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EVENING POST. THURSDAY, MAY 27, 1937. MUSSOLINI TO ROOSEVELT

; Sudden" enthusiasms for arms I limitation, by Governments that have ■ armed for Covenant-breaking conquest, o.r which will not answer 1 questions arising out .of their own peace proposals, must be regarded with caution. After Abyssinia, no . British Government in its senses could have delayed re-armament; j but, once entered on, re-armament is a long-term programme, not to be 1 halted when getting into its stride. : Such a contingency as an eleyentli- ■ hour arms-limitation proposal by one of the dictatorship Powers was foreseen when- tfie British re-anna- ■ ment programme was started; and it was stated at that time, on behalf of the British Government, that the wheels of the re-armament i machinery, once they began to revolve, would not necessarily stop at , a belated gesture from the Continent for limitation. If the traffic policeman in Rome or in Berlin was deaf and dumb when that warning was sounded, it is now rather late in the ■ day to blow the whistle for a general stoppage. If it is true that •Signor Mussolini has appealed to President Roosevelt to call an arms limitation ' conference, his appeal is weighted with such evidences of bad faith as the conquest of Abyssinia. Abyssinia may not be a sufficient reason for rejecting all compacts with Italy, .but it is a reason for not dislocating the expensive and extensive re-arma-ment machinery merely because the Duce has, dropped-, .a word in Washington about limitation. "Marked coldness," Washington cables, is the attitude there ,to the Italian move. The impression is strengthened that Washington is looking for international moves towards peace, but they are trade "moves. Washington wishes in the first place to know whether the bonds of intra-Eihpire trade are '■ to be drawn closer at the cost of the wider trade v (Anglo-American-European). To the Imperial Conference Washington appears to be looking for an answer to that question. _If the Conference responds by offering to broaden the scope of its economic proposals in an international sense—f without undue sacrifice of the intraEmpire idea —then a way 'opens to advance along the line, that Mr. C6fdell Hull (U.S. Secretary of State) naY been advocating for at least five years.'.. In that period, ■ perhaps, the actual tariff concessions that Mr. Cordell Hull has persuaded his Government to make, for the sake of international trade, may not be overwhelming. But they are 'considerable. And the Secretary of State's consistency, so far as his personal advocacy is concerned, has been admirable. His attitude is not the eleventh-hour repentance ot a Covenant signatory who bombed his .way into a remote African State. Mr. Cordell Hull's attitude has been one of unttfilliant, exemplary patience; and if the Imperial Conference gives him his opportunity for an international peace-movement on the trade fro.nt, that opportunity has been well waited for. A trade compromise with America naturally Suggests 4, shipping COiripromise too, andthe cablegrams contain thought-provoking rumours ot a reduction of Pacific shipping, competition and of an opening to nonAmerican shipping of the closed United States-Hawaii trade. But as this is the forecast of one correspondent alone, that matter may stand over till it rests more pn a fact basis. ,In much the same position 'stands Dr. Schacht's talk to the Paris journalists. It is not the first visit to Paris of Herr Hitlers economic adviser, and it is not the first, time that he has advocated getting together for some vague kind of mutual improvement. But hitherto, as the fate of the questionnaire shows, Germany has avoided getting down to specific commitments. Dr. Schacht knows that the economic sufferings incurred for re-armament by Germany and by Italy are severe. He knows that Britain, by making financial sacrifices, has now set a re-armament level (attainable only by a long-term programme) -which Germany and Italy cannot hope to eclipse; they have been beaten at their own game—arming by economic strain. Signor Gayda recognised these economic limits when he complained the other day that British re-armament was unjustified because Britain was not "menaced.' _ JNot menaced, after an experience like the Abyssinian War! From the Gayda argument to the Mussolini appeal to Washington, to stop the arms race, .is but a step. It is a step, however, that cannot deceive anyone who com- ' pares facts with promises (as in ! 1935-36) or promises with facts. Along with the Washington state- ■ ment (of which London officially 1 knows nothing) that the Caesar in , Rome has appealed to the elective s Caesar in Washington, comes a . Belgian report that Signor Mussolini ; has been expressing pride in his military invulnerability. Such boasts are intended for consumption within Italy as well as without. Italian pride must not be compromised by any limitation pleas coldly received in America. The Belgian report » credits the Duce with an extrar ordinary reference to the Guadalajara

defeat of Italians in Spain. "We want," he said, "our sacrifices for the defence of Europe against Communism to be known"; wherefore, he will "publish a ' list of Italian losses in Spain." Putting the Washington and the Belgian reports together, it seems that the American democracy is-asked to listen to the appeal of a man who would be quite likely to militarily intervene if civil disturbances started in the JJnited States, and if he (Mussolini) chose to brand one side.or the other as "Communist." Meanwhile, the reported continuance in Catalonia of the rising, of reputed Anarchists plays right into the hands of such a policy of interference as the Duce avows, But there is one silver lining to the foreign clouds. While conditions in Spain are "slill tragic and acute," the British Secretary for Foreign Affairs believes thaf Coronation contacts and Empire consultations are accompanied by an appreciable easing in the international situation, and that "an era of international opportunity may be at hand!'

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Bibliographic details

Evening Post, Volume CXXIII, Issue 124, 27 May 1937, Page 8

Word Count
967

EVENING POST. THURSDAY, MAY 27, 1937. MUSSOLINI TO ROOSEVELT Evening Post, Volume CXXIII, Issue 124, 27 May 1937, Page 8

EVENING POST. THURSDAY, MAY 27, 1937. MUSSOLINI TO ROOSEVELT Evening Post, Volume CXXIII, Issue 124, 27 May 1937, Page 8

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