INVASION OF MAINLAND OF ITALY

Evening Post, Volume CXXXVI, Issue 57, 4 September 1943, Page 6

INVASION OF MAINLAND OF ITALY

The guessing competition that arose concerning the next Allied step , after Tunisia, and again concerning the next Allied step after Sicily, ended in a win for the easiest guesses. The victors of Tunisia made for the nearest land, Sicily, Grossing rather wide straits, and the victors, of Sicily also made for the nearest land, crossing narrow straits into Italy's toe. These selec 1" tions of the obvious, not the remote, targets fully justify the language chosen for the official communique announcing the invasion of Italy: "The Allied forces under the command of General Eisenhower have continued their advance." Incurring the minimum of sea transport, Eisenhower has directed a continued advance against nearest objectives. Nothing like the strain on sea transport involved by the original voyage of the Anglo-American "armada to North Africa late last year is incurred by Eisenhower's successive operations. The Tunisia-to-Sicily-to-'toe-of-Italy advance is a study in continuity rather than in the far-flung Mediterranean movements that have been guessed at. The modest seadistances covered by Eisenhower since his first big voyage, must surely mean economy of shipping; and, while that economy exists, the option of striking some more distant spot remains with i the Allied. strategists. So the dash across the Straits of Messina may not be the whole of the story. But it is sufficient unto the day.

Since Sicily fell, the Allies have faced the critical question: How deeply is Germany prepared to commit herself to the defence not only of northern Italy but of southern Italy? The answer to this question probably contains the key to the immediate policy of the Badoglio Government, as well as to the military policy of Germany. Obviously, the best way to bring the answer to light is to strike across the Straits of Messina, as Eisenhower has done. The Germans will thus be forced to reveal the degree of their military commitment in the lower body of Italy,- including the toe; and if they are committed there in heavy force, and can be pinned' down by attack, their local commander will be under the constant strain of fearing Allied landings that may be made behind him, on undefended or lightly defended parts of Italy's long coastline. In short, the toe of Italy could become a Stalingrad. Eisenhower's direct attack across the narrow straits compels the German high command to show its hand not only in southern' Italy but in the Balkan peninsula, because southern Italy may prove to be a side door to the Balkans, via the Adriatic Sea. General Maitland-Wilson, commanding the Allied army poised for striking in Syria and in the Levant, has already coupled the two peninsulas—ltaly and the Balkans —in his strategic survey. He was reported recently to have said that his policy must be influenced by the degree to which .Eisenhower can fight his way northward in Italy. This utterance looked so naive, when it was made, that it might have been interpreted as being intended, to deceive the enemy. But it is completely consistent with Eisenhower's latest dash across Messina Straits.

The invasion of Italy brings the Allied war effort for the last quarter of 1943 into definite shape. An invasion of Europe via Italy, an

invasion of Europe via the west or north, and the adoption of offensive warfare in the Asia-Pacific theatre, would involve a triple burden on the Allied war effort. There is, so far, no evidence that this triple burden is to be undertaken. All that is definite is that the first and the third parts of it (Italy and Japan) are already being implemented. The second part (western .or northern invasion of Europe) has not yet materialised. If it did happen, then 'the Allied war effort would be taxed in much greater degree; and although it would be presumption to rule out the possibility of a third big offensive in Europe in 1943 —additional to the Russian front and the Mediterranean front —it is reasonable to conclude that the Allied, war effort in this dying year wbuld undergo a tremendous proportionate expansion if, in addition to Eisenhower's new southern campaign, the fortress of England were to erupt a new army of invasion thrown more directly at Germany. Nevertheless, as we have said, the news from the Straits of Messina may not be the whole story. Much will depend on how the AngloAmerican thrust from Sicily is parried by Germany, and to what extent the rapid march of military events in Italy will throw light on the determination of Germany to stand up to her Italian and Balkan fronts, or to yield southern ground and fall back on a narrowing circle of purely German defence.