RESIDENT MAGISTRATE’S COURT, CROMWELL.

Dunstan Times, Issue 844, 21 June 1878, Page 3

RESIDENT MAGISTRATE’S COURT, CROMWELL.

—o—• (Before W. L. Simpson, Esq., R.M.) John Marsh v. S. N. Brown —This was an information laid against defendant, charging him with that ho did on the 17th May, 1878, “ vote upon the following resolution passed by the Council of the said borough on the day aforesaid, namely: ‘ That Melmore Terracebo reduced to a uniform width of 57 feet from the bridge to Achilstreet,’ you, the said Stephen Noble Brown, having at the time of yonr so voting and the passing of the said resolution, a direct interest in the matter then before the said Council, contrary to the form of the said statute in such case made and provided. ”

Defendant conducted his own case, and after making preliminary objections to the information that- it did not specify the nature of the offence with which he was charged, etc., pleaded not guilty. [Space will not permit us to give the evidence, which was taken at great length.] His Worship in giving judgment said : The liret question raised and that came to he decided was, whether Mr Brown voted at the meeting in question. Mr Brown presided at the meetings and with all the other Councillor indicated his views on tho motion ; he afterwards put the motion, and there being no dissonti'-nt voice declared it carried. If Mr Brown, as Mayor, had only a casting vote, the information must be held at fault, but as he had both a deliberative as well as a casting vote the vote as recorded must be held to have been an unanimous vote of the Council including the Mayor, who is also a Councillor. The second question was whether Mr Brown was directly interested in tho resolution, that is, interested in a personal way distinct and apart from any interest that a person in his position as tho possessor of property in a street in common with all others living in the street might derive from the improvement of that street. The evidence showed that Mr Brown, by the resolution, would be saved personally in tho sum of 1.15, tho estimated cost of the removal of his building, such a sum, as the evidence had well shewn, would not tempt Mr Brown to sink his public in his private interests ; hut it must bo homo in mind that the pecuniary amount of the interest was not the criterion, hut it was the nature of the interest, and the Bench had, although with difficulty, come to the conclusion that strictly interpreted, Mr Brown’s interest must be held to coino within the interest pointed out by the Act, and should have made him abstain from voting. The next questianwas, Mr Brown having voted in n matter in which he was interested, had he rendered himself liable to the penalty : that is, had he done it knowingly. There certainly had been evidence that bis attention had boon directed, at a previous time in reference to this question, to the 7f»th clause of tho Act, and that he had read it, over and given his opinion on it, and had come to the conclusion that his interest was not such as alluded to. Mr Brown, therefore, could not plead want of knowledge ; but was tho Bench entitled after tho evidence of the numerous witnesses for the prosecution, who had all, with one exception, testified ■ that Mr Brown ‘would not for a moment sacrifice his public for his private ends, and also tho evidence that had been given as to the number of times this same resolution had-been carried by previous Councils, and that this Council was only giving effect to what apparently wasthe wish of the majority of the citizens; to consider the knowledge of that guilty character which no doubt’was contemplated by the act. Tho Bench had certainly had difficulty in deciding in reference to tho character of Mr Brown’s interest, it is not, therefore, surprising that Mr Brown came to the conclusion ho did ; at any rate, there being a doubt in the mind of the Bench as to whether Mr Brown did knowingly vote, being directly interested, it is hut just he should get the benefit of tho doubt, rather than he said to have committed so corrupt an act for so small a personal consideration, and more particularly a? the Bench had been hurried by tho informant to give a decision in a matter of so weighty a character, and possibly might be much at fault.

Same v. M'Nnlty, Goodgcr, and Behrens, on similar informations, ■wore ruled by the one judgment.