1914 CAMPAIGN

Evening Post, Volume XCVII, Issue 131, 5 June 1919, Page 7

1914 CAMPAIGN

LORD FRENCH'S STORY

COAST ATTACK SCHEME

THE SEARCH FOR A WEAK,SPOT.

(UNITED PRRsS ASSOCIATION.—COPSRIOHT.) , (AUSIRAM/iIMiSW ZEALAND CARL- ASSOCIATION.) LONDON, 25rd May (delayed). Lord French, in- a further article in the Daily Telegraph,'states : "In September I formed the opinion that it was extremely desirable to push along the coast and northward, and drive the Germans from the sea. Mr. Churchill enthusiastically supported me, and promised absolutely devastating naval sopport." Lord "French anticipated that Marshal Joffre' and the French Government would oppose the plan. Mr. Churchill on Bth December.wrote stating that Lord Kitchener fully agreed, with the.-plan, and promised to -send-tli.e. Twenty-seventh Division. Cabinet.next day strongly urged, the plan upon the, French Government, which referred the question to Marshal Joffre. He rejected it, as he had another plan elsewhere, "which," says Lord French, "proved a.very, feeble substitute."... Mr. ! Churchill continued to press the matter, urging Lord French again to put the Admiralty's views .before Marshal. Joffre. Lord' Kitchener, in a memorandum of 9th January, 1915, showed that the- War Council had abandoned the advance on the coast, on the'groiinds that it would be too costly and. would extend the line too far.' Heavy, reinforcements could not be' furnished without disorganising the general arrangements, and a- sufficient supply of ammunition was not available to ensure tho carrying through of the project to a conclusion, though every effort was being made, in all parts of the world in order to obtain an unlimited supply. The War Council also anticipated a strong German attack in the near, future, which could- better be resisted in the existing prepared positions. _ Lord French disagrees with these objections seriatim, and mentions that large train, loads of ammunition traversed France a few months later, bound for the. Dardanelles. He considers these reasoiis for rejecting the plan for the coastal attack illogical. Probably, he goes on, the true explanation was to be found in the War Council's memorandum of 9th January,. in which the view was expressed that the operations on the West front would probably develop into a stalemate.' It was necessary to find another theatre of war where decisive results might be obtained. His opinion I was invited on tho.' matter, and lie refilled, discussing all the possible theories, '-including Gallipoii. He said that an. attack on Turkey would be devoid of any decisive' results. The .only decisive theatre was Germany itself. He added : "It is quite feasible to break tlie German line with a sufficiency of guns and high explosive shells. In any case' it would be unsafe to withdraw troops from the Western front,' which is vital, and where alono decisive results are obtainable."

Marshal Joffre expressed his final opinion on 19th May, 1915, that it was neces sary to be prepared for. a German offensive in the near future. The front must be made absolutely secure. Tlie Allies must be ready to assume the offensive. Reserves were absolutely necessary, and all the secondary operations, including the Flanders , coast attack, must give way to that.

Lord French concludes that.ha always disagreed with these views, and remains convinced that his plan should havo been accepted and tried, whereas those actually employed:only resulted.in feeble and unsuccessful attempts to break tho German line, and absolute failure at the Dardanelles.