TWO ALTERNATIVES

Evening Post, Volume CXXXI, Issue 120, 23 May 1941, Page 7

TWO ALTERNATIVES

THE GERMAN ATTACK

PROBLEM OF SUPPLIES

LONDON, May 22

"The Times" says that the situation in Crete is apparently in hand, but that does not imply that the Germans have not established comparatively strong detachments at certain points. "It is supposed that the Germans count on corhpleting the subjection of Crete or at least assuring final success in three or four days," it states. "To drag it out longer would involve the problem of ammunition and food supply, which would, be very difficult without the aid of shipping.

"The question of whether we will be able to afford our troops the benefit of fighter planes is a vital one. With a measure of air support, especially fighter support, the chances seem strongly in favour of the defences, and the task of holding Crete without air support would be more difficult, though even then it would not be insuperable."

Analysing the probable German plan, "The Times" gives a warning that its defeat would be a heavy blow to German prestige. "There would seem to be. two alternatives open to the attacker/ it says. "He must either carry through the whole operation by air alone, or he must obtain a hold upon a stretch of the coast suitable to the purpose and sufficient in extent for the subsequent disembarkation of seaborne troops during the hours of darkness. The second alternative is the more probable.

"To attack by means of the first plan it would be necessary to seize a landing ground with such area of country round it that relays of troop-carriers could arrive in comparative safety and be immune from any ground action except long-range fire.

"The British airfields would have to be captured, or neutralised by bombing, so that the defence would be forced to rely on air support from Egypt or aircraft-carriers—though this would apply equally to the other alternative put forward. To conquer the whole 3000 square miles of this big island by air-borne troops alone would necessitate the transport of a force of a considerable size, and that force would also have to be supplied from the air.

"These considerations suggest the likelihood of a bold attempt to open up sea communications as speedily as possible in order to make use of the shipping in the Greek harbours and in the. Dodecanese for the purpose of supporting reinforcing, and maintaining in the field the aerial advanced • guard. There, however, the enemy comes up against the Navy.

"The Mediterranean Fleet might not be able to intercept every vessel which attempted to make the passage, and it would have to fight off some of the heaviest air attacks to which it has yet been subjected, but there can be little doubt that it would readily welcome the prospect of any such attempted operation."—U.P.A. and 8.0. W.