EFFECT ON PACIFIC WAR

Dominion, Volume 36, Issue 37, 7 November 1942, Page 7

EFFECT ON PACIFIC WAR

“Beat Hitler First” Plan U.S. SOLOMONS DEFEAT NARROWLY AVERTED (By Telegraph.—Press Assn. Copyright.) OW YORK, November 5. ■New strategic factors affecting the war in the Pacific and the broad relation. to global strategy are discussed in the “Christian Science Monitor” by Joseph C. Harsch and Guenther Stein, the latter writing from Chungking. Mr. Harsch says that the loss of the American foothold in the Solomons was averted only l>y a hairbreadth, and that defeat for the Americans would have meant the loss of the supply line to Australia aftd exposed Australia and New Zealand to siege without any serious prospect of relief, and exposed Hawaii to a flank, as well as a frontal, attack, freeing Japan for an attack on India, China or Siberia. In other words, Japan would have been clpse to securing a firm grip on all “We almost lost the naval battle in the Solomons, and our land position as a corollary, because a email proportion of total American military power was bearing the brunt of an attack by probably two-thirds of the entire Japanese fleet and an equal proportion of Japan’s mobile air force,” he said. “We are trying to do so much against heavy odds because of the dispositions of our forces under the broad plan to 'beat Hitler first.’ Pacific as Holding Front. "Under this plan it was contemplated that the Pacific would be a holding front on which the Pacific fleet, with small army forces, would hold the line to Australia via Samoa, Fiji, and New Caledonia, while a major effort would be made to smash Hitler quickly. This plan might have worked satisfactorily if a second front had been established. “If a second front was really intended, the time for it was when the Germans were trying to capture Stalingrad Probably the answer to the question, ‘What happened to the (second front.?’ is that it was sunk in the Caribbean in recent months, when U-boats deprived the United States of enough ships to guarantee an adequate stream of supplies and replacements for a landing on the French coast. “When the Continental second front disappeared for 1942 it changed the picture on all fronts. “The United States was caught witli a major concentration of land and naval forces in the Atlantic which, if they had been used, would have lifted the German pressure from Russia and thereby increased Japan’s concern about its dormant Siberian front. ‘Thus Japan had no worry except the minor American forces, and had a perfect opportunity to catch us at a disadvantage. That Japan made the attempt emphasized the fact that-the present American defence line in the Pacific is not good enough while we are trying to beat Hitler first. The idea is now emerging that we can concentrate for a big drive against Hitler we may have to lake time to erect a defence line in the Pacific which can be held. “The minimum defence line would include all New Guinea and the Bismarck Archipelago, with Rabaul firmly in our hands', the Gilberts and Wake Island. We also should have Borneo, from which to harry the enemy’s supplies and communications.” Japan's Shipping Worries.

Mr. Guenther Stein sees strong indications that the shipping situation is giving Toklo cause for more worry than was expected. This worry is not yet about, the maintenance of the present Hues of communication, but certainly in connexion with the tempting project of attacking Australia 01 India. ... Japan might toe able to ship to Aus-

tralia or India sufficient troops and material to launch a fairly powerful offensive, but Australia and India are prepared for strong resistance. Hitler’s failure in Russia and Egypt allows the Allies to eend reinforcemerits at a progressive rate so that the struggle following ihe Japanese invasion would certainly be more grim and longer than it might have been in the event of decisive German successes.

Therefore, Japan lias every reason to believe she is unable to provide sufficient supplies and reinforcements to maintain whatever foothold her troops might gain either in Australia or India.

The only remaining possibility for Japan to make offensive use of its relatively large anmy reserves would be to start a fresh offensive in China, but all indieationp point in the opposite direction. Chinese circles believe that Japan wil continue to concentrate on naval and aerial warfare, mainly in the Solomons, New Guinea, and the northern Australia area.

Otherwise, it is believed, Japan has already- gone on the defensive.