SOUTHERN STRATEGY

Dominion, Volume 36, Issue 32, 2 November 1942, Page 5

SOUTHERN STRATEGY

Enemy’s Hope To Choke Off U.S. Threat (Received November 1, 11.5 p.m.) NEW YORK, October 31. "Military developments between Japan and America have ceased to be a battle for the Solomons and become a battle for the South-west Pacific, writes Joseph Harsdh, who till iecentiy was the “Christian .Science Monitor’s” war correspondent in Aw>tf He adds: “The initiative lies in Japanese hands, as our forces cannot break off the action without exposin 3 the America-Australia supply lines. “The occupation of Guadalcanal by the Americans was the first challenge to the southward infiltration of the Japanese, but not a vital challenge. Why did the Japanese decide to make a serious issud in the Solomons, though India seems a more desirable Prize than,Australia and New Zealand; “The answer is that Japan will not be distracted by morsels of loot from the major business of securing and defending her new-won empire. Events have proved that the’ United States i the only enemy who is able to challenge Japan. Greatest Single Threat.

“The objective of the Japanese in the Guadalcanal campaign, therefore, is more than to wipe out a loss of face. It is a continuation of Japan’s creeping campaign further south and westward, by which the Japanese hope to choke off the greatest single danger to their conquests—the United States. . “Our only consolation is that it is unlikely tliat Japan will attack on any other front while the present campaign continues in the Solomons. But our forces are being pounded so heavily that a fulfilment of the suggestions which have been heard of a. second front to be opened by the British in Burma might be helpful.” The former Tokio correspondent of the “New York Times,” Otto Tolischus, addressing the China Society in New York, emphasized the importance of holding the Solomon Islands “in order to prevent the invasion of Australia.” Mr. Tolischus said that this, together with an invasion of Siberia, was Japan’s principal objective.