CHERBOURG THREAT

Dominion, Volume 37, Issue 226, 21 June 1944, Page 4

CHERBOURG THREAT

Astute Allied Tactics

ODDS AGAINST GERMANS Advance patrols of Americans are stated to be within a few miles of the port of Cherbourg. Meanwhile the wedge across the peninsula has been made wider and stronger. These operations carry a significance their local import. They must be considered,-in fact, in relation to the invasion of Normandy as a whole.

When ode considers the invasion of Normandy as u whole it becomes clear that the Germans have met with comparative success in their efforts to prevent the Allies gaing Caen. In order to deny the Allies this key communication centre close to the beaches the Germans have concentrated their main weight of armour in that area. No doubt they hoped that during these operations huge supplies of reinforcements would flow from all parts of France to Normandy. Those reinforcements could then be used in other areas, especialy the Cherbourg area. Actually this assumption was based on a wrong appreciation of Allied air power. Recent Allied action in the Cherbourg area has shown up the German failure to rush up adequate reinforcements. The Germans now find themselves the victims of a neat “pair of breeches” in the game of draughts. The Allies forced the German reinforcements to defend Caen at all costs. In doing so a gap was left open in the Cherbourg area which is due to cost the Germans something greater than their retention of the Qaen area.

It is indeed probable that the subsequent results of German inability to resist everywhere will have far-reaehing repercussions on the whole battle front. Operations in the Cherbourg area will enable the Allies to mount a powerful offensive with greater speed and security when this ideal hedgehog port falls. It is an admission of deep-rooted strategical frustration on the part of the Germans.

Marshes and Ditches.

Meanwhile the tactical situation in the Cherbourg peninsula has changed favourably for the Allies. The area is curious from a military point of view because it embodies every type of country. The Carentan area is marshy, and is actually flooded at the moment. This marshy area, intersected with numerous ditches and waterways, extends west Of Carentan for nearly 12 miles. This leaves a gap of some six miles in extent before the western coastline is reached. This gap is for the most part low and well watered: too well-watered for major tank operations. North-west from Carentan a. river curves toward the western coast. It rises, in tact, in marshy ground a few miles from the recent scene of operations in the vicinity of Carteret. The main west road north to Cherbourg runs through this marshy area. It may be said that almost the whole of the area from Carteret to Carentan involves marshes and ditches. It is ideal for defensive purposes and is poor tank and- mechanized country off the roads. The Americans have wisely driven their wedge across the’ peninsula north of this low marshy area. They are thus tolerably secure from effective armoured attack from the south. Meanwhile the German forces trapped in the peninsula must fight it out practically on their own. Hope of relief is decidedly remote. A further deterrent agaiiist attack by German forces from the south is introduced by the American operations toward St. iLo. If extended this must act as a definite threat to the flank of any German forces trying to push north into the .peninsula along the one main road and railway .forming the western route. It yould thus appear that Cherbourg is very seriously threatened. Once St. ILO falls and Allied forces push westward toward Coutanees, 15 miles away, Cherbourg might well be considered doomed.

In a matter of. a few days the siege of Cherbourg will no doubt take definite shape. The high’ground south of the port is cut up by orchards and woods. It is difficult’ country for quick,. results. Nevertheless a trapped-army of some 25,000 cannot continue to fight and to exist indefinitely ,in an area' which shows every sign of rapidly becoming too small to contain it. Moreover, this German hedgehog has sea on three sides. The Allies control the sea and control the air over the hedgehog. The odds are not in favour of protracted resistance. The Germans know It, and the psychological repercussions of this knowledge must affect adversely their will to resist.— EA..A.