NIKOLAI LENIN
HOW HE INTRIGUED WITH GERMANY AND BETRAYED HIS OWN COMRADES HIS ASSOCIATION WITH A POLICE SPY. Some day in the not remote future when Bolshevist tyranny in Russia has been overthrown, and Russian democracy asserts itself, and when Germany has become normal, the archives of the two nations will, we may confidently expect, reveal to the world the full story of the manner in which Nikolai Lenim and hia associates made common cause with the militarist regime of the Hohenzollerns on the one hand, and, on the other hand, united with the police agencies of the corrupt and despotic Russian • Government, under the old regime, to betray their own Socialist In all modern history there is no chapter so .sinister and vile as that which is known to be included in the archives in question (writes John Spargo, in the Saturday Evening Post). ■ It is very well known throughout Europe that for a long time prior to the first Russian Revolution in March, 1917, Lenin had enjoyed, by special permission of the German authorities, the right to reside in Austria near the Russian border. There is no room for reasonable doubt that he received the assistance of Germany in promoting the revolutionary agitation in Russia. This has been freely charged against him by some of the most responsible leaders of the Russian revolutionary movement, including Vladimir Bourtzev, that remarkable man whose special service has been the unmasking of spies and traitors in the Russian revolutionary ranks, and who has won international repute as the Sherlock Holmes of the Russian Revolution. When we add to the admitted fact of Lenin's immunity and freedom of action in Austria at such a time, his war time journey across Germany in a special train provided by the German Government, by which method h« and his associates were enabled to reach Petrograd and begin their intrigues for the overthrow of the Provisional Government, the conclusion that there was close co-operation between the Government of the Kaiser and the leaders of the Bolsheviks is irresistible.
This does not mean that Lenin was pro-German, though there are many indications that as between the two groups of_ powers he preferred to see Germany triumphant.1 His own explanation of this attitude is th&t he believed the triumph of the Central Empires, involving, as it must, the defeat of the Government of the Tsars, would afford a better chance for revolntionary Russia than would a contrary ending of the war. We cannot understand Lenin's course unless we take full account of his remarkable psychology. Coldly cynical, crassly materialistic, utterly unscrupulous, repudiating moral codes and sanctions as bourgeois sentimentality, Lenin had for many years, ever since the collapse of the Revolution of 1905, surrounded himself with desperate and shady characters, many of them having criminal records. PARVUS THE NOTORIOUS. .' On more than one occasion in the conventions of the Bolshevist faction of which he was 'a leader he boasted of this fact, and it was not unusual for a majority of those attending such conventions to belong to this criminal type. 'Rejecting all moral restraint Lenin. believes that_ the achievement of the end desired justifies any and all means that can be employed. Might, the power to do, iB the only valid right, according to his creed. Perhaps he believed sincerely enough what he told his followers by way of justification of his conduct; namely : _Thaf he could beat the German Government at its own game; that while using_ the German Government's natural desire to foment revolution in Russia, and thus apparently becoming a partner of the German war lords, he deE ended upon the revolutionary fire thus indled in Russia to consume Germany also. It was a cynically conceived polioy, characteristically reckless and desperate.
How much material support Lenin and his colleagues . actually received, from the German Government will be known only when the German1 Imperial archives have' rendered their secrets to the more democratic Germany of the immediate future. Certainly Russia was rife with ugly charges of German gold freely poured into the coffers of the Bolsheviks. There were many circumstantial stories in support of the charge, and the damand for a rigid investigation of the charge rose on every hand. That a well-known German Socialist leader, the notorious Dr. Helfandt, better known by his pseudonym of Pa:-vus, aoted as an intermedia,ry, and bribing agent there seems little room to doubt. The sinister part;played by this Plarvus has been abundantly exposed by leading German Socialists.
A still more shady side of Lenin's activities concerns his intimate relations with spies, provocateurs, and police agents belonging to the. Czar's infamous i Seeoret Police Department. In my book, " Bolshevism," I have given some of the main outlines of Lenin's intimate connection with one of the most brilliant and danagerous of these police spies, Roman Malinovs'ky. ' A fuller account has lately been published by Vladimir Bourtzev, which throws a flood of additional light upon the matter. It will be remembered .by , those who keep close track of events in Russia that when the Bolsheviks overthrew the Kerensky regime they cast Bourtzev into prison. In this way they acted precisely as the old regime acted, for when the war broke out Bourtzev hastened from Paris to Petrograd, and ■■ placed his services and j his influence at the disposal of the Russian Government, whereupon he was cast into prison. . DOUBLE-CROSSING AS A FINE ' ART. While he was in prison at the end of 1917 and the beginning of 1918, a victim of Bolshevik tyranny, he had as his cell, mate one BeTetzky, who, under the old regime of the Tsar had been the Director of'the Police Department. From this interesting fellow prisoner Bourtzev learned the true story of Roman Malinovsky. Nowhere else than in Russia I oould such a story be possible. Malinovsky was an intimate friend and, apparently an ardent disciple of Lenin. He was the leader of the Bolshevik faction in the Fourth Duma. In that body he was famous for the violence of his views, and for the extreme virulence with which he attacked all the Socialist members who did not approve of the Bolshevik tactics. He wanted violent revolution, scorned as unworthy compromise every suggestion of co-oper-ation with other liberal and radical groups, and in general established himself as the most violent and extreme of the extremists. .
Now the truth is itliat he was all tho time a paid agenft of the Tsar's Police Department, acting directly under the orders of its director, Beletzky, who actually wrote all his speeches! Thus the most bitter attack* upon th« Teat's government, *nd the moft virulent di«-
tribes against the police were actually of police manufacture. The reason for this is quite obvious to those who have any knowledge at all of the methods employed by Russian and other European police systems. Malinovsky was one of the mo3t active agents-provocateurs in Russia.
The advantage that this gave to the Police Department and the extreme peril in which it placed the Russian revolutionary leaders need not be pointed out. Malinovsky was the actual leader of the Bolsheviks in Russia, acting as the direct representative and confidential man of Lenin, the latter residine abroad/Though just prior to the outbreak of the war in 1914 travel between Russia and. Austria was exceedingly difficult and practically prohibited, Malinovsky found no difficulty in constantly travelling to and from Potrograd and the place where Lenin resided in Austria. This freedom of movement was possible to Malinovsky, who was not only a member of the Duma but an agent of the Police Department, because there had always been a working arrangement between the German, Austrian and Russian Police Departments. Through this arrangement not only were all the activities of Lenin and his party known to the Tsar's Police Department but, what is even 'more significant, Lenin's policy was limited and shaped by .the Police Department. The latter became possessed of incriminating documents and evidence which led to the arrest of many of the most active Russian Socialists.
Bourtzev tells an interesting story which throws a strong light upon this unholy alliance between Lenin and Malinovsky, the polioe tool, and almost compels one to believe that Lenin was deliberately conniving at the betrayal of his comrades. As far back as 1911 Bourtzev had directed the attention of the Bolsheviks to provocateurs holding responsible positions in their ranks. This he did both publicly in his writings and in private communications. • Among others, he denounced as agent-provo-cateur one Dr. Zhitomirsky, who lived in Paris. In 1913 Lenin wrote to Bourtzev, in the name of the Central Committee of the. Bolsheviks, urging him to preside over a committee to try the case of Zhitomirsky. This Bourtzev did, and in 1914 Zhitomirsky was declared to be a police agent. This judgment was abundantly proved by documents found in the Police Department after the fall of the Tsar's Government. THE IMPUDENCE O/MALINOVSKY, While the Zhitomirsky case was on, Malinovsky visited Bourtzev in Paris as the personal representative of Lenin to talk over Zhitomirsky's case and the subject of combating the agents-provocateurs generally. Malinovsky sought by every means known to him, but fortunately in vain, to ascertain the sources of Bourtzev's information. A little later Bourtzev learned beyond any question that Malincvsky in coming to him had acted also as the representative of Beletzky, the Director of the Jfolice Department! Hia instructions from both chiefs wereidentical. The reason is, of course, that Lenin's plan to send Malinovsky ; to Paris and his instructions to the latter were formulated by Belezky at the Police Department in_ Petrograd. Either Lenin was a. conscious and corrupt accomplice of Beletzky or he was his tool. That the latter is the true explanation will scarcely be doubted by anyone who knows Lenin.
j' Nevertheless, the question rises whether Lenin knew the true character &nd employment of Malinovsky. If he did it is not possible to acquit him of guili. If it can be shown that he knew that Malinovsky .was a police agent and spy no-amouht: of casuistry can serve to excuse or acquit him. Incredible as it may seem, there is much evidence to justify the charge that Lenin knew the sinister role that Malinovsky was playing, ■. Certainly long before he-ceased' to trust Malinovsky with ',his' confidence Lenin knew that charges of a very grave character had been made against him. For example, in the early part of 1914 the Assistant Minister of the Interior, Dzsunkovsky, .learned that Malinovsky, who, as stated above, was a. member of the Duma, was a police agent. Dzshunkovsky at once insisted that Malinovsky resign from the Duma. , The exposure made a great sensation at the time, and though no official announcement was made of Malinovsky's connection with the Police Department it was very widely known. The Russian revolutionists abroad demanded that Malinovsky appear before a revolutionary tribunal and threatened that if he failed to do so they would declare him a criminal and wreak vengeance upon him. Lenin, who, by the way, had proposed that Malinovsky be made one of Russia's representatives on the International Social Bureau, a position which would have grea-tly enhanced his influence, passionately defended his protege. Lenin used his influence to keep Malinovsky concealed in Germany, where he remained until the actual outbreak of the war. ' ■■ PRAISED BY LENIIJ. In 1916 Bourtzev published in the Russian Socialist press a circumstantial charge that Malinovsky was a provocateur. For this Bourtzev was roundly denounced and abused by Lenin and other Bolshevik leaders. Indeed, at every opportunity Lenin defended and .praised Malinovsky as a loyal revolutionist. It was not until the Revolution of March, 1917, when Bourtzev became possessed of the actual documentary proof of Malin-. ovsky's guilt, that Lenin ceased to champinn him. \ ' * .
Even while the war between Russia and Germany was still on Malinovsky was permitted to reside in Germany. He was known as the intimate friend "arid confidential adviser of Lenin, and the Germans not only permitted him to make Bolshevist propaganda among the Russian prisoners, which he did upon a large scale, but they actually financed ■ the work. ■ Lenin, therefore, knew that Malinovsky's connection with t.he Police Department had been charged with sufficient weight of evidence attached to the charge to convince many of'the ablest Russian Socialists.. Yet despite this he continued to confide in him and to make him aware of all his plans. It is unthinkable that when Malinovsky had to leave the Duma, and his work as* police spy was in every mouth, Leniii-could have been ignorant of the true character of his associate. It he was thus ignorant his unfitness for responsible leadership is obvious, ■ Malinovsky himself charged that Lenin andi other leading Bolsheviks knew perfectly well of his connection with the Polico Department. When the collapse of Germany occurred, early in November last, 'Malinovsky saw that his game was finished, both in Germany and in Russia. Instead of committing suicide or fleeing to Argentina or some other South American country, as a less daring and dramatic person would, Malinovsky suddenly reappeared in Petrograd at the Smolny Institute, headquarters of the Bolsheviks'. He demanded loudly that he be arrested and placed on trial, and for three days hung round the headquarters, persisting in this demand_, to which no responsible officer would give heed. Finally he met Zinoviev, with whom he ■had a bri«f conversation. He was then arrested and taken to Moscow for trial. At the Kremlin in Moscow, where he was tried, Malinovsky demanded the right to faco Lenin in open court, a right to "which he was entitled, not only according to Russian law, but also according* to the long-established rules of the Russian revolutionary movement. The right to faco Lenin in open court was denied to him, and Lenin never made any appearance in the trial. The prosecutor in the case was the commander of the Eeel Armjf, Kryleoko.
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Evening Post, Volume XCVIII, Issue 39, 15 August 1919, Page 3
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2,316NIKOLAI LENIN Evening Post, Volume XCVIII, Issue 39, 15 August 1919, Page 3
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