MUSSOLINI METHODS

Evening Post, Volume CXXVI, Issue 155, 29 December 1938, Page 8

MUSSOLINI METHODS

Various" theories of the SeptemberOctober Czechoslovakian crisis have been advanced, in anticipation of the verdict of history. One theory "is that Herr Hitler calculated that France would not fight for Czechoslovakia, but, being bound by treaty, could not say so. The fact that France would not fight had to be proved, and Herr Hitler proved it by producing the crisis—a perilous plan, which nevertheless prevailed. There is now some tendency to suggest that Signor Mussolini will act similarly with regard to French East African territory, including Jibuti, the seaport (French), of the Italian Abyssinian railway. Would the French, Government accept an.!-Italian seizure of France's own East African territory as readily as it accepted ;\ Czech concessions under the German army's threat to march !in SeptemberOctober? Would Britain be as ready, as in September-October, to advise French acceptance of the situation? According to "Pertinax," "some people assert" that Signor Mussolini may deliver an East African blow, "in order tc comfort Mr. Chamberlain 1 with un fat t accompli, relying on Mr. Chamberlain to forestall France's reaction." N . ' :

"Pertinax" has a sufficient reputation, both inside and outside France, to/demand notice for his qualified comment; even though it is clearly tinged with anti-Chamberlain feeling. His theory assumes that it is Mr. Charhberlain's purpose to dissuade France from, resisting East African cessions of French territory, as well as from, resisting the SeptemberOctober cessions of Czech territory. But his theory goes farther, and also assumes that Signpr Mussolini is concentrating military force near the French East African border, just as Herr Hitler concentrated (on a much greater scale, of course) on Czechoslovakia's borders; and with a similar object—to frighten France into submission, or even to establish Italian territorial occupation as an . accomplished fact. ; A.diplomatic negotiation aiming at French concessions to Italy in connection 'with Jibuti and the railway is one thing. To seize territory by occupation, or to emulate Herr Hitler by a threatening military concentration on the French East African border, is another. British diplomatic advice to France, in the former case, would be understandable. But a humiliating military coup, directed not at an ally's territory, but at France's own soil, would mark a new high point; in, the domineering tactics of Dictatorship. That "Pertinax" can give the colour of possibility — with whatever reservations—to such a further instalment of totalitarian intransigence is a strong comment on the atmosphere of suspicion and hatred which, between Christmas and New Year, enwraps Europe. It also shows how differently Mr. Chamberlain's appeasement role is regarded in France. Through the neutral lens of the American papers it appears that popular acclamation of Mr. Chamberlain's peace efforts in September and October was very sincere' in France, extending to all ranks of the people. But "Pertinax" fears that Mr. Chamber lam's restraining hand means intolerable French sacrifices:

Mr. Chamberlain flatters himself that he can act as mediator between Italy and France. A more realistic view makes him appear to be a dangerous agitator, despite his excellent intentions.

While Mr. Chamberlain prepares to go to Rome, and while M. Daladier prepares to go to Tunis, all capitals of Europe watch and wait with apprehension. It seems now that SM. Daladier's naval escort, planned on a scale which Signpr Gayda described as a warlike demonstration, will be reduced. It is only to be expected that" observers Jike "Pertinax" will read into this moderation the restraining hand of Mr. Chamberlain, whose mediatorship in the Mediterranean may become, increasingly difficult.