FUSION AND THE COUNTRY

Evening Post, Volume CX, Issue 125, 24 November 1930, Page 8

FUSION AND THE COUNTRY

Only a few weeks ago the Leader of the Reform Party thought to put an end to fusion talk with a statement that there were fundamental differences between United and Reform. Mr. Coates did not then specify the fundamental differences, and he has not since done so. The public are left guessing as to what they might be. Apparently several weeks of search are necessary before they can be discovered. Now, however, the; Hon. A. D. M'Leod'has found a new argument against fusion. It is not the existence of fundamental differences, but the fear of the Country Party. ' ' In the North Island at least he had little hesitation in. saying that fusion would bring about at the next election in. rural electorates a crop of Country Party candidates who would poll a very large number of votes. This prediction is based on Australian experience. Fusion in Australia, says Mr. M'Leod, led to the Country Party becoming a strong and vital force, and this, although the Country Party had no such , intention, "certainly assisted rather than weakened Labour's political position." We cannot agree with Mr. M'Leod's statement of the position. The Liberal and Conservative Parties were compelled to come together in Australia because their disunion was assisting Labour. A section of the electorate declined to accept the union, and made a new cleavage by forming the Country Party, but it cannot be proved that the Country-National-ist cleavage is worse in its effects than the Liberal-Conservative cleavage would have been.

Even if it should be admitted that this second cleavage is the worse, it is not a correct assumption that the experience would be repeated in New Zealand. Conditions in the Commonwealth are different in several important respects. There has been a greater degree of centralisation of population and power in Australia than in New Zealand. Here many of our country towns are closely in touch with rural industry, and throughout the Dominion there is the strongest sympathy with the primary producer. Moreover, New Zealand has not adopted the high protection policy which in Australia has caused farmers to band together in assertion of their rights. In Australia there has been some colour of excuse for a Country Party with a defensive policy. Here there is not the same reason for action, and the Country Party owes its existence to an entire misapprehension of the political position.

Mr. M'Leod's argument, however, is faulty in another respect. "Farmers and numbers of small country people did not trust the motives which lay behind city electoral intentions." This would not be an argument against fusion unless it were held that such a fusion would be ruled by the cities. What reason is there for supposing that it would be so ruled? Obviously, it would be subject to the influences which control the component parties. Does Mr. M'Leod suggest that the Reform Party is controlled by the cities? We certainly have not seen the evidence of it. As to the United Party, Mr. M'Leod himself supplies the evidence when he says that "no greater blow was struck in recent years against Reform than the assiduous spreading by opponents of the tale among farmers that as a party Reform was bound hand and foot to city interests." Plainly, if the farmers deserted Reform for this reason it was not to support'a party bound still closer to city interests. The farmers, therefore, must have concluded that the! United Party was not under city domination. Why, then, should they suspect a fusion of United (not accused of city leanings) or Reform (which suffered unjustly by the city-domination allegation) ? In any circumstances Mr. M'Leod's position is weak. The danger of continued Reform-United separation is real and undeniable. Yet he would not end it, for fear that another problematical danger might threaten the fusion. The better and more courageous course would be to meet the present real peril, and then .to prepare systematically to prevent the new clanger arising. A fusion which stood still and waited lo be supported would not save the situation, but a [live union of the two parties presenting a strong policy in an active campaign would have no reason to fear either attack or schism,