge like that preferred against him. Unless the words alledged to be perjury were set forth, the information contained no offence known to the law. He need not go far to seek authority, for on a similar charge preferred against Mr Barton, the complaint was dismissed on exactly similar grounds, but with the important difference that the information certainly assigned perjury in distinct terms. Nevertheless the objection that the information did not disclose what every information should disclose, the specific charge ; and Mr Strode dismissed the case. Application was made for a mvndamus requiring him to hear the case again on the ground that he bad exceeded his duty in dismissing the information, but when it was moved, it was said by Tudge Richmond that be was strongly inclined to think that the Magistrate was right in the course he took, as the charge was not sufficiently specific. The rule nisi was eventually discharged. He did not contend for a moment that the same particularity was necessary in an information as in an indictment, but it lay at the foundation of every charge of perjury that the defendant should know the language ascribed to him in order that he might know what he was called upon to meet. He submitted that the information did not disclose any offence known to the law, and must be discharged. Mr Wilson said the information was not only in accordance with the law, but was an exact copy of the one that Mr Justice Johnston laid down as sufficient. All that was required was that the magistrate should have some offence placed before him on which he might be justified in issuing a warrant. He qu'fted Judge Johnston’s words, to show that the Magistrate had jurisdiction in the matter, irrespective of the truth or falsehood of the charge; and if it were sufficient on the face of "it, it was not necessary to set it out distinctly. Before the Supreme Court, the offence had to be set out at length, but not on an information before a Magistrate. With regard to the present proceedings the question was whether there was sufficient evidence to disclose an offence. He contended there was sufficient for a justice to issue a warrant upon. His Worship did not consider that the information set forth the offence charged, in such a maimer as to enable the accused to defend himself. He dismissed the case. Mr Wilson wished specific reasons to be given, with a view to future proceedings. Mr Macassey, in the interests of his client, objected. His Worship declined to state any other reason than he had given.