ALLIED STRATEGY AND LEADERSHIP

Dominion, Volume 36, Issue 107, 30 January 1943, Page 5

ALLIED STRATEGY AND LEADERSHIP

Assessing Casablanca (By Telegraph.—Press Assu.—Copyright.) (Received January 29, 9.50 p.m.) NEW YORK., Jan. 28. The Washington correspondent of the "New York Times, Arthur Krock, assesses the results of the Oasablanca conference as. |.Messrs. Roosevelt and Churchill selected a British and American military leader for the remainder of the North African campaign. , r, d ~ 2.—They planned the military strategy for 1 943 to follow the eviction of the Axis from North Africa, based on an increased assumption of the offensive everywhere, particularly against the submarines. . . 3They laid the groundwork for closer co-operation with Russia and China in the formulation of military and economic decisions which will eventually be reached by a supreme council of the "Big Four,” at. which the views of the other United Nations will have weight. ~<•!• 4.They failed to obtain a satisfactory basis of adjustment of the political differences between the various French factions.

Informed officials in Washington say that the Fighting French faction remains unreconciled to M. Peyroutens appointment in spite of the fact that it was obviously made with the consent of Messrs. Roosevelt and Churchill, who were in Casablanca when Peyrouted arrived in North Africa. Mr. Krock says that for that reason it is clear that the Fighting French are no longer assailing the policy of tlie War Department. and the State Department, but the policy of Messrs. Roosevelt am. Churchill themselves. “Global View Lacking.” "A sense of unfinished business haunts the resounding echoes of the Casablanca conference.” says the New York “Herald-Tribune’’ in an editorial. “It lacked a concrete demonstration that a global war is being waged. Neither the American people nor their leaders yet appreciate what, waging total war implies, since the leaders have not awakened to tlie realism which the situation demands, and they have not yet enforced such realism upon their political, military and diplomatic servants throughout the various complex branches of our war machine. Hence it would be chimerical to expect a global policy to emerge from such confusion in the course of a single conference. "It is not surprising that M. Stalin found himself 100 busy to attend a conference at which he was apparently offered none of the realistic proposals which the Russians well understand to be the essence of war.” “As far as it can be told at present, the story of the conference is complete,” said the President’s secretary, Mr. Stephen Early, to the Washington correspondent of the United Press of America. “Subsequent chapters will undoubtedly be written,” he added. Tlie Chief of the Office of War Information, Mr. Elmer Davis, said the story would be amplified by subsequent military events. He discounted the reports that Finnish, Turkish and Italian representatives attended the conference.

The United Press correspondent, says that the Note front President. Roosevelt and Mr. Cliurcliill to M. Staliu is interpreted as foreshadowing even closer Russian co-ordination in the Allied offensive plans. Policy Against Japan.

Tlie Washington correspondent ot the New York “Herald-Tribune” in a weekly review says that "foreign corespondence suggests that Russia at some later date will take part in the disposing of the Japanese menace. "It is not surprising that Russia refrains from exacerbating her relations witli Tokio while the Nazi danger is so grave, but when the danger is removed it is a fair assumption that tlie forces of tlie four great. Powers will be turned against Japan,” he says. The Chungking correspondent of the “New York Times” says that Chinese officials assume the sincerity of the Casa' blitnea promises to give China all po_s' siblo aid, but it is impossible to avoid an impression that the interest in China which was taken at the conference was at second hand. There is no indication that China will be invited to a I‘our-l’ower council, which in general is regarded not only as bad manners by a nation which places a high value on manners but also as dangerously unwise. Authorities ou lhe Fur East naturally believe that Japan and Germany should be crushed simultaneously, but the authorities understand that every blow against Ger many, as well as tlie sea and air actions in tlie Solomons, is weakening Japan and forestalling an invasion of Australia and New Zealand. The Chinese "Central Daily News sums up lhe Chinese reaction in stat' ing: "Undoubtedly important military developments will follow Casablanca, but lhe official announcement leaves the question of u foitr-Power council unanswered and the Far Eastern military situation unchanged.” The Chinese Central news Agency in Chungking says that lhe Casablatiea conference was the most important event, since the joint United Nations declaration early in 1912, ami it is particularly welcomed in Chua. Japan Afterward.

"The Allies have re-emphasized their decision to smash Germany before they turn on Japan." declares the New 5 ork "Daily News.” which adds: "Nothing the Australian ITiim- Minister or anybody else says can chaiigi- that decision. Mr. Uiii-fiii's remark about Hie Soiilh-wesi Pacific being in the tmuils of a mere earetakor was one of tiie few sour notes in the t'asablam-a symphony.'' Other American newspapers share the. view that tlie Casald.-inca conference affirmed tlie Allied decision to smash Hitler first.