"WALL BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS"

Evening Post, Volume CXXVII, Issue 117, 20 May 1939, Page 9

"WALL BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS"

DESIRE FOR CO-OPERATION

MR. CHAMBERLAIN MYSTIFIED

(British Official Wireless.)

(Received May 20, noon.)

n RUGBY, May 19. Speakings in a debate in the House of. Commons, th« Prmier dealt fully with the negotiations between London and Moscow, and expressed the hope, in conclusion, that he would be able in due course to report to the House that final agreement had been reached between the two Governments. He looked to the opportunity which the Foreign Secretary would have tomorrow for discussion with the French Premier and Foreign Minister to help towards that end, but he indicated the regret . which Britain felt that Lord Halifax would not, after all, be v meeting either M. Molotov or M. Potemkin at Geneva. "I cannot say how much I regret the Soviet's decision not to allow M. Potemkin to go to Geneva," he said. "The meeting of the League Council was postponed for a week to allow him to go, and after it had been postponed it was found that he could not go, and Lord Halifax was deprived of the opportunity of a personal discussion with him on these matters which I think might have been valuable to both of us. No doubt the Soviet had good reasons for her attitude, but I regret that it was not possible for the meeting to take place. / . , "This'is one of the cases in which I cannot help feeling that there is a sort of veil, or wall, between the two Governments which it is extremely difficult to penetrate, and if the opportunity had been afforded us we might have shaken hands across the gap."

The Premier disposed again of the charge that Britain was impeded by some kind of ideological prejudice in her approach to toe Soviet, and he proceeded to deal faithfully with the suggestion that Britain sought to evade reciprocity of the obligation in the proposals put forward in Moscow. He insisted that Britain was not concerned at all with Russian internal political doctrine. She was solely concerned with the /best method of building up the peace front and enlisting the co-operation and assistance of the Soviet. *'We want the Soviet's co-operation; we attach value to it/ he said.

He proceeded to ridicule a suggestion that Britain's attitude was one of disdain for Soviet assistance. Whatever was the precise value—and he disclaimed any intention to make any unauthorised evaluation—and whatever the value of the Russian military forces or of the way in which they might be applied, no one would be so foolish as to suppose that that huge country, with her vast population and enormous resources, could be a negligible factor ii- consideration of a situation such confronted the peace-loving; Governments of Europe. * He cited M. Stalin's statement that the Soviet's policy was to support States which were the victims of aggression if they were prepared to defend their independence, and said that since that was also Britain's point of view, Britain felt it was an indication that the Soviet might be disposed to collaborate in carrying that commonyaim into, effect But in approaching the question of such collaboration Britain was also aware—and this was a point for which, Mr. - Chamberlain; complained, his critics had made insufficient allowance—that the direct participation of the Soviet in security guarantees might not be altogether in accordance with the wishes of some countries for whose benefit or on whose behalf the arrangements contemplated were being made. FORM OF RUSSIAN DECLARATION. Since Britain desired and sought the collaboration of all the countries concerned, she was anprious to avoid any division among them, said Mr. Chamberlain. That consideration was what promoted the character of the British suggestion to the Soviet Government. Russia should make a declaration regarding Poland and Rumania similar to the one made by Britain and France, but in the form that if Britain and France should be involved in a conflict in consequence of the undertakings which they had given to those countries the Soviet Union for its part' would be ready to render assistance also to Poland or Rumania, as the case might be, always provided, of course, that assistance was desired. The Premier expressed himself as mystified how it'could be contended that that offer was not reciprocal, or how misunderstanding in Moscow of that matter could have arisen. It had always been the British intention that the arrangement with Russia should be reciprocal. If it was argued that the British suggestion dirt not provide for the case of direct attack upon the Soviet Union, he replied that neither did it provide for the case of direct attack upon the United Kingdom. Again, it might be argued that it did not cover the case of certain States other than Poland and Rumania which were neighbours of Russia, and through which, perhaps, she might be attacked. That was quite true, but on the other hand ijt did not apply equally to certain western States, which, if an attack was made upo> them, might ultimately cause Britain to be involved in war. INEQUALITY IN FAVOUR OF SOVIET. The suggestion did not contemplate that the Soviet should intervene irrespective of whether Britain or France did so, although, as a matter of fact, those countries' commitments, by the assurances they had given, were irrespective of whether the Soviet came in. Therefore, if there were inequality between the two Governments, the inequality was in favour of the Soviet and not qf Britain. Somehow there had been a misunderstanding, and in any case the proposal was not acceptable to the Soviet so Britain had tried again. In the meantime, he reminded .those ! who were impatient for results that 'what they were seeking was not an alliance between a group of States, but means of resisting aggression. They would not succeed in that policy if by ensuring the co-operation of one country they rendered. another country uneasy and unwilling to collaborate.

Therefore, in this matter, which was one of great gravity and delicacy, a certain amount of caution was necessary. The object was to build up the peace front, and it would be better to delay for a few days longer rather than take hastily a step which might result in the work already done* crumbling before their eyes. Britain thought that perhaps the Soviet would

have been willing tg come to an agreement on matters on which they could agree easily and be prepared to leave to discussion at greater leisure subjects on which difficulties still existed. In the British view, that would have been the wisest course to take.