NOTES ON THE WAR

Evening Post, Volume CXXXVI, Issue 55, 2 September 1943, Page 5

NOTES ON THE WAR

LAND*AND AIR

STRATEGY IN EUROPE The two outstanding: features of the war in Europe arc the great land offensive of the Red Army InJtnsria and the great air offensive of Britain and America in Western Europe. The contrast looks like continuing: a little longer.

In his broadcast from Quebec Mr. Churchill did not repeat his earlier reference to Allied action in^ Europe ; "before the leaves of autumn fall 1; ;he^ said instead, "1 look forward to the day when British and American liberating armies will cross the Channel in full, force and come to close quarters with; the German invaders of France," but he would not indicate in the slightest ; degree when that was "likely to happen." He did, however, declare that the "terrific" aerial attack in Germany s would "increase steadily in volume and intensity." Mr. Brendan Bracken, the British Minister of Information, told the Press in Washington that there was "no chance of destroying Germany in 1943." To this might be; added Mr. Churchill's own assessment of British-American strategy: "It has been bold and daring and has brought into play against .the enemy the maximum effective forces that could have been employed up to the present by Britain and America, having regard to the limitations of ocean transport, the; peculiar conditions of amphibious warfare, and the character and training of the armies we possess." Against the persistent and insistent demand by the-Soviet Press for a "second front in Europe" may be set the fact that Britain and America, through Russia's treaty with Japan, lack the essential of a second front in Asia, namely, the most convenient base for a direct attack on Japan itself, that is, the Soviet's Eastern Siberia territory. Whetner the absence of a second front in Europe can be linked with a similar absence in Asia only the "heads" really know, but Quebec ■: seems, on the, one hand, to have deferred to some extent the project of a second front in Europe and to have concentrated ori: making the best job of the strategic position against Japan without the best site for a second front in Asia. Allies and the Air. Thus, while the military situation in Europe, with the Germans heavily committed to a costly defensive in Russia and their western occupied countries in an increasing ferment of unrest, amounting to revolt, in countries like Denmark and the Balkans, would appear to be highly favourable to exploitation by the western Allies at more than one point, it may,be that these Allies prefer to wait a bit longer and to continue the softening process from the air until it has reduced to a minimum the risk and cost of invasion. The trend of events goes some way to confirm that. There is no let-up whatever in the air bombardment of Italy, and Germany while the occupied countries west of the Rhine are subjected to continuous sweeps against airfields, communications, and all sorts of minor targets. • On top of this is the cabled summary of an article in the American military journal "Army Ordnance," ,by General Arnold/Chief of the United States Army Air Force, forecasting the early advent on the scene of a "revolutionary air battleship with a bomb capacity of half a car-load (40 tons?) and a flying range for a round trip from America to Europe," also - new armament, hew bombs, and new bombsights, "as revolutionary as the present Norden bomb-sight"; also new, types of fighter plane which will have "advanced beyond recognition in shape and combat equipment." Coming from' General Arnold and appearing not in a popular sensational magazine, but in a purely technical journal, this can hardly be overlooked. It would strengthen the view, alre%dy supported, by many other signs, notably the increasing emphasis throughout the Empire on the Air Force, that the Allied High Command is veering to the theory of Major Seversky's "Victory Through Air Power" that the war caa be won in the- air. Allied air superiority, despite still substantial losses in recent raids on Berlin and other German cities, is mounting over anything the Axis can put up against it and may soon become overwhelming. The Russians, in their concentration, on vast land operations wnere the use of air power is tactical rather than strategic, are apt to discount what the Allies are doing to Hie Axis from the air in the West, but, while the land and air blows are complementary, it is too soon to say which are the moreeeffe- t tive.