NEW BRITISH ARMY

Evening Post, Volume CXXVI, Issue 136, 6 December 1938, Page 19

NEW BRITISH ARMY

THE STRATEGIC AIMS

CO-OPERATION WITH ALLIES

EFFECT ON INDUSTRY

We have seen something of the New Model at work, writes a military correspondent in the "Manchester Guardian." Now let us examine some of the problems that this, like every other major reorganisation in any department of the nation's service, necessarily brings in its train.

Mr. Hore-Belisha has defined the functions which the British Armyexists to perform as (a) home defence, (b) defence of British overseas territories, (c) the maintenance of a strategic reserve for the reinforcement of overseas garrisons, and lastly (d) in the event of war assistance in the defence of the frontiers of any ally or allies that we might have. Few would be disposed to quarrel with these definitions or with the order of priority in which they are placed. On the whole, the New Model is better equipped for dealing with these tasks than its predecessor.

ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENCE,

But one point occurs at once. Jin our description of the Army at work we made no mention of anti-aircraft guns. The countryside bristled with the muzzles of Bren guns poked up into the air, spitting viciously at every low-flying hostile aeroplane. But Bren guns seldom bring down aircraft; that is the job of anti-air-craft artillery, and it is a highlyspecialised job at that. The reason for this omission obviously is that the bulk of the anti-aircraft artillery available is at present allotted to home defence; three new Territorial anti-aircraft divisions are in process of formation to deal with this essential task. The position is improving daily as mass production gets under way and more gunners are trained; but this glimpse of the reality of the air menace brings out certain points very clearly.

Our first line of defence, without which we are virtually powerless, is the air defence of these islands. Until this is reasonably assured, so that the normal life of the nation can be carried on free from interruption, it is doubtful if we could embark any considerable body of troops to reinforce overseas garrisons or to assist in the defence of the frontiers of our allies. There is little doubt that the Navy can be relied upon to keep open our maritime communications against all comers, but until at any rate local superiority in the air over the overseas base is assured it would probably be to disembark an expeditionary force with its impedimenta and stores.

STRATEGIC PROBLEMS

However, let us assume that the air menace has been brought under control and that the internal security and external defence of British overseas territories are assured. There then arises the problem of the best use to which the New Model could be put in fulfilment of its ultimate task, "the defence of the frontiers of any ally or allies that we might have." In 1914 a small and highlytrained British Expeditionary Force exercised an influence out of all proportion to its numbers. It is not too much to say that it saved the French from the consequences of their own faulty dispositions and their almost ludicrously inappropriate doctrine of war. In the sequel the blood of the New Armies was poured out unstintingly on French soil over four ghastly years of attrition.

Today the position is totally different. The French have profited from their terrible lesson of twenty-four years ago, abandoned the mystical doctrine of the "offensive a outrance," and covered their land frontiers with permanent fortifications that are as nearly impregnable as human ingenuity can make them.

COULD DEFEND THEMSELVES

Today the French, who would almost certainly be our principal allies in any war that one can envisage, could probably look after the defence of their own frontiers without assistance from the^ British Army. In any case, to employ a highly mobile fighting force such as the New Model for the passive defence of a fortified line would appear most wasteful.

The French, we may hope, would not be our only allies. But great care would have to be exercised not to let political considerations outweigh the dictates of sound strategy. Our wars with revolutionary France and Napoleon, which are filled with instances of British expeditionary forces being dispatched to the assistance of small nations, offer a standing warning of the danger and futility of scattering troops in little packets all over the world in conformity with no well-defined strategic plan. The ultimate success of the Peninsular War has tended to obscure the lessons of the many dismal failures that preceded it.

Nevertheless, one can envisage several countries outside France where we might be obliged to send troops, for our own safety as well as "the defence of the frontiers of an ally." The armies of such countries consist for the most part of troops organised and equipped on the old muscle-power lines; their frontiers are defended by no Maginot Lines

ADVANTAGE OF DEFENCE

It might well be that even a comparatively small detachment of the New Model, working in co-operation with the national Army oi! such a country, might again find the opportunity of exercising an influence out of all proportion to its actual numbers. The lesson of the advantage enjoyed by the defender over the attacker, which was bitterly brought home by the events of the last war, has impressed others besides the French. There are eminent military critics in this country who preach the doctrine of passive defence with as much fervour as Foch ever proclaimed the "offensive a ouArance." It would seem that they are in danger of forgetting other lessons that run through all military history. Surprise and the concentration of overwhelming force at the vital point still mark the sure road to success on the battlefield.

The New Model, with its mobility and fire-power, is probably the most formidable fighting force in the world today. But its very qualities giye rise to certain disabilities. To attain mobility whilst increasing fire-power numbers have been sacrificed. Automatic weapons can defend a position by day when visibility is good and the field of fire is clear. But for the prolonged defence of a position manpower is needed: a line held by the automatics of the New Model looks dangerously thin by night.

"FITS US LIKE A GLOVE."

Perhaps the key can only be found in the co-operation of the New Model with troops organised on the old lines. In these circumstances it will be highly interesting to see what steps will be taken after the present training season in regard to the future reorganisation of the Territorial Army. It is ip be hoped that the whole ge

at any rate the majority of the existing twelve infantry divisions will be reshaped on the pattern of the New Model.

If, as Mr. Hore-Belisha suggested and the evidence of one's eyes certainly tends to confirm, "the mechanised standard fits us like a glove," let us be aware of its implications. The Army of 1914-18 needed a surprising number of men behind the lines, as well as men and women working in the factories, in order to keep it in the field. If this was the case with a muscle-power Army, the New Model's demand on the industry of the country will be ten times greater. Once adopted, the mechanised standard will probably render for ever impossible the raising of a national Army on ihe scale o$ #U&1&