RUSSIAN STRATEGY

Dominion, Volume 37, Issue 10, 7 October 1943, Page 5

RUSSIAN STRATEGY

Threat To the “Fatherland Line” Now that the mammoth struggle between the Red Army and the Wehrmacht is in a temporarily static stage because of the autumn conditions and the reaching of the Germans’ “Fatherlaud Line” on the Dnieper a useful opportunity is given to consider the main strategic picture. Freed of all except significant details, the accompanying diagrammatic map shows the principal fronts at present—to the north in White Russia, marked “N”; before Kiev, marked “O”; and. in the south, the Crimea front, marked “8” and divided into “1 ’ and “2”. It will be noted that on the Russian side many main railway lines run toward the front but there is no long railway running north and south close to the battle zone. This lack of a lateral line linking up the armies is a disadvantage to the. Russians. Troops and supplies camiot be moved quickly by rail along the front. The advent of wintry conditions adds to the handicap. On the German side there will be noted a railway running almost north and south from Leningrad to Gomel. The River Dnieper roughly follows the battle front, and it provides a natural obstacle except in the northern attack. It is possible that the coming new offensive phase for the Red Army -will open with a great drive on the Leningrad front. However, for the present one can consider only the existing limits of the offensive. Presumably, the Russians hope to be able shortly to press home their attack in White Russia and force the Germans to withdraw. If they succeed several results would occur. The Leningrad area would become outflanked. Tills might necessitate a German withdrawal from that -area, and the Russians would then gain the Latvian seaboard, necessitating the Germans concentrating their fleet in the Baltic with suitable air

cover. Repercussions from that reach far out into Norway and even the North Sea, The next result from a successful attack in the north area would be to force the German forces to use Gomel as a hinge swinging back from that town to the north of the Pripet Marshes. These marshes are not suitable for wheeled or tank traffic’ even in winter. The German forces would therefore be confronted with (’»' need for a hasty, retirement Or the risk of becoming bailed up on the northern fringes of the marshes. Those armies, moreover, would lose contact with their southern armies, but unless tbe Russians found some way of penetrating through the marshes this would perhaps not be of great strategical significance. The central attack iu toe vicinity of Kiev, if successful, would once iigain bend the German line with Gomel as a hinge. The Germans would then be confronted with problems similar to those to the north of the marshes. The two German forces north and south of the Pripet Marshes, if forced to withdraw beyond and to the west of the marshes, could unite again, assisted by reinforcements, and the Russians would then find themselves with divided armies on either side of the marshes. It will be seen therefore, that these, marshes do not entirely -assist the Russians.

An advance in the centre would certainly assist the Russians in their operations in the south. The southern German armies could not hold on indefinitely to the Crimea if there were large scale withdrawals in the central area. Nevertheless, the southern operation must be considered on its own merit.

This operation consists of two attacks: One north and one east of the Crimea. The attack north of the Crimea is a direct threat to the whole peninsula. The Russians no doubt, hope by exertiug pressure in the Melitopol area to force a German retirement beyond the Crimea, trapping the German armies on the peninsula. This threat alone must inevitably draw large German forces to resist — forces which are therefore unable to -assist elsewhere. The attack to the east of the Crimea is relatively speaking a “mopping-up” phase. The Russians are making every effort to make the Germans withdraw under difficulties across the narrow Kerch Straits. Those that do not get across become prisoners; those that get across may find themselves trapped in the Crimea.

The repercussions from these series of concerted attacks involve questions of major strategy concerning which not even Mr. Churchill is ever constrained to speak with confidence. It is enough to indicate that very large-scale results would be obtained if the Russians do what they presumably hope they will do. Meanwhile winter is crawling down from the north. It is already gripping Finland and is on the fringes of the northern operations. In a few weeks flu- Gomel area will be in the grip of winter. Next month winter will have reached the Crimea.