THE NAVY'S OIL

Evening Post, Volume CXIV, Issue 124, 22 November 1932, Page 7

THE NAVY'S OIL

WEAKNESS OF BRITAIN

A GRAVE PROBLEM

Would the threat of war confront the British Navy.with a fuel-crisis? In other -words, is the Navy in' a position to safeguard not only the nations-food supply, but the large imports of fuel oil which the Navy itself and- a large section of our mercantile marine would need in order to carry on? ! To this latter question, I am 'informed on. sound authority, some of our most distinguished naval strategists return an emphatic negative, writes Hector Bywater in the London "Daily Telegraph." : War problems played out on the "Kriegspiel" board by certain of these officers have invariably demonstrated j the impossibility' of ensuring the safety of the ■ hundreds of oil-tankers which represent, as it were, our floating pipeline. . - . . .- .-■..--.. The "war game'" board, I should explain, enables problems of tactics and strategy to be worked out with a precision which experience largely' confirms, and the results obtained from such ''games" materially influence the organisation and , allocation of the Fleet.- ' ... It is no secret that the Admiralty, ever since the war, has been striving' to build up substantial reserves of fueloil at our naval bases at home and abroad. But for various reasons it is impossible to maintain in peace time the vast quantity of oil which the .Navy would require for a major campaign of .any duration. Hence the crucial importance of protecting the fleet of tankers upon the safe running of which the Navy's mobility Would de. pend in. war. LIABLE TO DISASTER. The conclusion reached by many naval officers of wide experience is that our floating pipe-line would be liable to be cut in the event of. war with a first-class European Power. Drastic scrapping and failure to replace obsolete ships have so reduced our strength that we have not nearly enough ships to provide adequate escort for the tankers. And it is precisely against these vessels that an enemy would make a dead set, as the German U-boats did. So heavy were the losses in tanker tonnage in the war that we were compelled to build a pipe-line across Scotland from the' Clyde to the Firth of Forth, to obviate the necessity of fleet tankers entering the worst danger zone. By December, 1910, the stocks of naval fuel oil had fallen so low that an Admiralty order waa issued restricting the Grand Fleet to low speeds save in exceptional circumstances, and as a result its striking power was gravely curtailed. It took over a year of strenuous work and all manner of expedients to accumulate sufficient oil to enable the Navy to regain its freedom of action. COAL BTXKNING. Tot at that time most of our battleships and cruisers burnt coal. To-day the Fleet is entirely oil-burning, and the question of fuel supply lias therefore become more complicated. Another new factor is the largo number of fast liners and important cargo vessels which now consume oil, either in furnaces or in Diesel engines. Many of these vessels would be directly or indirectly employed on naval service in war time, and their fuel supplies would be a charge on the Navy's reserves. The whole question is one of such importance that it is doubtless receiving the earnest attention of the Admiralty. It is probable that if we were in conflict with a strong European Power the Mediterranean route would have to be given up as too dangerous. In that case, tankers from Eastern ports would have to be diverted to the long route round the Cape, causing serious delay and extending our vital lines of communication. Another aspect of the problem concerns the system of storing oil at naval bases. Many of the existing tanks are above ground—e.g., at Portland and Invergordon— and being very conspicuous features of the landscape they would certainly invite attack by hostile warships or aircraft. The provision of underground tanks at,every important base would appear to be a measure of prudence.