NOTES ON THE WAR NEWS

Evening Post, Volume CXXX, Issue 85, 7 October 1940, Page 8

NOTES ON THE WAR NEWS

NATURAL HAZARDS

ITALIANS IN EGYPT

KEY TO SITUATION

When Marshal Graziani, \vho commands the Italian forces in Libya, paid a visit to Rome a few days ago to discuss future Axis plans with Mussolini, he - no doubt had to explain why the much-hexalded Italian invasion of Egypt, which began on September 14, has not carried his army further along the route to Alexandria than Sidi Barrani, which is some 60 miles inside the Egyptian border. Earlier Italy, had boasted that the forces at her command in Libya outnumbered the British forces by at least ten to one, and the Italian public were encouraged to anticipate yet another ■sweeping totalitarian victory.

f Graziani's plans, however, missed fire, and his forces are still "conscli--dating" their position round Sidi Barrani, harassed at every opportunity by - the bombs of the Royal Air Force and the shells of the Royal Navy. In the initial advance on Sidi Barrani Graziani's organisation was apparently good, but military experts agree that the Italian marshal made a bad blunder ■by pouring his troops into the town too rapidly and thus encountering the great .weakness on which Anglo-Egyptian .strategists have always relicd —the inevitable exposure of communications during a rapid advance in which consolidation in width is impossible. A Ribbon Track. The Italians in their advance into Egypt moved along a ribbon track in a vast expanse of sandy and rocky desert. They established artillery posts and intermediate supply depots at many points on this track, but that was< not sufficient for the maintenance of communications. Such posts an^ depots cannot be hidden from observation, and --are thus highly vulnerable to attack "from air and sea. The Royal Navy. unhampered by an Italian navy which is known to exist (see Brassey's Naval . Annual), has been able to shell Sidi Barrani and other points on the coastal road, and the Royal Air Force, using "new types of long-range bombers, has ranged from Sidi Barrani right across Italian Cyrenaica to Benghazi. Many Disadvantages. So far as it has gone, the Egyptian campaign has shown a readiness on the part of the British forces to seize on .and,-make the most of all the natural disadvantages that Graziani is up against. Those disadvantages are many; the greatest are the fierce heat arid the absence of water. Some sur- : prise has been expressed by the Egyptian authorities that Graziani should have chosen September, one of . the hottest months in the Western Desert, to start his attack. Each soldier, it has been pointed out, needs two-thirds of a gallon of water a day, and all of this must be carried on lorries. Machines need several gallons of water a day. In order to supply his men and machines with water, Grazi;ani must use a dirt road running near the seashore and exposed to the fire •of British warships, whereas the British main defences at Mersa Matruh can be supplied by rail and asphalt road. Only Water For Miles. *;-That is why Mersa Matruh is the ,'jkey-point in any attack on Egypt from Libya. In order to be successful in their invasion of Egypt the Italians must take Mersa Matruh and hold it, :for there is to be found the only water for hundreds of miles around. In addition, the town is the railhead of the -coastline railroad from Alexandria. .:~ There are many reasons why, in the Words of Richard Mowrer, writing recently in an English newspaper, "it "would be a bad thing to be an Italian j attacking Mersa Matruh."' | - The Western Desert within the confines of Egyptian territory extends over ■J200.000 square miles —a formidable natural barrier to invasion. When the Italians commenced their attack they "started from a point where there is "water, and that w"as miles west of .*Libya's eastern frontier. Two hundred miles from the sea coast and only 50 miles from the Libyan border there is the Siwa Oasis in Egypt; but from the Libyan border nearest the Siwa Oasis to the nearest Italian oasis in Egypt it is 250 miles. Further south the oases ■in Egypt are fewer and farther between, there is less water, and there is the great "sand sea." .On the coast the distances between -drinkable water are not so great, comparatively—about 80 miles from Italian Tobruk to Egyptian Solum. But at Solum the quantities of water available are insufficient to satisfy the wants 'of an expeditionary force;" and the Italian troops arc already well beyond Solum. Fortifications. .The importance of Mersa Matruh, 150 miles from the Libyan border, is its water, and for this reason it is fortified. Military experts estimate •that to attack Mersa Matruh with some chance of success the Italians •would have to use 15,000, men and be prepared to sustain heavy casualties. But before they could attack they would have to get their forces there, and in order to do that they would have to transport for at least 200 miles enough water for 15,000 men and the radiators of their mechanised units. Once they did that they would have to tackle a series of tough fortifica."tions. .; At first glance Mersa Matruh looks vulnerable from the sea, but permanent outlooks are posted on the points "outside the bay and coastal batteries cover the approach to the lagoon. . Submerged corals reefs complicate navigation. It is possible that enemy ships, should they ever venture out " and, what is still more unlikely, should they ever gain mastery over the British Navy, could shell Mersa Matruh to smithereens, but the destruction of the town would not affect the defences. - The men would be out of their barracks and at their posts, variously distributed in a 60-mile radius of fortifications. Exterior '' Decorations.'' The Mersa Matruh defences have been described as a perfect example bl wartime exterior decorating. Pillboxes, trenches, dug-outs, and depots blend with the desert and are hard .to make out. Pill-boxes are so placed as to make cross-fire effective. They are like chessmen —each piece covers .another. There are barbed-wire entanglements. There are tank traps tnd trenches. And at various places the white concrete 'little pyramids" -stand up In rows. When the Italian invasion of Egypt commenced, the strength of the British

forces in the Western Desert was estimated at between 30,000 and 40.000. and the strength of Italian forces in Libya at between 200,000 and 300,000. Since then the British forces have been considerably increased, but it is doubtful if there has been any increase in the size of the Italian army. In view of the tremendous natural difficulties he is up against, Graziani probably has as many men as he can handle—and possibly a great many more.