THE Evening Star. SATURDAY, AUGUST 7, 1869.

Evening Star, Volume VII, Issue 1952, 7 August 1869, Page 2

THE Evening Star. SATURDAY, AUGUST 7, 1869.

The country will wait with some degree of curiosity the unfolding of the reasons for the removal of Colonel Whitmore from the command of the Colonial Field-Force. It would he unfair to offer any opinion on the subject in the absence of correct information. With regard to his fitness t» command, tharc has always been a difference of opinion in the North Island. When he was first placed at the head of the forces, they suffered some reverses, and the Northern papers were loud in their denunciations against the Stafford Ministry for leaving the defence of the country in his hands. Notwithstanding the evidence that showed even to the least initiated that he had to contend against unexampled difficulties, every reverse was attributed to bis'incapacity. The result proved that this was not true; that lie had bad materials to work with, und that he not only know how to handle troops in the field, but to train and drill them so as to become efficient and victorious soldiers. There fire men who can see no soldierly qualities in caution. They would always have the troops rushing

into fiction without ascertaining ill - ' difficulties they have to overcome, or counting the numbers that are, arrayed against them. Dashing exploits are all very well, but they are very often successful at too great a cost compaied with the result, and in Colonial warfare too serious consequences attend upon defeat, upon such a stake, to risk the chance of success. Calm, resolute, unflinching courage, combiner with military skill, that knows when to make a rush, and when steadily to make a stand or even to retreat, although not so brilliant to read about, generally mark the tactics of the best commanders ; and the last campaign in the North Island, if correctly recorded in the accounts of the transactions that took place, justifies the belief that Colonel Whitmore possessed the necessary ability for his position. It is to be feared, therefore, that political rather than military considerations have had something to do with depriving him of the command of the troops. Col. Whitmore is a member of the Tipper House. To a certain extent therefore he is able to thwart or to expedite the views of the Government. Colonel Whitmore was appointed by the Stafford Government, and notwithstanding the unreasoning outcry against him, he was persistently and we think properly retained in his command. It is not unnatural to suppose therefore that ho may not altogether approve of the reversal of the policy of the late administration by the present Government. He may he, inclined to point to past successes, and ask whether they arc not evidence that the troops under his command deserve to he spoken of more approvingly than that they are “ a comparatively useless “ body.” Every allowance ought to be made for even Colonial Ministers in the heat of debate. They, like men in humbler spheres, sometimes get waim and say tilings that would have been better unsaid. But political bad temper has its limits, and it is a poor return for the brave endurance of danger and hardships, for the conflict and victory over physical difficulties, foi the suffering from privation, consequent upon penetrating into the fastnesses of the bush, and pursuing an enemy until his forces were scattered, and his power to do harm has been at least for a time annihilated, that the Colonial troops should he told “ they are a compara- “ tivelv useless body.” We never approved Mr Stafford’s policy. We believe that the war is entirely owing to the absence of the commonest prudential precautions on the part of the late Government. But neither can we approve of a system of political waifaie that condemns the meritorious efforts of those who were merely appointees under a defeated Opposition. One of the worst features in the gov einments of some of the American States is, that with a change of Ministry the whole civil staff is changed too. It is to be sincei’ely hoped that no such system will ever be adopted in New Zealand—yet there are symptoms of an approximation to it. No doubt, military commanders must be expected to carry out the policy of the Government under which they act, notwithstanding the large degree of discretionary power that necessarily is vested in them. Colonel Whitmore, in the Legislature, acts in one capacity j when in the field, he gives up a portion of his own will in carrying out that of the Executive. It may be that he has pioved refractory, and cannot agree that the course prescribed is the best. If so, we presume there would be no alternative but to dispense with his services. The telegram announcing his removal from the command of the field force assigns no reason for the change; but it is sincerely to be hoped that pure political feeling has not been the motive. If such should prove to he the case, no condemnation of such proceedings can be too strong.