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A SAILOR ON STRATEGY

With characteristic sea sense, Lord Chatfield has said some practical things about the Mediterranean war. He points out that Mussolini, in invading Greece, may be motived, in part, by a desire to draw to Greece British land forces now employed in Egypt and Palestine, If such British forces were sent to Greece, and if the sending of them should prove hereafter to have critically weakened Sir Archibald Wavell in his defence of Egypt against Italy's Libyan and Abyssinian armies, then Mussolini would declare his invasion of Greece to have been a successful application, against British Levant forces, of the principle of "divide and conquer." Apprehensive of the risks of such a diversion of British land forces, Lord Chatfield offers the opinion that "sea and air power would be more valuable help to Greece than sending a large army to Salonika." In this sailor's opinion, the soldiers should stay where they are.

Concerning the offensive value of our sea and air power against Italy, he distinguishes between the Adriatic Sea (across which Italy transports her troops to Albania) and the Mediterranean. To cut Mussolini's Adriatic route would be a great feat, but "the Adriatic is not an easy sea for the British Fleet to operate in, except for possible action by night." But if Italy comes out into the Mediterranean to operate against the Greek islands, then "the British Fleet may be given the opportunity to attack for which it has been waiting." It may be true that the Greek coast and the Greek islands offer many potential naval bases, which could be valuable either to Italy or to Britain. But it is not merely a question of who gets there first. The belligerent who seizes a potential base on the coast of a small country like Greece or Norway must accomplish a great deal to make its potential values real. Defence against submarine and air attack must be provided, and bases cannot be improvised today as easily as in the days of the old warfare.

Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/EP19401101.2.40

Bibliographic details

Evening Post, Volume CXXX, Issue 107, 1 November 1940, Page 6

Word Count
339

A SAILOR ON STRATEGY Evening Post, Volume CXXX, Issue 107, 1 November 1940, Page 6

A SAILOR ON STRATEGY Evening Post, Volume CXXX, Issue 107, 1 November 1940, Page 6

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