THE MUNICH PACT

Evening Post, Volume CXXVI, Issue 86, 8 October 1938, Page 8

THE MUNICH PACT

WHAT COMES AFTER?

ARMED PEACE IN EUROPE

POLICY OF BRITAIN

POLICY OF BRITAIN

(By "Senex.")

The world has emerged from the immediate crisis which faced it a week ago and whatever the name for the present phase of events—peace, truce, or respite—there is no war. As to the outcome of the Chamberlain policy of appeasement time is the only judge. There are those who feel that it will result in giving Hitter things he could have gained only as the result of a victory in a major war. TJaere are others who feel that with one-quarter of the world under her flag Britain has no business adventuring in Central Europe and that the Czechs were not worth a war anyway. One thing that emerges from the whole affair quite clearly is that Mr. Chamberlain has given new impetus to the retreat from Europe which Britain has been carrying out, with interruptions, since the war. It began with the refusal to guarantee French frontiers at the Peace Conference, and while it suffered the interruption of Locarno and of the reaffirmation of Belgian neutrality when Belgium reverted to her old status, it has proceeded ever since. It reached its zenith in the cases of Czechoslovakia and Spain. In order to follow that policy Mr. Chamberlain determined in mid-July, as he admitted in his House of Commons speech on September 28, to attempt to reach agreement with Germany about Czechoslovakia. It was known outside Britain, and widely printed in the world Press in the following month, that he was following the path of sacrificing the Czechs in the effort to obtain a pact with Herr Hitler. Perhaps the crisis moved up faster than he expected, but the Czechs have been sacrificed and there is a pledge exchanged between Mr. Chamberlain and Herr Hitler which can only result in a pact if the sentiments echoed in that document influence the two national leaders in the immediate future. HIS PLANS WfKE LAID. Mr. Chamberlain's course, then, has not been the outcome of sudden decision to meet an unexpected situation. It was the result of a policy the working of which has been hastened along by the German repudiation of the Runciman mission and by Herr Hitler's war threats. The British interest in reaching a settlement has not been the mere preservation of the Czech State, or what is left of it after its neighbours have finished adding its minorities to their own, but the preservation of the peace. The responsibility which Britain accepted was a limited responsibility and defined in Mr. Chamberlain's broadcast speech in which he said: "I cannot undertake the responsibility of committing the Empire to war because of a quarrel in a faraway country." It was "not the faraway country but the' near-at-home country, it was not Czechoslovakia but France which influenced Britain's course of action. And, from the British Conservative point of view, here is one oi the gains of the Chamberlain compromise For it detaches France from her responsibilities in Central Europe and thus lessens the risk of Britain having to support her neighbour State in a distant quarrel.. (It gives a guarantee to Czechoslovakia, but to a new State, an inoffensive one.) It alsc probably annihilates the Little Entente which was created by the French, bul that cannot be expected to weigh against.the settlement in London opinion. HOW SINCERE IS HITLER? What happens now depends in large measure on the sincerity of Herr Hitler, he said, and Mr. Chamberlain placed great stress on the statement, that the Sudetenland was the last oi his territorial claims in Europe. But he offered a new Locarno at the time that he smashed the old one, and deliberately evaded all efforts of Britain to discover the terms on which he would enter such a new agreement. He twice guaranteed the integrity of Austria, the second time just before he marched into the place. At the time of the Anschluss he even gave the Czechs a pledge that, if they would remain neutral, he would not advance German troops within 15 miles of their -frontier. Whether this new pledge is binding, and whether, if it proves not to be binding, any further reliance will be placed on Herr Hitler's promises is a matter Which only time can reveal. But from the recent events several things have emerged, all of the first importance. The first is that the Rome-Berlin axis (or should it not be called the BerlinRome axis now?) is, despite denials, a military pact. The second is that Britain is militarily aligned with France if she should be attacked. A third factor, that Poland has been drawn into the German orbit, could be predicted, and was, indeed, predicted in this journal on July 11 when it was pointed out that if dismemberment of Czechoslovakia became certain Poland would aid Germany in the partition. BRITAIN NOT PREPARED. The final matter, and the most important from our point of view, was the preparedness of Britain for war. A close examination of the situation led to a conviction that had she fought it would have been under disadvantageous terms, with an air force not yet properly equipped or completely manned by trained men, an industrial organisation not fully protected against enemy raids, an army which has still much ground to cover before it can claim to be a strong mechanised force. At the beginning, of this year Britain had only as many tanks as are included in a single German tank regiment, and the heavier ones were oi doubtful value. Could Britain have fought successfully? Undoubtedly she could have done so had she been given time, but in the interim she would have had to protect' her industrial organisation against the air assaults oi an enemy better equipped, because German industry is virtually on a war footing. In. France, also the same things applied. The Little Entente was of doubtful military value, the extenl and quality of Russian help was uncertain. In fact, in immediate preparations the Fascist Powers were in the better plight and authoritative quarters are of opinion that Britain wil] not be ready to fight for at least another eighteen months. This lends special significance to Mr. Chamberlain's declaration that Britain will nol call a halt in her programme of rearmament, a programme which is "daily increasing in pace and volume." This, also, is the significance of the settlement. If Germany has been bought off with a free hand in Europe Britain may perhaps feel secure, may anticipate some years of peace. But it will be an armed peace*