The Evening Post WELLINGTON, SATURDAY, OCTOBER 27, 1945. A HOBO EUROPE FACES WINTER

Evening Post, Volume CXL, Issue 102, 27 October 1945, Page 6

The Evening Post WELLINGTON, SATURDAY, OCTOBER 27, 1945.

A HOBO EUROPE FACES WINTER

Among the main causes of Europe's present distress are* mass movements of peoples and the breakdown of transport, accommodation, and food supply. For this breakdown, the primary responsibility rests with Nazi Germany, who prolonged World War II long after it was evident that Germany's defeat could be averted only by something approaching a miracle. When Nazi-Germany decided, to continue the war beyond 1944, declaring that "there would never be another November, 1918," the last chance of saving Germany from colossal ruin— the ruin that was avoided by the preinvasion surrender in 1918 —finally disappeared. Germany turned her back on her own prudent example set by the 1918 armistice, and thus provided such an object lesson of destruction and demoralisation that even Japan, a little later, recoiled from a similar sacrifice. It is now known that the leaders of Nazi Germany had only one shred of justification—or what they deemed to be justification— for the prolongation of the conflict. Their justification was the .hope of a victory-winning "miracle" wrought by science. In fairness to their mentality, if not to their conscience, it should be admitted that the Germans were far nearer, in 1944-45, to this scientific approach to victory than Allied populations were aware. Several independent accounts sof Germany's scientific progress towards engines of destruction indicate that it was "touch-and-go" which ' side should arrive first at an atomic bomb, or a world-smashing rocket, or some other irresistible weapon, on which Nazi "last ditch" hopes rested.

The primary responsibility for the breakdown mentioned therefore i rests with the truculent enemy. As to the mass movements of peoples that have served to emphasise the breakdown of transport, food supply, etc., these movements were to be expected as a consequence, in greater or less degree, of any German defeat. Hitler's population-movements had to be reversed, and the' revived States victimised by Hitler were certain to bring about migrations or expulsions of their own. It is in failing to control these movements that the post-war policy of the Governments —those that are directly concerned in the ebb and flow of millions—comes under challenge. The Governments in charge of European zones or areas that are dumped into protest to the Governments of the dumping countries, who will not or cannot give sufficient compliance with the protests. Those Governments on whom falls the responsibility of transporting, feeding, and accommodating the moving millions along their line of march, or in their destination zones, can blame primarily Nazi Germany for willing colossal destruction; but secondarily there is an accusation that transport at any rate could be much improved by the Allied Governments if they were actuated by practical humanity and not by politics. In short, the Governments concerned are not making the best efforts to alleviate, from their post-war resources, the suffering to which Nazi Germany, in the war, condemned Europe. It seems to be many years since a British Secretary of Foreign Affairs, in time of peace, uttered such a condemnation of conditions in Europe as was uttered in the House of Commons by MrBevin. Europe, he is reported as saying, was in danger of a terrible epidemic; and efforts to build up what he called a health defence line on the Continent had been hindered because "politics had intervened against common-sense arrangements."

An amazing picture of a hobo Europe is outlined by Mr. Bevin when he says that, through the transfers and migrations that are going on, as many as twenty-five million people in Europe are moving at once, some one way, some another. That the Allied Governments of the day share the blame for the transport bottle-necks is sufficiently indicated by the Foreign Secretary's reference to the failure of the Conference of Foreign Ministers to agree about the waterways of Europe. "If," Mr. Bevin told the House of Commons, "we could get strategy and spheres of influence out of the picture, nothing would do so much to restore Europe as the setting up of communications for the Oder, the Rhine, the Elbe, and the Danube." If river transport is such a primary factor, the charge against the Big Three, or one of them, amounts to a major indictment; and in this respect the statement of the British Secretary of Foreign Affairs goes far beyond that recently made by the United States Secretary of State. "I told other countries weeks ago," Mr. Bevin added, "that we were in danger of a terrible epidemic in Europe—a further terrific human loss more devastating than the guns and even the atomic bomb." He now thought it was probably wrong to have developed zones of occupation, "but there were very grave political considerations which I do not propose to introduce now." Mr. Bevin also said that the United States Congress was now considering a vote of £450,000,000 for UNRRA; "if that vote is 'hot carried, UNRRA will be broken, and in a few weeks the situation will be disastrous."

The coal famine hinges largely on the development of the Ruhr, and both the Ruhr and the Rhine are highly charged with politics—in this case with Western as well as Eastern politics. The Ruhr coal and industrial structure are of European importance economically, and further are of political importance to France as Germany's neighbour. Can the Ruhr be taken from Germany without ruining Germany's peacetime economy? On the other hand, can Germany be allowed to retain the Ruhr on terms which will cause France to continue to fear a German war? While admitting that France looks on a unified Germany as a nightmare, Mr. Bevin also says: "I don't want to ruin the peaceful industry of Germany." At the same time, he adds: "I do feel that against such a warlike nation as Germany I am entitled to ask for a reasonable insurance policy." But what would be a reasonable insurance policy? Apparently it would not include territorial change, for the Minister is reported as saying that "territorial change is not so vital as international control." While thus making a gesture towards international control of the Ruhr and the Rhine, Mr. Bevin "reserves his decision." To remake the world, he thinks, a more economic approach is needed. But will the Governments be able to get away from the political

approach? There is* one approach that none of them can prevent—the approach of winter.