THE WAY TO PEACE

Evening Post, Volume CXVII, Issue 62, 14 March 1934, Page 9

THE WAY TO PEACE

TWO ROUGH ROADS

ENGLAND TODAY

STJRYEY OF POSITION

A study of history reveals that, after every great -war, plans have been set on foot ,to reform the international system in some ■way which will prevent so great a calamity from ever overtaking mankied again. Unfortunately it also reveals that, as soon as the memory of the last war begins to fade, there is a slackening of the moral and political effort to ensure that war shall not recur, states the "Economist" editorially. For example, the post-Napoleonic peace movement died away in the eighteen-twenties, with the result that the peace which followed 1815 was followed in its turn by a fresh crop of wars and revolutions which filled the years 1848 to 1871. Clearly, in our generation inertia is likely to produce the same catastrophe again unless we summon up the moral and mental energy to counteract it; and we are well aware that, ■•■£his time, the penalty of lailure will be immeasurably greater in proportion to the stupendous increase in our command- —for destructive as weir as for constructive purposes—over the forces of Nature. THIS YEAR'S PROBLEM. If, therefore, we are going to make a'serious attempt this year to set our foot on the road to social recovery, it is imperative that we should face the present position of international affairs and consider what action to take in the light of it. One plain fact is that the "postwar era" is now at an end, and that our reprieve from the operation of the old fatal system of international relations is ending with it—unless we take active steps now to change the course on which we are in danger of drifting. During the past fifteen years the Balance of Power, which is tire traditional system of relations between parochial sovereign. States, has been suspended in two separate ways: first, through the unilateral disarmament of the Powers who were on the losing sWe in the late war; and, secondly, through the partial success-, of our efforts to "build up an alternative system of collective security on a basis of a reduction of armaments all round combined ■with co-operation in keeping the peace. The unilateral. disarmament of the vanquished was intended as an interim measure to give time for putting the new collective system on a permanent effective working basis and our failure to make the collective system work,before Germany recovered from the temporary prostration of defeat is the explanation of the crisis which, in the international field, has certainly not yet reached its culmination —whatever the ■ present phase of the business evele may be. In these circumstances some people in this country are looking forward — riot, indeed, with a Japanese or German exaltation,, but with an AngloSaxon complacency—to a relapse into the ancien regime of the Balance of Power between competitive national armaments as the next chapter of the world's political history. CAN LOOK AFTER ITSELF. The complacency shows itself in a belief that England can look after it-1 self (perhaps with the help of the Do-' minions'?) quite comfortably in such circumstances, and in, a>conviction that an-acquiescence in the return of the, old armed' balance of power is decidedly preferable to assuming any further responsibilities or taking any further risks for the sake of making the new collective system of security effective after all. . "The first thing that strikes an observer of this English school of thought is that, on the question of what to do next, it is sharply divided against it-! self! There is one wing, which, on the assumption that the League and Disarmament are done with, is preaching the traditional English policy of ; studied isolation from the affairs of the. Continent, arid another wing which is advocating—-as an, alternative substitute for the Covenant and the Disarmament Convention—a naval and military alliance between the United KiDgdom and France. Neither of these policies, however, will stand examination. The policy of isolation is manifestly visionary. At no time during the four centuries for which the modern European balance of power has existed has it actually been possible for this country to keep out of any general war on th,e European Continent. Our isolation has only availed against minor conflicts which did not threaten to bring the whole Continent under some single Power's dominion. And if this is true of the past, it is a fortiori true now that the strategic insularity of Great Britain has been undermined to oiir disadvantage by the invention of the submarine, and at the same time transcend, equally to our disadvantage, by the invention of the aeroplane. > Today England can be bombed and ■blockaded simultaneously from air and submarine bases on the Continent; and at the present moment Great Britain is strategically, and therefore also politic- • ally, as much a part of Europe as Canada is of North America. We can no more disentangle our fortunes from those of Franco and Germany than Canada can disentangle hers from those cf the United States and Japan. These are facts which cannot be conjured away, however embarrassing they may be. The policy of isolation is moonshine. THE PROPOSED ■ALLIANCE. On this showing, the alternative policy of throwing in our lot with Prance is at first sight more specious. Though the Dominions would jib at it, they cannot deny us the right to look after our own vital interests in Europe •—just as Canada, for instance, claims to have the last word in her own relations with the United States. And, of course, if a Franco-British alliance did really make another Enropeau war impossible, then this unpopular means would be actually producing the result which the Dominions, as well as we ourselves, desire. But can we convince ourselves that a Franco-British alliance would rule out •war in Europe by keeping the balance of forces invincibly weighted against any possible antagonist or group of antagonists—even supposing that the unilateral disarmament of Germany •were to lapse! Certainly the combina-! tion would be a formidable one for Germany to face; for France would retain her alliances in Eastern Europe and the ■benevolent neutrality of Russia (who is almost as much afraid as Poland of a militant Germany), while England's solidarity with France would deter Italy from throwing in her lot with Germany. At first sight it looks as if this would Surround Germany with an iron ring 'on- which she -would never venture to irjreak her sword, even if she were fully and filled with the martial spirit. Yet history shows that, in any .'division of Powers into two opposing armed camps, there, is an invincible tendency for the strengths of these two camps to approximate to equality until eventually .they are near onough for one or other side to venture upon war. However heavily we may weight one ieale for the moment, we cannot guarantee that this distribution of weights ■will remain, permanent; and there is

every likelihood that the futility of the attempt will be proved, when it is too late to try a bettor policy, by yet another outbreak of hostilities. In short, both the policies which are now being put before us as alternatives to thoroughgoing support of the collective system merely lead by different routes to the same ultimate disaster. And, this being so, it is surely worth our while to incur heavy responsibilities and even to run risks if by so doing we can save the collective system from shipwreck. There is little doubt that, if the collective system is to be saved, all the States supporting it will have to be prepared to make much greater sacrifices on its, behalf than they have been ready to make hitherto. But if it is a choice between two rough roads, one ending in salvation and the other in perdition, no one who realised whither they were leading would hesitate for one moment which to take.