THE DRIVE ON TRIPOLI
Jt is remarked by a London Times correspondent at Cairo that General Alontgomery is not out for sensationalism in his drive to Tripoli, from which his advance troops in the southern sectoi aic now only forty miles distant. Ihe fact, however, remains that the whole of the Eighth Army’s campaign from the start of the British offensive from El Alamein has been a series of sensational episodes and achievements. Only a few days ago commentate! s weie specti lating about what kind of stand Rommel would make, and where, since his retirement from El Agheila. A stubborn defence was expected in the Buerat-Misurata area. But those places are things of the past, and this is what we now read from Reuters correspondent: a bound of 50 miles in 24 hours, fast armoured columns of the Eighth Army are tonight closing in on Tripoli.” In the light of Rommel’s past record as a resolute commander and skilful desert tactician his present apparent disinclination to give battle in defence of his position must seem puzzling, and has even prompted the question whether, as one commentator has put it, he has “something up his sleeve.” On the other hand, Rommel piesumably is a realist who recognizes what in this case appeals to be the inevitable. What seems clear is that the winning factors on General Montgomery's side have been air superiority, the utmost co-ordination between air and land forces, and speed in advance when advance has been got well under way. Rommel had all these advantages on his side in the earlier stages of the fighting in Libya, but they have been progressively weakened by the pounding received from the Eighth Army when-. General Montgomery launched his offensive from the Egyptian border at El Alamein, by the raiding of his sea tianspoits, and the swing of the balance of resources over to the Allies by the steady stream of reinforcements and munitions which flowed along the long haul round the Cape to Egypt. In these circumstances the suggestion made by some observers of recent events that Rommel may be endeavouring to save his re-sources-for a junction with the Axis forces in Tunisia would seem reasonable —not an improbable move for a general commanding a defeated, retreating, and constantly harassed army to make. It would seem impossible for an army so stricken to maintain its fighting moi ale while under almost incessant fire from the air, both by day and by night, and from several directions, from the east, from the west, and even from Malta.
Permanent link to this item
Hononga pūmau ki tēnei tūemi
https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/DOM19430121.2.31
Bibliographic details
Ngā taipitopito pukapuka
Dominion, Volume 36, Issue 99, 21 January 1943, Page 4
Word count
Tapeke kupu
426THE DRIVE ON TRIPOLI Dominion, Volume 36, Issue 99, 21 January 1943, Page 4
Using this item
Te whakamahi i tēnei tūemi
Stuff Ltd is the copyright owner for the Dominion. You can reproduce in-copyright material from this newspaper for non-commercial use under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International licence (CC BY-NC-SA 4.0). This newspaper is not available for commercial use without the consent of Stuff Ltd. For advice on reproduction of out-of-copyright material from this newspaper, please refer to the Copyright guide.