Evening Post.

Evening Post, Volume CXV, Issue 72, 27 March 1933, Page 6

Evening Post.

MONDAY^MARCH 27, 1933.

THE MUSSOLINI PLAN

The speech in. which Mr. Mac Donald opened the debate on foreign affairs in the House^ of Com-mons-on Thursday performed the useful service of separating and defining two ;momentous and closely related issues which have inevitably, been confused in the arguments and the speculations of the last fortnight. The Disarmament Conference was threatened with collapse and, as he informed the delegates at Geneva, "the fabric of civilisation was cracking about their ears" Avhen he gave them fresh life and hope by t submitting ihe comprehensive but 'avowedly transitional scheme of the ' British Government. "The Disarmament Conference had," as "The Times" said, "lost its way, and Mr. 'Mac Donald put it on the straight path to a definite goal." International fears and hatreds and suspicions have prevented the nations from giving effect to the general reduction of armaments which they declared "in the Versailles Treaty to be an essential condition of a stable peace, and the most potent $f these influences has^; of course, been the mutual antagonism of the two nations whose centuries-old differences started the I World War. ::•■ :;.

The real barrier ,to disarmament, said the "Daily Telegraph" in its comments on lli-. Mac Donald's spoecli at Geneva, is the continuing distrust and tension between Prance and Germany. It. welcomed-the new plan as affording an opportunity for the restoration of confidence. .' .

In their attempts at disarmament the nations find themselves moving in the same vicious circles as in their search for economic peace. The distrust and the fear which are at the bottom of both troubles can only be overcome by a restoration of confidence, but confidence cannot be restored while the distrust and the fear continue. In the days before the War the armed alliances designed to maintain the balance of power were, regarded as the best guarantees ,of security and peace. But the division of Europe into two hostile camps did not avert the World War, and for that reason and others nobody would advocate a return to "the system now. In the Treaty of Locarno, however, we have a post-war model of a different kind which undoubtedly did much to ease the tension between France and Germany and the unrest of Europe, and would doubtless have done far more if Stresemann had lived. The essence of the Locarno Treaty was that, Britain and Italy, recognising that they could not afford to face another World War, guaranteed to protect the frontiers of France and Germany as^fixed at Versailles against the aggression of either of these Powers.. The distinction between this kind of treaty and the old alliances was about as wide as it -'could be. It. was not aimed, even conditionally, at any of the nations that were not parties to the Treaty; on the contrary, it made the position of every one of them safer than it was before, and that without charge or liability. The object of the Locarno Treaty was to guard, a matter of universal concern —the security of the Franco-German frontier as determined by the Peace Conference.

Signor Mussolini's proposal is that the same four Great Powers which signed the Treaty of Locnr1". should agree to co-operate in the solution of the international problems of Europe. No military nlli^ ance is suggested. The military sanctions by which , the Locarno Treaty is distinguished from the Kellogg Pact could not be contemplated by Britain for a moment and have not been proposed by Signor Mussolini. But with this important reservation the analogy to the Locarno procedure is close. Before Mr. Mac Donald and Sir John Simon had left Rome "The Times" referred to their visit as having already eased the tension in Europe.

However natural it may be for travelling British statesmen to break their journeys at Paris, it said, these repeated meetings will rouse misgivings in other capitals. It so happens that the Italian and British Prime Ministers are better placed than anybody else to arrest the disintegrating process which, if unchecked, will throw Europe back into two armed hostile groups.

This is wisely and tactfully put. It

was inevitable that the recent improvement in Anglo-French relations should have been regarded with suspicion in Berlin, and the accession of the Nazis to power has doubtless strengthened the tendency of Germany to look to Italy as her best friend; It is therefore a most fortunate circumstance that, just when Hitler's victory and the deadlock of the Disarmament Conference seemed to mark the zero hour of the cause of peace, these conversations •at Rome should have inspired the hope of a permanent Quadrilateral of Powers in which Germany will be included, and that the suggestion should have come from Italy. Signor ; Mussolini's proposal was absurdly denounced by the "Daily Herald" as

a new attempt to undermine the authority of the League of Nations and replace the Council of the Assembly by a self-appointed Junta of Great Powers ... a move back to the system of Holy Alliance and Concert of Europe.

The Locarno Treaty might have been less unreasonably so described, since it had at least the element of force behind it. According to the official statement of the Anglo-French conversations in Paris,

the French Ministers affirmed their desire to see established in tho interests of peace within the framework, and in. the spirit of the League of Nations a loyal co-operation between, the four European Powers 'who are permanent members of the Council of the League of Nations.

There is surely nothing here to scare the most timid of pacifists. Nor was there any ground for alarm, but rather for thankfulness and hope, in the view of the British Government as presented by Mr. Mac Donald:—

The Government welcomed Signor Mussolini's idea, he said. There were no greater immediate ■ dangers to Europe than that when, the inevitable Nationalist revival occurred the treaties might be the subject of challenge by one interest, and under conditions which would only renew animosity and ruin the prospect of friendly accommodation. The conversations in. Rome amounted to this, that now, when it was perfectly plain to everybody that national life was being revitalised in Europe, Jho four Powers' should meet before they might bo driven apart and try to removo by negotiation dangers which would have to be.mot in any event. ■

Whether the four Powers will be able to agree upon the details of Signor Mussolini's scheme is, of course, another matter, but that they should • mek arid make the • attempt, and be prepared to meet again, would be in itself a.hopeful achievement. To get Germany there and in a mind to talk business would have seemed beyond hope a week ago, but the possibility is actually suggested by about the only reasonable utterance of Herr Hitler's that has been reported since he took, office:—

We accept Signor Mussolini's farsighted plan. We are- ready sincerely and peacefully to collaborate with Britain, France, and Italy. Wo earnestly desire to avoid an increaso of arms. Germany wants nothing more than equal rights and equal freedom.