ITALIAN CAMPAIGN

Dominion, Volume 37, Issue 195, 16 May 1944, Page 5

ITALIAN CAMPAIGN

Operational Strangle By Allied Forces

AIR pbWER’S APPLICATION

Before the attack jn Italy started, it is stated, the Mediterranean air forces had been making ah all-out effort for a month to strangle the German supply lines. This supplies a clue to the pattern of all the ensuing operations. _ Moreover, it is the first time that an Allied “operation strangle” of this nature has been definitely linked with an attack by ground troops. It is probable that operation strangles will play an increasing part in all attacks. When Great War II started the armies were unprovided/with really satisfactory tank-stopping equipment or dive-bomber antidotes. The weairons of attack were in fact more powerful than the defence against those attacks. The Germans found it possible to overrun areas of the Continent using methods which today would fail. There has been a slow change in defensive equipment proceeding all throiigh the war. Anti-tank guns have improved enormously 'and bazookas and other fancy weapons have appeared. Multiple rocket guns and- specially-equipped aircraft now make tank operations far more perilous than they were. say. in 1940. ■ AU modern armies now make use of the hedgehog system of defence, wMch introduces strongpoints iii depth rather than a narrow trench line. The hedgehog system has provided an excellent answer to mechanized attack. The attacker becomes enmeshed in the enemy’s defensive belt, which consists virtually of scattered fortresses interlinked one with another. Each fortress has to be reduced before progress can be made.. Moreover, the attacker can not remain indefinitely within the enemy hedgehog area, because his own communications become endangered, and it is often not possible in the time available to starve out each hedgehog, which is capable of receiving supplies by air as well as land. . Methods in Italy. An operation strangle is only possible when the‘attacking commander has such complete control of the _ air he can cut and keep cut each link in the communication network behind the main defensive belt held by the enemy. Admittedly the hedgehogs will be well stocked, but their power to resist will diminish in proportion to the pressure applied in the attack. There must come a time, if the strangle is continued, when the entire hedgehog system begins to crumbje. It would seem, therefore, that command or the air gives the attacker a method whereby he can reduce an enemy belt of defences laid ouf on the strongpoint principle in conformity with modern requirements. . Actually our task in Italy js not so simple' as all that. The configuration or the ground favours defence and not attack, and it enables the Germans to modify their strongpoint principle by skilful use of geographical features. Small isolated units in hilly country can be supplied almost indefinitely by air, and can hold up an advance till they are resolved- For that reason alone our advance cannot equal those speetiidular pursuits which were such a feature of our desert victories. The desert dragnet must give way to the oyster-opener, always a tedious operation. Defensive localities fall into two main groups—natural and artificial. Good natural defences are better than artificial defences. This was proved in the desert. But for the natural defences of the Quattara Depression. Rommel would perhaps be in 1 Cairo. The enemy’s artificial defences fell one by one‘as we advanced toward Tunisia; the natural defences at the end proved the tougher proposition. A further factor will affect dur advance in Italy——there are no suitable aerodromes immediately behind the battle line. Maybe it was with this aspect of the advance in view that the Allies occupied the much criticized Anzio bridgehead.— E.A.A.