THE ROOT CAUSE

Evening Post, Volume CXVII, Issue 63, 15 March 1934, Page 11

THE ROOT CAUSE

DISARMAMENT DELAYS

DISTRUST OF XATIOXS

SECURITY V. EQUALITY

MR. EDEN'S SOBER SURVEY

(British Official ft'trelesa.) (Received March 15, 11 a.m.) RUGBY, March 14. Disarmament prospects were reviewed by the Lord Privy Seal (Mr. Anthony Eden) during a debate in the House of Commons this evening. Before examining the European situation in detail he remarked that in the difficult months of the Conference one of the most encouraging features had been the close collaboration between Britain and the United States. Only a few days ago President Roosevelt had issued a statement giving full support to the fresh initiative as set forth in the British memorandum. ! Proceeding, he recalled the limited scope and purpose of his mission to the European capitals which he visited to explain the purpose of the proposals in the British memorandum, to meet their criticism upon them,. and ; if possible, to gain from the Governments statements on their points of view. He had hoped' that his Majesty's Government would as a result be in a position to see how far there was agreement. upon the proposals in the memorandum. That hope had not been fully realised, but it would be in a very few days. They had had expressions of opinion from two Governments, and expected to have the view of the third shortly. Meanwhile, he limited himself to revealing certain impressions forced upon him in the course of his journey. He reminded the House that the long delay of the Conference was not owing to a disagreement among experts, but rather he thought to the fact that the nations had been unable to summon that confidence in one another which was necessary, if a convention was to be realised and kept. OVERMASTERING MOTIVES. 'As an inevitable legacy of war they had been conscious of the presence in Europe of two overmastering motives—on the one side a mistrustful apprehension, and on the other an aggravated impatience. The rival demands for security on the one side and equality on the other were only vocal expressions of these sentiments. The anxiety of France was for security—a demand based in every French mind upon deep and abiding memories. Just as France had.this instinctive desire it seemed perhaps difficult for her to appreciate that it was possible that Germany might have the same feeling expressed in another form. France was so convinced that she had no intention of attacking any one that she found it difficult to believe that another country, not at present permitted comparable armaments, should not feel absolutely secure of her vicinity. France joined with Britain in regarding the League of Nations as an outward symbol of a collective peace system, and it was difficult for France to believe that a great Power in Western Europe could remain long away from Geneva. CAN THEY BE RECONCILED? Sometimes speeches were made that added to her fears. There was one in the' last few days by General Goering. If there was a lack of instinctive trust between nations and of confidence deep, and abiding, it sometimes happened that comments of small- importance had greater significance. If these were the respective positions not of Governments, but of the sentiments of nations for some years past, it was clear they could not be readily reconciled. How was it to be done, and could it be done at all? When he asked himself was it his experience on his brief mission that this was a hopeless task the answer he gave was "No," decidedly "No." Until all the replies had been received on the British memorandum it was premature to be pessimistic. Britain's stake in peace was probably greater than that of any other nation in "the, world, and her stake in the League of Nations was also great. If the Disarmament Conference failed, she would have as much cause for anxjety as any nation, and every country would no doubt have to review all its armaments. NO SECURITY IN ARMING. But he did not believe that even a manifold increase in existing armaments would alone be sufficient to (ensure our national security. Competitive armaments in themselves were no security. We had them in 1914 and they availed us nothing in preventing war. By standing on our security in armaments we could not flatter ourselves that we should then have realised the luxury of isolation.' But anxious as the situation was he did not believe it was desperate. Something was surely to be gained from the fact that' public opinion among nations was today alive to the seriousness and anxiety of the situation. That was not the case in 1914. He did not therefore accept the judgment of those who spoke as though war in Europe was imminent;' but they had an urgent responsibility to get on with the work, for every month made the task'1 more difficult. That task was twofold. The first was to realise a convention, not a spectacular convention —that was out of our reach—but a convention containing some disarmament based upon a realisation of the | present position—in short, a con-

venlion on the basis of the recent British memorandum. The second was to seek to restore to the League of Nations that full authority it could.only enjoy from a membership of all the great Powers of Western Europe. Every development of science and policy since the war increased the need for some such organisation as the League of Nations, and the widest possibility of membership of it had now become an indispensable clement of international policy. What he had learnt in three capitals convinced him that there was no alternative to die general lines of the British memorandum, if an agreement was to be reached on a disarmament convention at all. When the Government received the complete replies of three nations, it would examine them with sympathy and understanding, and;. with the construction that no nation would willingly allow a final breakdown of the Conference. The debate is proceeding.