LESSON OF 1914

Evening Post, Volume CXXVI, Issue 84, 6 October 1938, Page 5

LESSON OF 1914

ULTIMATUM DANGER

A QUICK ROAD TO WAR

NAZIS & THE CZECHS

A point of great interest in the threats from Nazi Germany to the peace of Europe appears from a comparison of the Berlin-inspired demands upon Czechoslovakia with the demands of Austria-Hungary, backed by Imperial Germany, in the ultimatum to Serbia in July, 1914, says a writer in the "Sydney Morning Herald." The i Serbs' friends then, as the Czechs' J friends now, counselled the utmost concession; Serbia then, like CzechosloI vakia now, accepted every demand except those implying an abdication of sovereign integrity. Assuming that a peaceful settlement of the present crisis is desired, one most difficult point was the demand of the Sudeten Germans, inspired from Berlin, for the right to profess National Socialist views, and to carry on National Socialist activities within Czechoslovakia. These demands would create a "State within a State"—in this case, a totalitarian German State, within the Democratic Slav State of Czechoslovakia. In 1914, Europe was brought to war because of the demands of AustriaHungary, a Teutonic Power, for the suppression of subversive activities against itself in Serbia, an independent Slav State. Today, Europe "hovers perilously on the brink of war- because Germany, a Teutonic Power, demands the right to carry on subversive activities within Czechoslovakia, an independent Slav State. THE SOUTHERN SLAVS. Whatever may have been the fundamental causes of the Woxld War, its proximate cause was, -Ss everyone knows, the question of the Southern Slavs. For three centuries, until the nineteenth century, Bosnia had been under Turkish rule. The year 1878 saw a strong Nationalist movement in that portion of Serbia which was already liberated in favour of reunion with their Bosnian brothers. In that year, Austria-Hungary occupied Bosnia and Herzegovina, neighbouring provinces.- For 40 years, until the end of the Austro-Hungarian occupation in 1918, there was continuous strife. Despairing of union with Serbia, a representative assembly of Bosnian-Serbs in 1907 even demanded the end of the Austrian occupation, and a position as an autonomous province of the Turkish Empire. It had- at first been believed that Austria's purpose was merely protection of her Adriatic interests while Balkan troubles were settled. It became evident later, however, that Austria's idea was not the liberation of Bosnia, but the subjection pf Serbia. The Archduke Ferdinand ' was among those who looked upon this as a mission. His supporters favoured a policy known as Trialism, as opposed to the existing Dualism of the Austro-Hun-garian Monarchy. This policy envisaged the creation of a tripartite Empire, in which, thie Southern Slavs should rank equally with Austrians and Hungarians. In 1909, Bosnia and Herzegovina were formally annexed despite the protests of their inhabitants. After the emergence of a Greater Serbia from the Balkan Wars of 1912----13, Bosnian hopes of reunion were raised to great heights. Reunion- became a foremost object in Serbian policy. In Bosnia, there were innumerable secret societies working towards the same end. One of these societies was led by the young assassin, Gavrilo Princip, and his crime was directed against the policy of Trialism; led by the murdered Archduke. THE WAY OPENED. The Austro-Hungarian Government was convinced that the independence of the Kingdom of Serbia imperilled the existence of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, because it provoked the Slav subjects of the Emperor to break away. Austria had already determined to lender Serbia harmless by making it dependent upon her, and he had instituted diplomatic action to isolate her by means of the Balkan League. The murder of the Archduke, however opened the way for military action. Count Berchtold, the Austrian Foreign Minister, in the critical days of July, 1914, told Count Tisza, the Hungarian Minister-President, that Austria's intention was "to take advantage of the crime" to "settle its account with Serbia." So followed the famous ultimatum to Serbia, which is the matter of immediate interest. In the Austrian Note, the murder of the Archduketook a quite subordinate place. Of its eleven different requirements, only four arose out of it, or had to do with, the murder. The first demand was that the Serbian Government should express its disapproval, in dictated terms, of the propaganda -directed against AustroHungary. This was to humiliate Serbia before the world. Five demands were concerned with the suppression of the political agitation which had been carried on through the Press and the secret societies. They included the suppression of any publication inciting,, to hatred and contempt of the AustroHungarian Monarchy, the dissolution j of the Narodna Odbrana, and other j similar societies, control over education, the schools, and the teachers. In addition, they were required to dismiss all officers and officials "guilty of propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, whose names and deeds the Austro-Hungarian ■Government reserve to themselves the right of communicating"; and they were required to accept the co-opera-tion of the Austrian police in the suppression of the subversive movement directed against the Monarchy. ' SERBIA'S DILEMMA. These demands virtually meant that th Serbian Government would cease to have the responsible control over their own territory. They would have bound themselves without appeal to the dismissal of a large number of public servants simply because of their political opinions. The co-opera-tion of the Austrian police would have placed the reputation, the freedom, perhaps the life, of every Serbian who was obnoxious to the Austrian Government in jeopai-dy. Thus, the Serbs were confronted by a terrible alternative; to have accepted the extreme demands would have been to acquiesce in the subjection of their country; to have refused them would have involved an immediate attack from a Power whom they could not hope to resist. But if the Austrian Note was an ultimatum to Serbia, it was also an ultimatum to Europe. At one blow, it overthrew the laborious diplomatic work of the previous year; it aroused in the most acute form the slumbei> ing opposition between Russia, protector of the Slav peoples, and Austria; it undermined the mutual confidence on which international relations were based. The foundation was destroyed; within forty-eight hours—period of the ultimatum—the building was totterj ing to its fall, and within a week it had collapsed.