SINGLE STRATEGY

Dominion, Volume 37, Issue 21, 20 October 1943, Page 5

SINGLE STRATEGY

Case For A General Staff In Pacific LONDON, October 18.. ““The first need of the Allies in the Far East is for a United Nations Pacific General Staff, equipped with a planning staff, which will consider total strategy not in terms of this or that nation, this or that service, this or that front, but in terms of the maximum contribution which each man, plane, and ship can make to common strategy,” says the “Economist,” discussing the Pacific Command. It adds that once such a central authority is established the subordinate problem of overlapping commands and rival strategies will fall into place. The article says that a sudden decisive increase in Allied strength in the lacitic can only come from tbe British side, but it would be folly at this crucial stage of tbe European lighting to drain away the manpower and machines needed tor a filial blow, which, once struck, will release an overwhelming concentration or military power for use against Japan. Till this overwhelming concentration of new force can be applied in the Pacific war it is very doubtful whether the Allies can do much more than they are doing—which is to keep Japans military resources stretching to cracking point and wear them down by a steady and sustained attack on the Japanese periphery. . , . There are encouraging signs flint turn restrained tactic is having severe results for Japan, and that signs of the strain of the Japanese war effort, compared with the blind, spendthrift complacency of the first iveur, show the Allied tactics of “nibbling' nt edges,” however unsensational, are having an effect. After Germany’s Defeat. But the state of the war in the South Seas and the geographical disposition of the forces show that tiny id ore daring strategy demands forces which cannot be released till Germany is defeated. Another reason for this waiting is to see wluit part the Russians are likely to play when Germany is defeated. The article points out that if the Russians decide to remain neutral the attack against Japan will presumably follow in reverse of the Japanese advance of 1942. Whether or not Russia decides to take part, the Allied operation will be a combined operation on a scale never before conceived or attempted, entailing the closest co-operation among _ all three Services “particularly relations between air and sea-power and a ™dical change in the traditional outlook ot the Service leaders.” The “Economist” adds that unless there is some rationalization of the plethora of separate cominands--India, East Asin. China, ami General MacArthur's —(here may well be chaos when tbe lime comes to swing every front forward into violent action. The influential Chungking newspaper “Tukung I’uo” says: “The South-east Asia campaign requires close Chinese cooperation. China cannot play a leading role in Burma, but she has a great responsibility in Indo-Chinn and JJiailajid, both of which belong to the China theatre. „ , ~ “The recapturing of Burma should not be simply n land campaign. Allied landings should ‘be made at Rangoon and even at. ‘Singapore, with General MacArthur’s forces moving nori h ward to meet Lord Mount.batten somewhere in The Japanese expect the war in lhe Ear .East Io last another five years, said a Chilean journalist who is beingropatriatedjrom