THE Evening Star. SATURDAY, JULY 3, 1869.

Evening Star, Volume VII, Issue 1922, 3 July 1869, Page 2

THE Evening Star. SATURDAY, JULY 3, 1869.

The Middle Island is now well represented in the Colonial Ministry. Mr Vogel and Mr F. D. Bell are in office, and as their opinions have been frequently expressed on the most important subjects that will occupy the attention of Parliament, the Colony will look anxiously for the carrying out of those principles which they have so frequently enunciated. Mr Vogel is not a believer in the self-reliant policy. He thinks British troops ought to be employed in the protection of the Colonists. -V For our own part we think that it would be much better for the Maoris to understand that the Colonists are quite able to defend themselves. It is degrading to us, as descendants of a brave and chivalrous race, to have it paraded before a set of savages, that we must have men from Home or from India to fight for us. The mistake that has been made has been that of making war on too large a scale, and fancying it necessary to invade the enemy’s territory in order to secure submission. It is one thing to repel attack, and another to act on the aggressive. In the one case the enemy has to attack at a disadvantage. The defensive position will be chosen for its strategical advantages, and strengthened by every means that art can devise. There will be shelter for the troops and arrangements for secure retreat, if necessary. Few savages would have the hardihood to attempt attacking positions defended by the means that science and civilisation can provide. They could not hope to be successful, and would be conscious that any attempt, except by surprise, would only result in tremendous loss to themselves. In this respect they have shown themselves superior tacticians to ourselves. They have adopted the very strategical policy that should hive been our own. They have built pahs, and waited for our troops to attack them. They have held their fortifications as long as they were tenable, and when they found it better to run than to fight, they have taken themselves off and dispersed in the bush] leaving us too frequently the glory of an empty victory purchased by the lives of many brave men. Comparisons have occasionally been drawn between the North American Colonies and the New Zealand settlements so far as the Indian raids are concerned. Our records of early conflicts are not very numerous, but the defensive seems to have been the stand taken by the colonists. It would, in fact, have been madness to have carried on aggressive warfare in such a country and with such enemies. It really ultimately comes to a matter of profit and loss. Chivalry and glory are all very well, but in all time the cost of war has been an element in the consideration. “ What king, going to “ make war against another king “ sitteth not down first, and consulteth “ whether he be able with ten thou “ sand to meet him that cometh against “ him with twenty thousand 1 ” This calm calculation seems to have been one of the very things neglected by the Governments of New Zealand. The Duke of Wellington, in one of his despatches in reply to the Home Government, who urged him to decisive action, said he would not sacrifice a single soldier without some end beyond mere victory was to be gained by it. Our grand mistake has been to imagine that the destruction of a pah and the dispersion of a Maori force meant peace. We have formed our ideas of war upon European precedents. We have noted the likenesses, but forgotten the differences. Between civilised nations the destruction of an army is an irreparable loss. It is followed by the country being overrun, cities deserted or burnt, the country laid waste, industry paralysed, cultivation destroyed. The loss of a pitched battle is national ruin. On our side there is certainly something like this risk incurred; but what on the side of the enemy 1 He runs up a pah from rough material close at hand. It is the work of a few days. He mounts no guns, provides no commissariat, establishes no line of communication, has nothing but his life to defend. Drive him thence, he goes into the bush. Follow him there, and if the dangers of ambush are escaped, what is gained ? After days of weary march, it may be the traces of his last encampment are reached, and, divested of all hostile appearances, mixed up with, and undistinguish able from, the people of some professedly friendly tribe, the men who lately fought stand looking on, amused to think they have drawn the pakeha on a bootless errand after them. This is the history of every Maori war. It is no imaginary picture. It is a thing of necessity, from the very nature of the case. What then is the ignis fatuus that we have been following ? It is peace with the Natives, to bo won by reducing them to submission,

Our experiment has signally failed. It could do no other. We have had all to lose; the Natives comparatively nothing. If we seized their land, the cost of holding it proved immeasurably more than it was worth. If we seized their persons, they were better clothed and fed and housed in prison than in their native fastnesses. Tinwonder is they ever wanted to escape. We incurred the cost of maintaining them without being any nearer the termination of war. If they swore allegiance to the Queen, it was only to ward off a crushing blow, and to enable them to break their oath at their earliest convenience. Aggressive warfare on our side has been an expensive mistake, and we are glad to think that our tactics are to be reversed. Defensive operations are conducted at a light expense. There is no heavy commissariat required; no transport service ; no long line of communication to be maintained ; no train of camp followers necessary to supply the fighting men with food, ammunition, and necessaries. A defensive force has these at hand, and a few unsuccessful experiments by the Natives in trying to force a defensive position would soon teach them that they were powerless against the well devised resisting measures of the Colonists. They would then probably cease to fight.