THE FALL OF KHARTOUM.

Dunstan Times, Issue 1223, 7 August 1885, Page 3

THE FALL OF KHARTOUM.

Sir Charles Wilson’s report of the fall of Khartoum has just been published. In vindication of his conduct, and in explanation of the two days’ delay at Motemueh, Sir Charles Wilson says the steamer from Khartoum reached Gubat on January 21, while his force was engaged at Metemneh, and he received General Gordon’s letters between 3 and 4 p.m. on that day. He at once determined to proceed to Khartoum, bat several considerations led him to delay his start. He observes, however, that if Khartoum at mid-day on the 26th, and he had left on the morning of the 22nd, and travelled at the same rate as he did, he should only have reached after it had fallen. The considerations which guided him were—(l) the military position, and the fact that his force was considerably weakened and hampered by the wounded; (2) a “most characteristic” letter of General Gordon, insisting most strongly on the British advance-guard taking actual command of the steamers, and removing from them all Pashas, Bays, and men of Turkish or Egyptian origin, and the impossibility of manning the vessels with the Naval Brigade, as had been intended —this remarks Sir Charles Wilson, was the principal reason for the delay ; (3) Omdurman being in the hands of the enemy, who were in force with artillery and the boats b ing in a comparatively defenceless condition, it was necessary to overhaul the engines and prepare the boats, as far as possible, for the heavy fire they would have to encounter ; (4) there was nothing to show that the crisis at Khartoum,so long delayed, would occur within the next few days, and he hoped that the battle of Abu Klea, the result of which was known in the Mahdi’s camp, would have delayed the crisis, though unfortunately it appeared to have had the opposite effect. Summing up, Sir Charles Wilson says :—“ The only day which might have been saved was the 22m1, as the reconnaissance showed that the force had nothing to fear from the Berber direction ; but I think if I were again placed in similar circumstances, I should act in the same way. F.om the moment the steamer started on the mo ning of the 24th uo time was lost. No one can regret the untimely death of General Gordon more than I do, or could have been more anxious to relieve him, but I do not think that any action of mine could have saved his life or averted the fall of Khartoum.”