NOTES ON THE WAR NEWS

Evening Post, Volume CXXX, Issue 94, 17 October 1940, Page 12

NOTES ON THE WAR NEWS

NAZIS & RUMANIA

DRIVE TO THE EAST

POSSIBLE STRATEGY

Oil is almost certainly the main reason for the Nazis' latest piece of military penetration into a pinioned and illequipped Rumania. But the pressing need for more oil also points to a course which fits into a grand strategical scheme, which would ease the existing pressure of European communications and enable the continent to be consolidated against the British blockade.

Familiar Deficiency. The deficiency of oil supplies in Europe is by now familiar to most. The figures are complicated and obscure because for years past nations

have been building military reserves, some of which have now fallen into the hands of the Nazis, but broadly it is possible to put German total production (25,000,000 barrels last year), Rumanian total production (46,000,000 barrels), that of countries under German control, and reserves and booty, at a figure of 129,000,000 barrels. The civil consumption of Germany, of the German-occupied countries, the German-dominated lands, neutral countries without access to seaborne imports (such as Sweden, Switzerland,

and Hungary), and other European countries with access to the sea (such as Greece, Turkey, and Bulgaria) is estimated at 205,000,000 barrels. The military needs of the Axis are figured at an additional 25,000,000 barrels, the total being 230,000,000 barrels. (There are about 7 1-3 barrels to a ton.) Distribution Problem. This leaves a formidable deficiency. Nor will the general situation be improved by the Nazis holding the Rumanian fields, though they themselves may obtain more than the 30 per cent, of the output which they gained last year. Even the application of German thoroughness to increasing production will leave the problem of distribution unsolved. This is where wider and more promising strategic considerations come into play. If the entry of Rumania can be used to apply pressure to Greece to make that country cease granting the use of its harbours to the British Fleet, !as the Axis says it has been doing, and if Germany and Italy are able to use these harbours instead, a material advantage will be gained in the Eastern 1 Mediterranean. Following this, if the | Nazis, by use of a subservient Bulgaria can break the adherence of Turkey to her pact with Britain, and perhaps send Turkey the way of Rumania, 'a bright prospect is opened up for Berlin. i Additional Supplies. ! This is a pathway to the Near East, I not only towards the eastern gateway of the Mediterranean, but towards the only other adjacent oil supplies which would enable Europe to obtain sufficient oil. The 78,000,000 barrels annually produced by Iran and the 31,000,000 barrels of Irak would just about meet Europe's needs this year, providing a total of 238,000,000 barrels, against an estimated need of ! 230,000,000. I Moreover, the conquest of these countries would give the chance of a Napoleonic thrust at Egypt and make possible an attempt to conquer the Canal by land and the exploitation of the Germans' strongest arm which, today is anything but fully employed. And if this attack succeeded and the Mediterranean were held against Britain a still happier position would be created for the Nazis. For the position of the Mediterranean as a highway would be restored (at present Italian command of it is so limited that even fishermen fear to put out around the Italian coast and fish bring luxury prices), and the traffic of goods would be on a more normal footing. Oil Transportation. In addition to this fact, the oil transportation problem, which has hindered supplies being drawn from Russia, would be alleviated. The Italian tanker fleet of 420,000 tons, could be fully used and so could that portion of the French tanker fleet, of 310,000 tons, which has fallen into enemy hands. In these circumstances it might even be possible to draw much more heavily on Russian supplies and thus avoid the need to use up reserves which this year may have to provide at least fivetwelfths of the total oil used. In other words the Germans would strengthen themselves at their weakest point. At the same time they would lighten the strain on the ricketty railway system, now badly overloaded and steadily deteriorating, and would put their communications on a better footing. Distribution remains their ma] or problem after a year of war. A Difficult Campaign. These things could be accomplished only after a campaign waged at a great distance, with considerable difficulties in the way of supply, and consequent risks for the attacking force, but they offer such rich promise in the event of success that the Nazis are almost certain to undertake them if they are convinced that they have been checked by the Royal Air Force and that the Battle for Britain holds little chance of victory. The occupation of Rumania was not the result of a sudden decision. Rumania, like Czecho-Slovakia before her, had to accept German "military protection," and was informed of that fact on August 31. Two days later (cannot one almost hear Hitler talking about those impossible Czechs who were "up to their old tricks again"?) the Rumanians were told that their territory would be occupied unless they curbed agitation against Axis control. The man who, when Germans were in foreign lands, felt his heart yearn towards minorities, was following his old path. The Vienna Settlement. The method of the Vienna settlement of the Hungarian-Rumanian dispute left no doubt of what was ahead. In the old palace, the last occupant of which i was the Archduke whose murder at, Serajevo precipitated the World War, the Germans and Italians handed down their decision on territorial rights to the Rumanian delegation. It was, in. the German manner, a "diktat." The Rumanian Foreign Minister, Mihail Manoilescu, announced that it was "a sentence handed down by the arbiters, a sentence we could not even discuss." In a few weeks, and without war, Rumania lost 37,000 square miles of her territory to Russia, Hungary, and Bulgaria, and King Carol was reported to have been given grudging extensions of ten or fifteen minutes to say yes or no to the final terms. The decision to ! demobilise the Rumanian army was ! one of the things he had to accept. It opened the way for German action on the familiar lines and for the foundations of a new drive to the east, j