"JACKY" FISHER

Evening Post, Volume CIX, Issue 43, 20 February 1930, Page 19

"JACKY" FISHER

HIS LIFE STORY

A GREAT SEA LORD

CLASH WITH CHURCHILL

Dead rnbre ( than nine years, Lore FisKer, Britain's greatest Sea Lord Btiili; lives in the memory of the Brit ish people. Ho captivated the populai imagination,, and "Jacky" Fisher became the most discussed man of his generation. ' ' For 60 years his genius was devoted to building up the British Navy in readiness for war. He lived' to see his.prophecies fulfilled, his judgment vindicated, and his policy bear the fruit: of victory. But, in a dramatic clash with Winston Churchill, he finally; found himself thwarted and his power diminished at the very climax of his life's work and at a time when England needed him most. • Fisher-, says a writer in an overseas paper, is the subject of a thousand legends. He himself wrote two works covering certain phases of his own life. JiiOW, nine years after his death, the biography of this remarkable man has been written by Admiral E. H. Bacon. TRAGEDY AT THE DARDANELLES. ■ A great part of the story of Lord Fisher's later life deals with the-trag-edy of the Dardanelles and the Clash with Winston Churchill. Admiral Baconthus summarises the position:— ■No. unbiased person, looking back now and studying the history of the Dardanelles can fail to trace the sequence of events. Smitten with, the fascination of a great operation which, if successful,, promised a vast political reward, Mr.« Churchill practically forced the War Council to adopt his proposals, although ho knew that he had neither Lord Fisher's approval nor that of; Admiral Sir Arthur Wilson. Ho never consulted the Board of, Admiralty.";: He constantly, in the face of Lord Fisher's objections, persuaded and cajoled him into acquiescing to send out morevand more vessels urgently required at home. On ■ the fourteenth of May, 1915, in the--.i midst of the campaign, we find Mr. Churchill writing to the Prime .- ■• .'i-rnust aslc you to take note of Pisher's. statement to-day that-"he was against the Dardanelles, and had been all'along;" or words to that effect. The First' Sea Lord has agreed in writing to every executive telegram on "which the operations have been conducted, and had thdjr been immediately successful the credit would have been his. ' ' ; But I make no complaint of that. .Mr.: Churchill's statement is correct, pufeso also- was Lord Fisher's. Mr. Churchill knew perfectly well that lord. Fisher, was, and always had been, agamst; the whole operation, and that it..was : only at his insistent request and under pressure, that Lord Fisher had reluctantly consented to aid the operation in every way he could. In his World Crisis he himself says: —"I am in no way concealing the great and "continuous pressure which I put upon the old Admiral." "I CANNOT CONSENT TO BE PARALYSED." Mr. Churchill's lctlei to the Piime Minister continued:— J am attached to the Old Boy, and it is a great plcasuie to me to work ■with him. I think ho, iceipiocates These feelings. My point is that a moment will arise, in these operations when the Admiral and General on the spot will wish and lcquirc to run a nsk with the fleet for a great and decisive effort. If I agiee with them, I shall sanction it; and I cannot congent to be paralysed by the veto of .a friend-who, whatever the result, will say, "I was always against the Dardanelles." The First Lord thus in effect wrote to the Prime Minister to s>ay that he intended to arrogate to himself the functions of the Sea Lords. He himself has stated that "no ship could sail or gun fire without the sanction of the First Sea Lord;" and, in effect, he now asked, either that Lord Fisher .be dismissed, and a weaker First Sea Lord appointed who would do his bidding, or that he himself should be given auihoirty to. override the professional views of the Sea Loids. One-.must marvel at the assurance oC this young politician, who assumed professional naval knowledge superior to that of picked men whose lives bad been spent in the Jiavy and in the study of naval problems. Aiready, during the ill-fated first few months of his" war administration, disaster had dogged Admiralty policy, and he had been forced to call in Lord Fisher to put mattcis right. Ovei the Dardanelles he had biough't the Navy info a difficult position by his disregard of the advice of his professional colleagues; but lie, in spite of this, appealed to the Prime Minister to re,lieve him entirely from all professional control and virtually to dismiss the lnan who had retrieved the errors of the early part of his administration. If success had followed his previous disregard of the advice of his naval advisers he might, with some appearance of reason, have a&kcd to bo allowed in futuie.to follow his unfettered judgment; -.- but; instead of success, something approaching disaster had icsulted. A FATEFUL NIGHT.

During -the course of the night of 14th May four memoranda came to

Lord Fisher's office from the First Lord.. -' . t Captain T. E. Crease-, naval assistant to Lord Fisher, gives a vivid description of the events of that fateful night:—...',----"I was1 working-in my room at the Admiralty on the night of ,14th; May, when, towards midnight, ■ Mastc-rtou. Smith (the First Lord's private secretary)' came-in with the minute (No. A)' and covering letter, and said that the First Lord wished the First Sea Lord to have them in the morning. ""Masterton Smith- asked me to read them through, and I did so. Ho was evidently uneasy about the minute, and asked me 'how I thought the old man would take it,'' Knowing we'l Lord Fisher's frame of mind during the past few days and his letter to the Prime Minister of the day before (iv which ho pointed out Mr. Churchill's determination and forecast his own resignation) and reading that submarines were now included iv the proposed reinforcements," in addition to various other ships and materials that Lord • Fisher had not.mentionld a few hours earlier, I had no hesitation about my reply. I said at once' that I had no- doubt whatever Lord Fisher would resign instantly: if he; received the minute; for these new proposals, coming at that inomant, would be the last straw. " Had' Mr. Churchill been wise he would have kept back the minute and have discussed the matter next morning; but either, in his optimism, he did not care whether Lord Fisher resigned or not, or he had confidence that ho could bind 'the old admiral' tp his purpose." FISHERY ULTIMATUM. ::;Lord' Fisher opened the dispatch bos next morning^ and saw at once what the Fast Lord proposed with reference to weakening further Fleet in home f!waters. He felt that it was impossible to work with him any longer, and at once wrote, and sent off before breakfast, a, letter to the Prime Minister resigning his .office of First Sea Lord. This action precipitated a crisis, and Mr. Asquith, bending before the storm, decided to invite the Unionist leaders to enter the Government. \ The succeding . days, therefore, brought a change so far as Lord Fisher was concerned. The; reconstruction of the Government introduced an entirely new factor. He began to see that if in the ne.wly reconstructed Govornment Mr. Churchill left tho Admiralty, he, Lord Fisher, might still remain as First Sea Lord, provided that the new First Lord was not irrevocably committed, in advance, to the enterprise. Later he was old/ by someone, who professed to know what was in progress behind the scenes,, that the Unionist leaders were determined he should remain at the Admiralty and practically made this a condition of their joining the Government. This is clear from letters he wrote' after he reached Scotland. •'■■-. Eventually, however, the rumour reached him that Mr. Balfour would become First Lord and that Mr. Churchill would remain in the Cabinet. Desirous as he was of staying at the Admiralty, and completing the'work he had started, he determined not to do so with the Dardanelles millstone hung round his neck; for, next to Mr. Churchill, .the most ardent advocate on the War Council of the Daidanc-lles operations had been Mr. Balfour. lie accordingly, without consulting anybody, seized his pen and wrote to tho Prime Minister. His letter amounted to an ultimatum,-and Prime Ministers are not accustomed to submit to such dictation, nor to be told whom they aio to exclude- from their Cabinets. Had Loid Fisher1 called on the Prime Minister he might have placed bofoie him his point of view in a perfectly constitutional manner, but the letter that he wrote finally destroyed any chance oi: his', being retained as Fiist &ca Loid. "COMMANDED BY THE KING." The end came- on 22ncl Mjy m a letter from the Piimo Ministei s(Mr. Asquith):— "Dear Lord Fisher, — I am commanded.by the King to accept your tendered "resignation oi' the office of First Sea Lord of the Admiralty. , Tours faithfuly, H. H. Asquith." This was an abrupt iorm of farewell after over sixty years of good service to his country; but a man who precipitates a Cabinet crisis in wartime cannot expect any great courtesy from, those whom he has • embarrassed. lit is a matter of history that, in,the past one hundred yeais, and piobably for longer still, no First Sea Loid had ever lesigncd through a difference of opinion with his. Fiist Loid. Mr. Chuiehill pieateil a double lecoicl m this respect. Two of his Fust Sea Louis—Adnnial of the Fleet feu 'Arthm Wilson and Admiral of the Fleet Loid Fibhei — both lelinquished their posts owing to diffeiences of opinion with Mi. Churchill on naval matteis. Tins iooord is all the nioic icmaAablo when it is appreciated that these two weio piobably the most cxpeiienced Sea Loids the countiy had seen for a, centmy; whereas Mr. Churchill was the youngest and, politically, the most inexperienced of any First Lord who had held office during that time. It is not unreasonable, therefoic, to suggest that Mr. Churchill's unfortunate and unduly optimistic belief in his own judgment was not only a great disservico to thecountry, but was the dominating ica&on for Loid Fisher's lcsignation. _____________