RUSSIA’S AUTUMN OFFENSIVE
It is unlikely that the blows launched by Russia last week in the opening of the autumn offensive, which is now making substantial, progress, came as a surprise to the German command. Signs weie not lacking in the news cabled earlier that the. Red Army was preparing to make further efforts to improve its positions before winter closed down on the battle lines. Nevertheless, the enemy may well have been astonished and disconcerted by the weight and extent of the Russian operations. Clearly, the recent Russian pause, contrary to the opinion of certain observers, was not dictated by the weather but by the need to bring up fresh troops and material for the autumn attacks. Now that these attacks have developed they can be seen, to be powerful and sustained in spite of the chill and muddy conditions which must be prevailing northward from the southern-central front. In their first offensive blows five days ago the Russians secuied three bridgeheads on the western bank of the Dnieper River, and also exerted considerable pressure in the north as far as the Leningrad region. Thus their, attacks were directed at the most westerly points of the deep bulge on the long front between Leningrad and the Sea of Azov. These bridgeheads have since been enlarged. Indeed, they are reported to have'broken the “Dnieper line, which Germany has looked upon as a reliable eastern barricade for the winter of 1943-44. Suitable communications are all-important, and the enemy obviously has counted on holding the key railway running north and south in the rear of the line west of the Dnieper. If the Russians accomplish the dislodgement of the Germans from their central line, considerable retirements may be brought about. ; The communiques on Friday last suggested that the enemy, s southern flank protecting the Crimea looked far from safe; and'this has been borne out by a dispatch stating that the Germans., realizing the grave threat to their whole southern forces if their line should crumble in this (the Dnieper) sector and Kiev should fall, are making desperate efforts to throw the Soviet forces back into the river. In addition, the Russian pressure in the north, according to } s such as to cause the enemy to prepare for the evacuation of the Baltic coastal regions—a move which would relieve Leningrad, sevei the German link with the Finnish army and give Russia, vitally-important access to the Baltic. These are some of the possibilities of sive.’ Apart from them, the fact that Russia is attacking powerfully at a time when the campaign was expected to slow down to a winter standstill is unmistakable proof of the Red Army’s tremendous resei ve strength and fighting spirit. The autumn offensive must .be having the effect in Germany of a great additional blow to the declining morale of the people.
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Dominion, Volume 37, Issue 14, 12 October 1943, Page 4
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472RUSSIA’S AUTUMN OFFENSIVE Dominion, Volume 37, Issue 14, 12 October 1943, Page 4
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