Evening Post. TUESDAY, OCTOBER 16, 1934. A NATIONAL STATESMAN

Evening Post, Volume CXVIII, Issue 92, 16 October 1934, Page 8

Evening Post.

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 16, 1934.

A NATIONAL STATESMAN

When M. Doumergue received the President's invitation to form a Cabinet which should be above party and be framed with a view to averting the danger that was threatened by the riots of February 6, and uniting the nation for the needed reforms, he agreed on the condition that all the living exPremiers gave him support. A Cabinet with this support, and representing all the parties would, he said, constitute "a real National Union," and it alone could restore the situation and ensure the necessary attention for the Budget and for foreign affairs. Until this was done the trouble would continue. There was one of the eleven exPremiers for whose support M. Doumergue did not need to stipulate, and he was the most distinguished of them all. Too ill to join ihe Cabinet or even to take part in the negotiations, M. Poincare had to confine himself to a telegram, but it is probable that Piis message of congratulation to "the only man equal to the task" was welcomed by the Premier himself and by the nation as one of the happiest omens of those fateful days. For M. Poincare too had been called in, after every other hope had failed, to face a similar crisis: he too had formed a Cabinet of National Union in order to meet it; and his brilliant success supplied the best possible ground for hoping that if a similar procedure could now be informed by a similar spirit his success could be repeated. Both during the War and afterwards the finances of France had been a peril and a disgrace to a nation which individually is one of the most frugal in the world. During the War only 26,098,000,000 francs were provided from revenue against an expenditure of 169,929,000,000 francs. With far less excuse the orgy became far worse when the War was over. The post-War borrowings exceeded the War borrowings, writes Mr. SisJey Huddleston in. his "France and the French," and in some years f.ho income of France was only 7,000,000,000 francs against an expenditure of 57,000,000,000 francs. There were no real Budgets— or rather, in addition to a purely nominal Budget, there was what was described as an "extraordinary" Budget, for which there were no receipts. In 1914 the Public Debt ' was 33,000,000,000 francs. 1n'1926 it was over 300,000,000,000 francs. There was, besides, an external debt of about 40,000,000,000 gold francs. Half of the Public Debt was of a short-term character. The service of the debt absorbed more than half the Budget, when at last the Budget was balanced. It was in reliance on the receipt of "astronomical" sums from Germany that the balancing qf the Budget had been regarded since the War as an expensive superfluity. Such was the general position in July, 1926, and at least six successive Finance Ministers had struggled with it in vain. .M. Herriot's Ministry was not even given a chance of tackling the problem. Formed on July 19 it was thrown out on the 21st, and on that day the franc, which before the War had stood at 25 to the pound, fell with a nice regard for mathematical neatness to 250. France seemed about to shoot the rapids. It is interesting to recall today that it was M. D.oumergue and M. Poincare who saved France on that occasion. On the evening of July 22, 1926, M. Doumergue, who was then President, invited M. Poincare to form a Cabinet. On the following day M. Poincare was ready with a Cabinet of National Union, representing all parties except the extremists at either end (Communists, Socialists, and extreme Right) and including M. Briand, M. Herriot, and four other ex-Premiers. The immediate effect was that the franc jumped up to 187 to the pound. In the Chamber of Deputies on July 27 M. Poincare read the Ministerial declaration of policy, which included the following:— After a careful and conscientious examination of the situation, we are absolutely convinced that it is possible rapidly to improve! the state of French finances, and to raise the exchange value of our currency. ... We do not claim that we .shall, within a few weeks, or even within a few months, solve the whole of the economic and financial problems which surround us owing to an unhealthy state of affairs which is almost universal. The essential and first thing is to go straight ahead as fast as possible. There is a suggestion both of the Snowden and of the Roosevelt touch in this modest but resolute statement. The Poincare Government did better than it promised. Within a week it had persuaded the Chamber to authorise increased taxation to the amount of 11,000,000,000 francs, and the normal Budget deficit was turned into a surplus for 1926 of more (hart 1,000,000,000 francs. Before the French Parliament adjourned on August 11 ihr: whole of M. Poincare's proposals for the

restoration of the finances.

includ-

ing the institution of a sinking fund, had been carried. On August 10 the National Assembly—a joint session of the Senate and the Chamber —had by a vote of 671 to 144 carried a one-clause Bill which put the sinking fund beyond the power of an ordinary Parliamentary vote by incorporating it- in the Constitution. Those who have described the completion of the whole of this revolutionary programme within three weeks after the formation of the Government as ".savouring of the miraculous" are not without excuse. As a Parliamentary feat it will stand comparison with the best that Britain's National Government accomplished in 1931, and it must be remembered that M. Poincare's Government was a one-man Government to an extent which could never be alleged of the Mac Donald Government. The value of M. Poincare's foreign policy is a far more difficult matter to assess. Elected to the Presidency of the Republic in January, 1913, his term of office covered the whole period of the World War, but that office did not carry with it the executive control of military operations, or anything much in excess of advisory power. From one of Clemenceau's characteristic sayings which his biographer records it might be inferred that in his opinion Poincare nevertheless asserted a power which exceeded the constitutional limit. Poincare never wanted to conduct himself like a President of the Republic nor Foch like a soldier. One day Foch said to me: "You know,, I suppose, that, constitutionally, I ani not under your orders." I answered: "I feel very friendly towards you, but if there. is i one bit of advice I can give you it is not to try that game on me." He was satisfied that I' meant what I■said. The single warning that was enough for Foch was probably more than Poincare ever needed, for in calling Clemenceau to the Premiership he knew exactly that the man was better at giving orders than at taking them, and that was one of the grounds of his choice. We are not aware that anybody else has accused Poincare of undue interference in the control of war policy, and it seems likely that if his personal power had been greater he might have prevented some of the changes of Ministry which were almost as frequent during the War as they had previously been. On Poincare's post-War foreign policy British opinion has been for* the most part unfavourable even where the interests of the two countries have not been in direct conflict. In his invasion of the Ruhr, in his general attitude to Germany, to the League of Nations, and to the cause of peace Britain thought that Poincare was wrong, and regarded Briand as a much safer guide.