NAVAL ARMAMENT

Evening Post, Volume CVIII, Issue 136, 5 December 1929, Page 30

NAVAL ARMAMENT

ENGLAND AND AMERICA

NEED FOR CONFORMITY

WAI! NOT UNTHINKABLE

.(By Senator William E. Borah.)

(Copyright.)

[ Tho.basic thought behind alt naval programmes is directly related to a fear on the part of the nations that they are unprotected upon the seas. Thcro is lacking any assurance* or confidence that their trade is really safe, and that they can scud their ships hither and yon in confidence.

In January, 1928, tho administration in power in tho United States proposed a naval programme which was to cost our people from 890,000,000 dollars (£160,000,000) to 1,000,000,000 dollars (£200,000,000)| Wo wero to build twenty-five 10,000-ton eruisors, 9 destroyer leaders, 32 submarines, and 5 air-craft-carriers, making 71 vessels in all. Why were wo building again on such a vast scale? Did we anticipate war unless it arose over the effort to deny us the use of the sea? We were at peace with all nations. There was no thought in the mind of anyone that Great Britain or Japan or France, or all combined, would declare war on tho% United States.

The fact is that the question of Bineh guns was closely associated with the position of America with reference to small ships, and all the propositions wero being considered in the light of the condition of maritime law. "Wo were thinking about the protection of commerce. And everyone was seeking to secure that which would best serve them in protecting their interests under the dominion of force. Reference must be made to the breakdown of tho Naval Disarmament Conference at Geneva and the disregard of basic naval factors involved in the disarmament conference of 1921-22. In this latter meeting, while some agreements were entered into, the fundamental, underlying question of tho use of seas was not considered. I contend that an international agreemet, accepted by all tha maritime Powers for the protection of seaborne trade in time of war as well as in time of peace, would remove the dominating obstacle to a reasonable understanding between all maritime nations. SOME CONTROL OTHER THAN FORCE. This is the only way, it seems to me, that you can eliminate competitive building in naval armaments. It would create an atmosphere of trust and confidence instead of suspicion and fear. "With the first gesture of Premier MaeDonald to establish accord and create good feeling by stopping the construction of certain ships 'and the answering act of President Hoover in doing likewise, I find a real willingness to get together on these perplexing matters. But naval armaments will continue to grow unless some sound method is found that will place the sea under some control other than force. Civilised nations, with their people groaning under tax burdens, still leave the great Common, the sea, to be mastered by those who can summon the greatest fighting force for that purpose. The minute war breaks out anywhere and the dominant sea power enters in or becomes involved, it makes short work of the rights of neutrals. In other words, all legitimate pursuits upon the sea must give way to the dominaney of the sea power which may be involved. During the late war, all rules, all principles, relative to the rights of neutrals, were utterly disregarded, and that condition still obtains. "When we come to settle the claims of neutrals, Great Britain refused' to Teceda one inch from the position which she had taken during the war, and that position was expressed by the Premier: "We are not going to allow our efforts to be strangled in a network of judicial niceties. . . . Under the- existing conditions there is no form of economic pressure to which we do not consider ourselves entitled to resort." I may be allowed to quote the statement of Lord Wemyss, who said: "So long as our fleet is unhampered by diplomatic restrictions, this country is able, on account of its peculiar conditions, the result of geographic position, to wage war in a manner which has been denied either entirely or in a very large measure to other nations—a manner which is swifter, surer, less destructive and far less costly in the expenditure of either life or treasure than ever can be the ease with war waged on land —at sea by cutting ofi our enemy's supplies and refusing to him the use of those resources which alone make it possible for him to continue to wage war at all." TO STAY THE PACE. In other words, the moment war breaks out other neutrals must remain from that region of the world which Great Britain thinks inimical to her interests to have them. We are now a great commercial nation, building up and extending our trade in every part of the world as never before. That trade is entitled to and will be given protection. This protection can come in a large measure through and by means of understandings, taking the form of treaties or accepted international law, or it can come through, and by means alone of, great naval armaments —force. If there is no agreement or understanding among the nations as to their rights at sea, if we go forward in an atmosphere of suspicion, fear, and a feeling that all depends upon force, does anyone believe that these navies will not continue in. increase at a mad pace? There may be honest efforts to stay the pace and temporary halts may be had. But the mad pace will increase as in tho past from year to year. Our only serious and near serious controversies with Great Britain have been with regard to the use of tho sea. It is difficult to imagine any controversy arising between these two nations unless is should arise over this same question. No one expects an open attack, but everyone expects, judging from the past, that our commerce may be driven from the ocean. While many deplore any talk of trouble between these two nations, still it is the part of wisdom to discuss the problems that are apt to create trouble. It ia better to bring them out in tho open by a frank discussion and thus have understandings and agreements that will thus prevent the resort to force. COMMERCIAL SUPREMACY. People upon public occasion havo been fond of saying that war between Great Britain and the United States is unthinkable. The World War was unthinkable thirty days before it happened—and it was this World War which Woodrow Wilson declared after the war was over, was a war for commercial supremacy. It is equally unthinkable that two great nations, speaking the same language and living to a marked degree under institutions wrought from the same principles, cannot come to an understanding and place the common ocean once for all under the reign of law. So long as they fail to do so, so long as they rely for the protection of their commerce wholly upon the strength of their navies and build with their thoughts and minds upon each other, it is idle to speculate upon irhnt may happen. I believe the farseeing statesmen in both Britain, and